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Preface
Increasingly, the specter of technological risk is haunting modern
culture. From the newly discovered sulfites in our beer and
urethane in our wine to questions of too much ozone in the lungs
or too little in the atmosphere, to the choice between losing
equity in a house contaminated by dioxin or remaining in a con-
dition of imminent danger, we face a kaleidoscope of technologi-
cal risks. The origin of these threats and how they are distributed
symbolize the relationship people have to one another and to
their environment.
Many voices condemn errant technology as the source of most
modern day risks. Machines, they argue, are polluting the gar-
den. Others blame overpopulation and the increasing demand
on the world's resources as the cause of technological expansion
and increasing risks. Still others find the consumptive habits of
modern families fueling the technological engine and its dan-
gerous effiuents. This story about a mine fire in Centralia, Penn-
sylvania, and the stories of dozens of other neighborhoods
polluted by the products of industrial technology, suggest that
the real source of modern technological risk is the relationship
between technology and modes ofeconomic production designed
to produce things faster and cheaper by allocating the hazardous
byproducts ofproduction to those most defenseless against them.
These modern tragedies also illustrate the inability of govern-
ment to develop effective policies to prevent the growth and
spread of technological hazards and to respond adequately to
technological catastrophes when they do occur.
While all of the above is largely true of industrial societies,
be they capitalist or socialist, the process by which technological
risks are developed and dealt with differs depending on the social
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modes of economic production. Marx recognized early that hu-
man health and the social fabric of communities are parts of the
environment that capitalist social relations manipulate for ex-
pansion and profit. People and their communal lives are part of
the resources that other people exploit for market purposes. It
is our belief that this book and others on towns and neighbor-
hoods ravaged by environmental contaminants illustrate a need
to ponder anew the problem of social justice. As long as we
believe that the welfare of society is linked to monopoly capital
expansion-that a just society is based on converting the natural
environment into corporate profit and distributing the productive
wastes to the relatively powerless and less advantaged-there
will be books to write and lectures to attend about local towns
and neighborhoods contaminated by the wastes of modernity.
Whatever strengths this book possesses have required the
work and good will of many people. Several research assistants
helped us at various stages of the project. Barbara Knox Hom-
righaus, Susan Kroll-Smith, Ronald Andruscavage, and Michael
J. Kryjak, in particular, provided a valuable service in gathering
and coding historical and field data. Thanks also go to the Cen-
tralia high school students who helped gather survey data; to the
several undergraduates who coded survey data; and to Marianne
Pindar who supervised the coding. Three people deserve special
recognition: Jim Staudenmeier, whose faith in the project, if not
in all our reasons for requiring additional money and time, helped
to sustain the research in its critical early stages; Frank Clemente,
whose support as our department head was unflagging; and Lau-
ren McCallum, whose substantive and editorial suggestions
added appreciable to the quality of this book. We must recognize
the fine bibliographic support provided by Hazleton Campus
librarian Richard Tyee and his colleagues Kathleen Stone and
Dolores Mhley. Appreciation also goes to Rick Cannella for re-
cording parts of the Centralia story on film. The following col-
leagues and friends donated their insights, ideas, and criticisms
to early drafts of the manuscript: Margaret Cote, Bill Ellis, Paul
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Lukehart, Joe Marchesani, Donald Miller, and Alan Price. We
extend special thanks to Adeline Levine, whose close reading of
an early draft provided many important insights and whose own
work on the Love Canal served as a valuable guide and inspi-
ration.
Many organizations also deserve recognition for their assist-
ance. Chief among them is Penn State, which provided financial
support through a Research Initiation Grant and several grants
from the Faculty Scholarship Support Fund. The Hazleton and
· Schuylkill Campuses of Penn State also helped by providing us
with reassigned time with which to carry out this project. We
also appreciate the clerical and typing skills of many members
of the university staff, especially Jane Cochran and Marie Kahler.
Special thanks are also due to the Pennsylvania National Bank,
which provided us with a small grant and with office space in
Centralia, and to the law firm of Spiegel and McDermott, which
gave us access to its nonconfidential Centralia-related records.
Kroll-Smith also wants to thank Tom Burns, a mentor and
friend whose felicity with symbolic thought keeps him thinking
about the deep meaning of almost everything, including this
work. In addition, Kroll-Smith owes special thanks to Joe Tam-
ney, Sam Klausner, Victor Lidz, and Diane Crane, his teachers
at Ball State and the University of Pennyslvania. He also wants
to recognize Sam Garula, a cherished friend whose special tal-
ents helped make this book, and Centralia's relocation, a reality.
Finally, and with an appropriate shift to the first person, lowe
a deep debt to Susan Kroll-Smith for reminding me that, in the
end, relationships are more important than books.
Couch extends special appreciation to his mentors at Oberlin
College and S. U.N. Y. Binghamton, most especially to Steve Cut-
ler, John Flint, Terry Hopkins, Kiyoshi Ikeda, Jim Walsh, and
Milt Yinger, and to a former colleague at the Smithsonian In-
stitution, Roy Bryce-Laporte, who in very different but important
ways taught him to appreciate and make sense of the depth and
complexity of social life. He also wishes to thank his wife, Kathy
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Couch, and his daughter Amanda Couch who, unable to be at
the starting gate of this project, gave much support down the
home stretch.
We dedicate this book to the few present and many former
residents of Centralia.
Introduction:
A Dying Coal Town
Northern Appalachia is a region of contrasts. In some ways it is
like other predominantly rural areas of the Northeast. In some
ways it resembles the rest of Appalachia to the south. In others
ways it is unique.
Many of the contrasts are quickly apparent to visitors who
drive south from Danville, Pennsylvania, on State Route 54. Mile
after mile of rich farmland stretches among rolling hills, dotted
with handsome farm buildings and occasional suburban ranch
houses. As the hills give way to more mountainous terrain, the
farms become fewer and the rich black soil fades away into
patches ofgray-red dust. The skyline is dominated by mountains.
On some are large black patches where vegetation once grew;
others look as if their sides have been gouged out; still others
end abruptly in flat tops, as if their heads have been cut off. Tall
pines and stately maples and oaks give way to small white birches
sticking precariously like pins out of the sides of the mountains.
After merging with Route 61 the road widens to four lanes
and crosses an area formerly strip-mined for coal, now a black,
desolate plain. Five miles later the highway enters the Borough
of Centralia. Not long ago, well-kept single-family homes and
row houses lined the street. But now, in the spring of 1985,
Centralia has the appearance of a ghost town-or, more accu-
rately, a town that is dying. Interspersed among the occupied
homes are boarded-up houses, their paint peeling and their lawns
unkempt.
Beyond a neat white Methodist church and a few shops, a stop
sign marks the center of downtown. A couple of customers walk
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into the Pennsylvania National Bank's small branch office; a few
teenagers hang out at the cycle shop. This is a small town in very
slow motion.
After Route 61 turns right at the stop sign, it climbs a hill past
more boarded-up homes and businesses. A VFW post still op-
erates in a building set back from the road but all around are
vacant lots bearing the scars of recent demolition, posted with
Keep Off signs. A small building that looks like a former church
is identified by a sign as a teen center, now abandoned. So far
there is not even a clue as to why the town is dying.
At the crest of the hill lie a handsome Roman Catholic church
and rectory, with a parochial school across the street. Just beyond
the school stands a patch of dead trees. On a clear dry day, there
is nothing more threatening to be seen. But when the tempera-
ture is cool and the air is moist, white steam pours from the
ground around the trees and blows across the road. The very
roots of the trees appear to be smoldering, but no flames are
seen-only billowing clouds of acrid steam. To the right, steam
oozes eerily from the side of a small hill. Even the rocks seem
to be blasted white from the heat beneath. At night, when the
weather is damp and chilly, a couple of low-wattage street lights
serve only to illuminate the gaseous steam that belches from the
earth. There is an almost overwhelming sense that danger is
close.
Like many anthracite coal mining communities, the Borough
of Centralia is dying. But the immediate cause of its destruction
is unique: an underground mine fire that has been burning for
a quarter of a century, like an insidious environmental demon
far below the earth's surface. Just as coal was the reason for its
birth, coal is now the agent of Centralia's death.
From the founding of the borough in 1866, life in Centralia
revolved around the mining and processing of anthracite coal.
The decline of the anthracite industry during the first half of this
century brought down the population of Centralia along with it.
By mid-century, most of the thousand or so inhabitants were
elderly and poor or working class.
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The fire that is eating away at Centralia originated in 1962 in
a garbage dump on an abandoned mine stripping at the south-
eastern edge of the borough. When the initial fire-fighting efforts
failed, the blaze ignited an outcropping of coal. From there it
spread underground into the abandoned mine shafts that ho-
neycomb the ground under and around Centralia. State and fed-
eral governments spent over $5 million over the following two
decades without halting the fire's underground march.
Despite the failure to contain or extinguish it, the under-
ground monster did little visible damage for years. But in 1969
carbon monoxide gas drove three Centralia families from their
homes. In 1976 carbon monoxide in a concentration twenty times
the lethal dose for a human being was found pouring from a
borehole twenty-seven feet from the doorstep of another Cen-
tralia home. In 1979 a service station was ordered closed because
of rising gasoline temperatures in its underground storage tanks.
The following year the federal government purchased seven bor-
ough properties considered to be unsafe; others followed. More
and more residents complained of physical illness that they at-
tributed to the fire.
A turning point came on Valentine's Day in 1981, when a
twelve-year-old boy fell into a cave-in caused by the mine fire
and escaped death only be grasping onto an exposed tree root.
Several Centralians responded to this near-tragedy by forming
a community action group to push for an adequate governmental
response. But instead of rushing to join the new group, most
Centralia residents became hostile toward its members. Gov-
ernment efforts to control the fire continued to fail. Public meet-
ings, scheduled more frequently, became occasions for residents
to express bitter hostility against the government and against
each other. This small-town community became the scene of
telephone threats, tire slashings, and a fire bombing. No fewer
than seven grassroots community organizations sprang up among
the one thousand inhabitants, each group offering a different
perspective and proposals, and each prepared to fight for its
views.
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In July of 1983 a resolution of one sort was achieved when a
government-sponsored engineering study judged the fire to be
even worse than anyone had thought. It concluded that if left to
burn itselfout, the fire would make all ofCentralia uninhabitable,
but continued efforts to control or extinguish the blaze would
also make life in Centralia intolerable. The solution: Centralia
must go. In October of 1983 the u.s. Congress authorized the
sum of $42 million dollars for purchase of Centralians' property.
The vast majority of Centralians accepted the government's offer
to buy their property, and the relocation is now under way.
But the costs of the Centralia mine fire cannot be measured
merely in terms of property loss, ill health, poor financial posi-
tion, or environmental degradation. Other losses are less tangible
in nature but no less painful. The Centralia story is one of resi-
dents who lost faith in government and in each other. It is the
story of rancorous discord as neighbor blamed neighbor for the
protracted trauma that threatened to continue without end. It is
the story of an ecological disaster that stripped away the facade
of community to reveal a segmented, uncoordinated collective
that was ill prepared to unite in the interests of the town as a
whole. It is the story of municipal government, citizens' groups,
and informal cliques bringing unrealistic grievances against in-
appropriate targets through ineffective strategies. It is the story
of a village unable to invoke criteria of shared experience or
communal affiliation to interpret or resolve its crisis.
This book examines a small town's response to an increasingly
common type of adversity, the chronic technological disaster.
We will look closely at the frantic and largely futile search within
Centralia for a medium of discourse agreeable to a majority of
resident for defining the scope and seriousness of a long-term,
human-caused disaster that could be eased or extinguished only
by technological intervention. We will show how the complicated
and confusing phenomena of risk perception and threat beliefs
aggravated the rancorous conflict within the town. We will also
follow the path of a disaster agent that resisted the intervention
of expensive, sophisticated, cutting-edge technology, posing
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unique problems for legislators, scientists, and, most of all, the
affected community.
The Centralia story is a tale complicated by the power of
technological reasoning to preclude other, arguably more appro-
priate, modes of defining issues. Decisions of a technological
nature in fact masked political choices, while the community was
too conflict-ridden to demand prompt, effective action. Ironies
abound. For example, a sense of community began to emerge
in Centralia only when the death of the community was assured.
And when government finally took decisive action, it was to buy
and demolish Centralia, not to save it.
The residents' own words lend human proportions to the
trauma of the Centralia experience. Consider the interpretations
that several Centralians gave to their experiences of the fire,
particularly how they interpreted the rancorous response of their
neighbors to the underground blaze. In their blunt and honest
appraisals, the tragedy that befell the town is thrown into sharp
perspective:
Centralia went from a community that was almost placid . . .
to a community that's in a constant turmoil. It's divided neighbor-
hoods. It's created groups that work against each other. It's made
me cynical in lots of ways. It's made me doubt the intentions of
people. All the rumors of the coal and the money and the deals and
all that stuff.... It makes me not want to participate. I'm sick to
death of it. I go through these gamuts, from really caring what
happens, to not giving a damn at all.
Centralia is like someone you know who is slowly dying of cancer;
I mean, every time you turn around there is another part of town
that's infected. If we would just get together we could fight this
cancer. But people around here are more concerned with them-
selves than with their neighbors. Rumors, hostileness, prejudice,
backbiting ... this town's more sick than the fire.
The fire has split up people. It has torn people apart, you
know-divided us. We're divided this and that way. We are worse
than a pie cut into eight pieces.
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We've lived in this town for forty-six years. We had a chance to
move twice, but for me this was a good place to raise my kids. Now
I want out. This fire has made people mean. Anymore, I can't even
walk down to pick up my mail without someone glaring at me or,
worse, calling me a name; and these people were once my friends.
People hold grudges in this town. They don't forget. And I'll tell
you, I no longer respect people unconditionally. Conditional re-
spect, that's what the fire has taught me. That is what it has taught
me as a parent and I will pass it on to my children.
These passages suggest that the disaster in Centralia turned
it into a place of little compassion, a town where neighbors were
unwilling to care for one another, where friendships could not
survive-a town, in short, that experienced an ecological crisis
as a profound social and personal tragedy.
The social reality we are setting out to explain is the destructive
community conflict that characterized Centralia's response to a
twenty-five-year-old mine fire. The literature suggests that the
social response to most disasters includes the development of a
"therapeutic community," in which residents band together to
help each other cope with the catastrophe. In this altruistic co-
alescence, community ties are strengthened and mutual coop-
eration is increased. In Centralia, however, the community
suffered from sever, debilitating conflict. Instead of aiding and
cooperating with each other, neighbor struggled against neigh-
bor, creating as much havoc aboveground as the fire created
below.
As sociologists, we faced many difficult decisions about how
to study a town in the throes of social and moral collapse: What
methods should we employ and how much should we become
involved in the community's efforts to reach a consensus on its
problem? We refer the reader to appendix A for a discussion of
the ethical and methodological issues we wrestled with through-
out the course of this project.
We drew on data from several sources to capture the unique
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sociological dimensions of Centralia's trauma: historical records;
field data in the form of participant observation and in-depth
interviews; a community survey; a self-reporting stress study;
and such documentary accounts as government reports and news-
paper articles.
As in all communities, Centralia's social structure and culture
developed over time, making a knowledge of Centralia's history
essential. With the aid of two research assistants, we assembled
and examined historical material to piece together a picture of
the economic, social, and cultural development of the borough.
The material included official documents, such as tax records,
deeds, and minutes of the meetings of the Borough Council and
community groups; correspondence and other personal records;
and secondary historical material on Centralia and the rest of the
anthracite region.
We began collecting field data in the fall of 1981 and continued
fieldwork throughout the project. Accompanied by a research
assistant, we attended public meetings, festivities, and church
services; observed community life on the street, in public build-
ings, and in residents' homes; and carried on informal discussions
with borough residents, government officials, and representa-
tives of private social agencies. The fieldwork intensified in
March 1983, when Stephen Kroll-Smith moved into Centralia.
Renting a house for eight months in an area officially called the
fire's "impact zone," he was able to observe and experience daily
life in a hazardous area, as well as the response of local govern-
ment and citizens' groups to the mine fire.
Kroll-Smith conducted in-depth, extended interviews ofthirty-
four adult residents during 1982 and 1983, using snowball sam-
pling techniques. The open-ended, taped interviews, which
lasted from one to three hours, investigated the residents' per-
ceptions ofsmall-town life, the mine fire, and community and gov-
ernmental response to it, as well as the significance of personal
and collective religious faith when a community is in crisis.
The community survey was conducted during August 1982.
Questionnaires, primarily in the form of closed-ended questions,
8 The Real Disaster
were distributed door-to-door to all adult residents of the bor-
ough and collected by the survey team two days later. A total of
368 people, or 56.9 percent of Centralia's adult population at the
time, returned the questionnaires. The information collected in-
cludes demographic, socioeconomic, and attitudinal data, and
residents' perceptions of their community and the mine fire.
With the cooperation of two nurses and a research assistant,
we conducted a resident-reporting stress study during late 1984
and early 1985. Thirty-five respondents, selected on the basis of
home location within the town, were interviewed for one to two
hours each. Questions attempted to discover residents' percep-
tions of the amount and sources of stress in their lives.
In the last segment of our research, we examined the volu-
minous government correspondence, memos, and technical re-
ports on Centralia and a complete file of local newspaper articles.
These data throw much light on the chronology of events in
Centralia and on the response to the fire by local, state, and
national governments and organizations. Our studies extended
to the relationship of the press itself to community discord.
Throughout this study three fundamental assumptions guided
our analysis and structured our arguments. l
Our first assumption is that human social life must be viewed
in an ecological context, as an integral part of the ecological
system. Accordingly, this study views the mine fire as an aversive
agent interrupting the normal exchanges between a community
and its environment, substituting a new context and shaping the
social response.
We further argue that a typology of disasters can be con-
structed on the basis of two dimensions-the duration of the
disaster and the degree of human-technological involvement in
its cause or abatement. A natural disaster may be sudden (as in
an earthquake) or of long duration (as in a prolonged drought),
whereas a technological disaster may continue for years, like the
mine fire, or strike quickly, like the disaster at Bhopal. These
characteristics can help to predict the social response to the
disaster.
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In ordinary usage, the word "disaster" is associated with aver-
sive agents that strike swiftly and disappear just as suddenly,
leaving in their wake destruction and probable death. A tidal
wave rolling over a shoreline village is a massive, unrelenting
reality that is unequivocally interpreted and responded to as a
disaster. With little collective doubt about what occurred and
how it should be interpreted, extra-local governments and social
service agencies declare the site a disaster area, in need of relief
and rehabilitation. At the local level, a therapeutic community
can be expected to emerge, expanding the day-to-day roles of
citizens and organizations within the community to meet the
immediate needs of the injured, the homeless, and the grief-
stricken.
What we shall call the chronic technological disaster (or CTD)
has quite different characteristics. A CTD, such as contamination
by dioxin or asbestos, lasts longer and is considerably harder to
detect. Related to the difficulty in detection is the difficulty in
assessing the long-term consequences. With CTDs it is fre-
quently difficult to identify the victims objectively. Moreover,
the varying ways in which people experience the disaster agent
can be expected to result in significant differences in their sub-
jective assessments of its potential for harm. Since a CTD is
manmade, its abatement or disposal demands sustained tech-
nological intervention. In other words, a unique pattern of psy-
chological, social, and cultural disruption characterizes the CTD.
Our second assumption in dealing with the effects of disaster
is that a community's social and cultural history shapes its ability
to respond to the events and forces that challenge it. The local
social, economic, and political structures are the vehicles by
which collective responses flow. The local culture is the source
of the conceptual, emotional, and physical resources by which a
threat is defined, meanings are determined, and responses are
launched.
At this level of analysis it is particularly important to under-
stand the differences between Centralia and the prototypical
small town. Founded in 1866 as a small anthracite mining village,
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Centralia grew to harbor a mixed ethno-religious population
while remaining predominantly working class. Life in the bor-
ough depended almost solely on the extraction, processing, and
shipping of anthracite coal. The mines, collieries, and many of
the area's businesses and homes were owned by absentee coal
operators who dominated community decision-making. Coal
profits, far from benefiting the long-term development of Cen-
tralia itself, flowed out of the borough and into capitalist ventures
in major cities along the eastern seaboard. Given the unstable
nature of the mining industry, Centralia's population was in a
state of constant flux, as miners and their families moved into
the area in great numbers during times of prosperity, only to
move on when the local economy turned sour. There was little
sense of community, and group attachment within Centralia was
restricted to family, church, and ethnic group.
The dependent, fragmented structure ofthe community, tenu-
ously adapted to a single-industry economy, was poorly prepared
to adjust to the decline of coal. As with the entire region, Cen-
tralia was deprived of the economic and human capital to attract
substantial new industry; the structures and cultures of a coal-
based economy were ill suited to new technologies. Frozen in
time, social structures and cultural norms have changed little up
to the present day, long after the economy for which they were
suited has vanished. At the community level, then, Centralia's
collective life can be characterized as weak and overadapted; the
traditional community could not serve residents as a supportive
context from which to organize a collective response to the un-
derground fire.
Our third and final assumption is that a community is not only
part of an ecological system but also ofa larger social system with
which it interacts constantly. Small towns are always more or
less affected by their relationships with the larger social entity;
they are especially affected by that system, however, in times of
collective crises. In the case of a chronic technological disaster,
a community's response is shaped Significantly by its relationship
to remote centers of power and influence.
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In Centralia's case, state and federal government agencies
were the primary actors at the extra-local level. These agencies
have three characteristics that emerged as critical to this study.
First, they are remote from Centralia in terms of geography,
culture, and power; with values and world views widely divergent
from those of small coal towns, influential government agencies
are unlikely to be sensitive to the needs and desires of small,
politically weak communities. From a distance they are even
more likely to be perceived by community residents as uncaring
and insensitive, an irritant to the very communities they are
mandated to assist.
State and federal agencies, being bureaucratic, are governed
by written rules and regulations, but there are no laws or regu-
lations, and few precedents, for dealing with chronic technolog-
ical disasters. Instead, the situation calls for innovation-the
second shortfall of the government agencies in Centralia. Bur-
eaucracies, like a community itself, are least likely to innovate
effectively when the situation begs for intervention but lacks any
precedent.
Complicating such situations, extra-local government power
is decentralized, with a multitude of agencies at various levels
sharing responsibility in any given policy area. This decentrali-
zation greatly lessens governmental ability to make policies work,
aside from the fact that environmental policies themselves are
frequently unclear and conflicting. Given the diffusion of au-
thority and the considerable expense of ameliorating a chronic
technological disaster, agencies may be expected to differ as to
where responsibility lies.
Moreover, confronted with a technological problem that ad-
mits of many competing solutions-none of them certain, all of
them expensive-and faced with a hostile community, no matter
how powerless, the agency response is likely to favor short-term
problem management and containment rather that long-term
solution. Indeed, a primary goal of the agency might be seen as
minimizing political damage to the agency itself at a minimum
outlay of public expenditures.
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Another source of extra-local response to the Centralia mine
fire was the social service sector. Several agencies, including
Catholic Social Services, Rural American Women, and Ralph
Nader's Public Interest Research Coalition, offered tactical and
financial support to various citizens' groups within the commu-
nity. A social service agency has a vested interest in defining a
problem in terms consistent with its mandate, ensuring that some
claims about the severity and scope of the mine fire crisis would
be supported, while others would be challenged. These agencies
played an important, though unwitting, role in fostering com-
munity discord while at the same time meeting the concrete
needs of many individuals and a few of the groups in Centralia.
In the next three chapters we examine Centralia's history, the
history of the mine fire and the response of government agen-
cies to it, and the rise among residents of the town of multiple
interpretations ofwhat was happening. Next we describe the first
grass-roots response to the fire, analyze the conflicts that de-
veloped as competing groups emerged, and describe how Cen-
tralia's fate was at last sealed. In the concluding chapter, we try
to make sociological sense of the story by comparing some key
elements of natural calamities with those of chronic technologi-
cal disasters.
In the appendix, we justify our decision to focus on the impact
of citizens' groups, government intervention, and the uncertain
march of the mine fire on the community. We discuss the meth-
odological difficulties that followed the decision to make the com-
munity, and not any particular group, our unit of analysis.
Readers with methodological interests may want to read the ap-
pendix before continuing with the story.
1. King Coal Built a Town
but Not a Community
A little over a century ago, the anthracite coal mining region of
Pennsylvania was embroiled in one of the more famous labor
conflicts in American history. A major part in this conflict was
played by the Molly Maguires, a clandestine Irish organization
considered by some to be the champions of liberty and by others,
anarchic terrorists.
According to local legend, the Mollies accosted the rector of
St. Ignatius Roman Catholic Church in Centralia and beat him
up because ofhis staunch opposition to them. The priest returned
to the church, rang the bell to summon his congregation, and in
his anger pronounced a curse on Centralia, condemning it to
destruction. A century later, the town is dying-although the
effectiveness of the historical curse is open to debate.
There is no question, however, that in less dramatic ways the
past of a community affects its present. It is the past that shapes
the patterns in which a community responds to crises, the re-
sources available for response, and the culture that interprets
crises and channels the reaction. Much as an individual reacts
to crises on the basis of a personality shaped by past experiences,
the community response is based on social and cultural patterns
developed through decades of collective experience.
Centralians view their history in terms quite different from
what we discovered about the town's past. When asked to assess
the damages wrought by the mine fire and the bitter conflict that
it ignited, many Centralians mourned the decline and death of
a close-knit community. "Centralia," they said, "is not like it used
to be."
"There was a time," mused one resident, "when people
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trusted one another here.... This was a real town once, not
one of those cities where people get mugged while their neigh-
bors watch. We lived in Philadelphia once but moved back be-
cause it was what we wanted. Now, with this fire, we might as
well be back in the city."
For many residents ofCentralia, the mine fire destroyed tradi-
tional bases for communal identity and action. Another Central-
ian put it this way: "The young families, they may not remember
[when things were different]; this thing [the fire] has been going
on for over twenty years now. They may have known nothing
but the fire. That's been their whole life, the fire. But I've lived
in this town for seventy-two years. This fire has torn our guts
out. ... [This] used to be the friendliest town. Didn't matter
what the problem was, six people would be there to lend a hand.
"I've lived in this town all my life, and I can tell by looking
at you I'm old enough to be your grandfather. Things was dif-
ferent here before this crazy fire business. This was a good place
to live. People could rely on one another, not like now.
. . . People was proud to call themselves Centralians. We're a
laughingstock now. When I go out of town I don't want nobody
to know I'm from this crazy town."
The media, government representatives, and social service
agencies served to intensify residents' perception of a once vital
settlement now dying in the grip of an underground monster.
Centralians were frequently exhorted by agency personnel and
legislators to put aside their differences and revitalize a shared
past wherein behavior was governed by common bonds rather
than by individual or factional interests. The image of the "old
Centralia" as a close-knit community lost to the ravages of an
underground fire was nurtured by the popular media. In news-
papers, television, and a documep.tary film, Centralians were
given the opportunity to reaffirm their perception of a past, now
dying, in which the crucial quality oflife was the sense ofcommon
purpose in a small town.
If such personal perceptions were relatively accurate portray-
als of the "old Centralia," we would have expected residents
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confronted with a protracted crisis to be capable of organizing
effectively, of pooling their resources in a coordinated way to
achieve some resolution to their predicament. But Centralians'
response to the mine fire was anything but coordinated.
The apparent discrepancy between Centralians' accounts of a
shared past and their rancorous discord in responding to the fire
in part reflects the gap that separated the subjective construction
of the community's past from what is objectively known about
its evolution. Historical remembrances may tell us more about
the residents' present state of mind than about what actually
happened. Remembering the "old Centralia" in terms akin to
the classic primary group is less a response to recorded history
than it is a reaction to present scarcities. 1 It is a perception rooted
not in historical experience but in the desire for collective re-
sources not available in the present. In short, in recalling their
past people in the town were engaging in the invention of tra-
dition, more popularly called nostalgia.
An examination of Centralia's history fails to reveal an "old
Centralia" where community attachment was strong. The at-
tachment structure was constructed at the levels of family and
religious and ethnic groups rather than at the community level.
The groups that Centralians were encouraged to identify with,
to be guided by, fell short of representing the town as a whole.
There were in fact several communities in Centralia, each with
an explicit recognition of its own common interests. What passed
for effective and frequent communication in town occurred more
within specific ethnic and religious cultures than across them.
In short, Centralia is not a typical Tocquevillian village, but an
anthracite mining town.
In the mid-nineteenth century it was coal that fed the ex-
panding industrial capacity of the United States. Over 20 million
tons ofcoal were mined in 1860.2 As the coal industry developed,
however, chronic overproduction and overinvestment sapped the
industry's initial strength. 3 The independent coal operators found
themselves in a difficult economic position, as did the railroads,
which could not count on a steady supply of coal to transport.
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In an effort to consolidate the industry, railroad companies began
buying coal land to gain control of production. The greatest coal
empire of the day was built by the Philadelphia and Reading
Railroad, which purchased 60,000 acres of coal land in 1871 and
40,000 additional acres over the next two years. 4
Centralia's history is tied to that of a competitor of the Phila-
delphia and Reading, the Lehigh Valley Railroad, which had
amassed 32,000 acres of coal land by 1873. Since its charter
prohibited the direct purchase of coal lands, the Lehigh Valley
gained a controlling interest in several "independent" coal com-
panies. One of the first of the companies to be taken over was
also the first to operate in Centralia: the Locust Mountain Coal
and Iron Company.5 By 1870, Centralia's long history of asso-
ciation with the Lehigh Valley Railroad had begun.
The coal barons were not content simply to own the land: they
saw it as being in their economic interest to dominate the social
and political order of the region. Their drive for dominance
molded the distinctive pattern along which the anthracite mining
town developed.
Geology was paramount in the thinking of the coal barons as
they plotted the location of human settlements in the region:
quite simply, towns and mine patches were located where the
coal was. The coal seams were found in three regions-the upper
(or northern), middle, and lower (southern) fields. Economically
and socially, two distinct regions emerged: the northern, settled
originally by farmers from Connecticut and New York; and the
southern, inhabited by Pennsylvania Dutch and Pennamites. The
former looked to New York for capital and markets; the latter,
to Philadelphia. North or south, growth was rapid. In the north-
ern field, Carbondale's population of 50 in 1828 had grown to
2,500 by 1833, and to nearly 5,000 by 1850. To the south, Potts-
ville, a hamlet of a few houses and taverns in 1825, numbered
more than five hundred dwellings by 1831; by 1845 it had more
than 5,000 inhabitants. 6
Dotted among such relatively large settlements were a great
many small mine towns and patches. Because of the location of
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coal seams and the difficulties of traversing the mountainous
terrain, most settlements were isolated and quite self-sufficient.
Many were company towns. 7 The advent of the railroads did
little to break down the provincialism that developed; rail lines
were laid to haul the coal to the eastern seaboard and to bring
immigrant workers to the coal fields, not to link the various areas
within anthracite country. The geographic isolation made union
organizing within the region difficult throughout the nineteenth
century.
In its early history, Centralia was typical of most anthracite
coal communities. In 1855, the first engineer and agent of the
Locust Mountain Coal and Iron Company, Alexander W. Rea,
built the first home in the settlement that was to become Cen-
tralia. During the next few years, streets and lots were surveyed,
several collieries were built, and homes for mine workers were
constructed by the company. This settlement, surrounded by
several small patch communities serving various collieries, be-
came known as Centerville. In 1862, a post office was established,
necessitating a change of name, as Pennsylvania already had a
community named Centerville. At the suggestion of Alexander
Rea, the name became Centralia. 8
Into the Borough of Centralia and its environs came an influx
of the skilled English and Welsh miners and Irish laborers
needed to work the collieries. By 1870, the population of Cen-
tralia stood at 1,342; a decade later, it approached 2,000. 9 By
1860, several collieries were operating through leases from the
Locust Mountain Coal and Iron Company and the famed Girard
Estate. In the early 1860s, the Centralia and Continental colli-
eries opened, followed by several others in 1865. 10
Although many of its first homes were company-built dwell-
ings, Centralia evolved into a "free" town, surrounded by small
company patches attached to specific collieries. As in other free
towns of the region, the mining company influenced the com-
munity)s social life. For example, during the last quarter of the
nineteenth century the Locust Mountain Coal and Iron Company
provided land for the Methodist, Episcopal, Baptist, and Roman
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Catholic churches. Breaker operators financially supported Holy
Trinity Episcopal Church; one of them paid for its chancel win-
dow, complete with his monogram. The company favored fra-
ternal organizations too, donating land for the Odd Fellows' Hall,
for one. Even municipal services were targets of the operating
company, the Lehigh Valley Railroad, which in 1881 paid $50,000
for a controlling interest in the newly formed Locust Mountain
Water Company, which served Centralia. ll
Retail trade in Centralia was no exception to the coal company
pattern, which attempted to meet every consumer need through
the aptly named Mammoth Store, which opened in 1881 with
departments stocked with groceries, clothing, furniture, building
supplies, and agricultural products. Household maintenance and
repairs were offered, and for the farmers, "even bull service was
provided. "12 In this true company store, purchases by company
employees (who made up the bulk ofthe customers) were handled
by a credit system that deducted purchases from wages.
Throughout the region, the companies made their political
influence felt at all levels of government, using lobbying and
patronage to the fullest. Since elected officials at the local level
often sided with the miners against the operators, the companies
worked to reduce the power of local officials to next to nothing. 13
Clifton Yearley points out that the Commonwealth of Pennsyl-
vania had the legal power to control the Reading Company's
voracious expansion, but did not do so because the Reading in
fact constituted Pennsylvania's "interim government. "14 Perhaps
the most blatant appropriation of state sovereignty by the com-
panies occurred in the 1870s, when several reputed members of
the secret Molly Maguire organization were hanged, after private
detectives hired by the Reading investigated the case, company
police arrested the alleged offenders, and Franklin B. Gowen,
president of the Reading and a lawyer, prosecuted the case him-
self. As Aurand quips, "the State provided only the courtroom
and hangman. "15
The Molly Maguires, or their reputation, tore Centralia apart.
Violence blamed on this clandestine society resulted in at least
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four murders, including that of the town's founder, Alexander
Rea, in 1868. Many of the town's "leading citizens" fled the rash
of violence and arson. 16 Among the many breaker fires, the Cen-
tralia colliery burned three times between 1866 and 1879. 17 Nor
was the destruction directed only at the coal operators. Many
homes and businesses were torched, including an 1872 blaze that
consumed two square blocks of the town. 18 The violence, which
had class and ethnic overtones, was directed largely against coal
company agents and facilities. But it also split the Irish laboring
community itself. Some supported the Mollies, but a great many
of the Irish detested such .violent tactics. Neighbor was pitted
against neighbor and son against father in a pattern of suspicion
and mistrust that would reemerge with another fire in Centralia.
Even before the time of the Molly Maguires, labor unrest
plagued the companies, in the form of a boatmen's strike on the
Schuylkill Canal in 1835, 19 and a strike by anthracite miners in
Schuylkill County in 1842-their first-which the militia was
called out to disperse. 2o The first miners' union appeared in
Schuylkill County in 1848. 21 Violent mine and railroad strikes
occurred in 1869, 1871, 1877, 1897, 1900, and 1902. 22 Centralia
workers participated in many of these strikes, as well as some
local strikes of their own. 23
The coal companies' reaction was to pressure the government
to allow the formation of a quasi-public police force unique in
this nation's history: Pennsylvania's "coal and iron police," which
existed from 1866 to as late as 1935. Created by an act of the
Pennsylvania legislature, they were controlled and paid by the
coal and iron companies, yet were commissioned by the governor
and given the full powers of police. The dominant police in the
anthracite region during the last quarter of the nineteenth cen-
tury, this force embodies the overwhelming dominance of the
coal companies over the lives of the area's inhabitants. 24
During times of labor unrest, many coal and iron police were
commissioned to patrol company property, protect strike-break-
ers, and intimidate strikers. Violence was common. But even in
times of labor peace, the coal and iron police were the dominant
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constabulary of the region. In company towns and patches, they
functioned as eviction officers, debt collectors, and agents of
various social services, such as public health and sanitation. In
"free" towns, where they supplemented the inadequate munici-
pal police forces, they ultimately gained the upper hand, reduc-
ing many local constabularies to figureheads.
Through these law enforcement armies, then, the companies
were even able to define the boundaries of permissible behavior
and to punish offenders. In Centralia what passed for legal vio-
lations and punishment of the rule breakers was dictated by
authorities remote from the community, thus denying residents
access to a major source of civic consciousness. 25 The overall
conditions throughout the region, especially in company towns,
have been compared to those in medieval fiefs. 26 A colonial
analogy is in fact more apt: the anthracite regions became internal
colonies to core areas along the East Coast. 27 Economic and social
development was accomplished not for the sake of the coal re-
gion, but for cities along the eastern seaboard. Coal and profits
flowed out of the region, helping to develop core cities, civic in-
stitutions, and the urban upper class. E. Digby Baltzell states,
"IfProper Philadelphia can be said to be the capital ofan empire,
then its chief colony is the anthracite . . . region of northeastern
Pennsylvania. "28 Conversely, the anthracite region was deprived
ofan indigenous upper class and, indeed, ofa strong local middle
class, with the most influential members ofthe latter being agents
of the coal companies.
Although a few major companies came to dominate the life of
the region, the coal giants were unable to stabilize the local
economy. Fluctuations in the demand for coal created a boom-
or-bust economy and frontier-like social conditions. Coal towns
would expand quickly when coal production peaked, only to lose
much of their population when production slacked off-an un-
stable pattern that inhibited the development of community
attachments.
Centralia was on this roller coaster. After the violence of the
1860s and 1870s had diminished, Centralia entered into the de-
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cade of its most sustained growth and prosperity. The population
of the borough rose by over 30 percent in the 1880s, to 2, 761
people in 1890. In 1882, the seven Centralia-area collieries pro-
duced a combined total of 510,000 tons of coal. Local religious
and labor groups showed signs ofgrowth like the coal industry's-
a bigger Methodist church building, a new Baptist congregation,
additions of a school, convent, and meeting hall at the Roman
Catholic church. By 1885, two labor organizations boasted a com-
bined membership of 415 men. 29
Centralia's period of growth, however, was to be cut short by
the end of the century by a cutback in coal output. In an apparent
attempt to rationalize production in the area, the Lehigh Valley
acquired direct control of seven area collieries in 1896,30 and
immediately retrenched, reducing production drastically. The
seven collieries, which had a combined output of more than
706,000 tons in 1890, were producing a mere 236,000 tons nine
years later. Centralia suffered accordingly. While the population
of the rest of Conyngham Township rose from 2, 739 in 1890 to
3,037 in 1900, Centralia lost a quarter of its population, which
fell from 2, 761 to 2,048 during the same period. 31
Such instability and upheaval ruled out strong community
attachments and institutions. As Bertoff states, "Community ties
were weak, even within towns and villages. . . . The population
of most mining towns was too mobile, too transient, too quickly
gathered and easily scattered again. "32
Instead of developing a strong sense of community, Central-
ians and others throughout the region found social attachments
at other levels. By far the most binding ties were developed at
the level of the family. In the words of John E. Bodnar: "The
families of this mining region . . . adhered to a persistent pattern
of sharing and cooperation which was rigorously enforced. Par-
ents provided discipline and jobs; children supplemented family
income and provided care for elderly parents. "33 In the face of
governmental indifference and the weighty economic and social
burdens of the times, the family-especially the extended
family-was the major source of emotional and social security.34
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Ethnicity and religion also provided sectors for in-group iden-
tification and out-group division. The English, Welsh, and Ger-
man Protestants who were the early settlers of the coal mining
region were joined in the middle of the nineteenth century by
large numbers of Irish Catholic mine laborers who made rela-
tively fast progress into the more skilled miners' positions. 35 Dur-
ing the last quarter of the nineteenth and the first quarter of the
twentieth century, thousands of Eastern and Southern European
Catholics migrated into the region and began their advance from
the bottom of the economic pyramid. In this "new immigration,"
the number of Eastern Europeans who joined the primarily Irish
laboring population of Centralia was great enough to support the
establishment of a Greek Catholic congregation in 1910 and a
Russian Orthodox parish in 1916.36
In the wake of the immigrant waves, ethnicity and social class
overlapped to a large degree, as did residence patterns. In Cen-
tralia, as in the anthracite region as a whole, ethnic, religious,
and residence patterns have proved enduring, carrying over even
to the present day. They still provide lines along which, for
example, political behavior may cleave. 37
With communal attachments limited to the family and ethno-
religious affiliations, it would have been difficult for any single
individual or group in Centralia to outline a course ofcommunity
action and persuade others in town to embark upon it. Any such
attempts at leadership would likely be rejected as arising out of
self-interest rather than representing the community as a whole.
The historical tendency to refuse a bid for leadership from within
would help undo Centralia's efforts to manage its twentieth-cen-
tury mine fire.
One of the elements of communal instability in the anthracite
region was the high incidence of physical calamities. Wallace
found that "crushes, gas explosions, underground mine fires, and
flooding [to put out the fires] repeatedly put many collieries out
of business for weeks, months, or even years at a time."38
Centralia did not escape the recurrent physical catastrophes.
The borough's first school, erected in 1858, was engulfed by a
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mine cave-in a decade later. A replacement was destroyed by
fire in 1935, along with all its records. Among the frequent
breaker fires, the Centralia colliery alone burned down four times
between 1866 and 1961. Between 1908 and 1912, three surface
fires devastated Centralia's downtown section, and cave-ins regu-
larly ate away at buildings and roads. 39
Along with others throughout the anthracite region, Central-
ians grew to accept mining disasters as part of their way of life.
As Bertoff notes, "death in the mines was an everyday matter. "40
Of course, this did nothing to blunt the pain at the death or
injury of a loved one. But because coal mining carried with it
the seeming inevitability of personal and environmental catas-
trophes, those who lived with coal miners of necessity learned
to cope with what they could not change. From this point of
view it is not surprising that many Centralians, as well as others
of the anthracite region, believed that too much was being made
of the mine fire. For many of the more elderly residents, it
seemed like just another problem ofthe region, one which should
be borne without so much fuss.
During the nineteenth century, Centralia developed as a typi-
cal small anthracite mining community, dominated by huge ab-
sentee corporations, populated by a shifting, largely immigrant
working-class population, and buffeted by recurrent economic
and social crises. The history of the anthracite region in the
twentieth century has been shaped by the fall of "King Coal."
Changes in technology that opened the door to the less labor-
intensive surface, or strip, mining shared in the blame. But over-
shadowing all else was the precipitous decline in demand for
coal, which was replaced by oil and gas as home heating fuels
and by diesel and electric engines for power generation. 41 These
shifts ushered in the Great Depression early for the anthracite
region.
Hard times had shut down all of the Lehigh Valley's collieries
by 1930, and shortly thereafter, Centralia's Mammoth Store
closed and was razed. 42 Various companies attempted to continue
operating during the 1930s, but with little success. In the words
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of one Centralian: "There was no work at all. . . . It was boot-
legging coal, picking huckleberries-I think that's what kept this
town going because we had no other source. There was no relief
at that time outside of the poor order, which was ten dollars a
month. And it wasn't easy getting that, either." By "bootlegging"
coal from small illegal mine shafts sunk on company property,
Centralians at least managed to keep warm during the long winter
months, and some of them sold the coal for a small profit. Boot-
legging was so widespread that even the company police who
patrolled the coal lands were defeated. According to one infor-
mant, and in keeping with Centralians' main attachment struc-
ture, the bootleg holes were extended family operations that did
not include neighbors or friends.
The industry stabilized briefly during World War II, but the
1950s almost put an end to anthracite mining, as figures from
Schuylkill County clearly show. In 1945, the county's anthra-
cite production was 16,731,000 tons and the industry employed
19,000 workers, but by 1960, production had fallen to 6,933,000
tons, and the workforce had declined to 6,900. Eight years later,
only 4,297,000 tons were mined in the county, employing a mere
2,646. 43 Anthracite production throughout the United States,
which stood at 19 million tons in 1960, fell to 6 million tons in
1976. 44
Given the nature of the area's one-industry economy, it lacked
the resources to attract substantial new business. The garment
industry picked up some of the slack,45 but by 1980 it also was
running out of steam. Waves of out-migration and chronic un-
employment hit both the region's urban centers and its smaller
communities. Centralia's population dropped steadily, from
2,449 in 1940, to 1,986 in 1950 and 1,435 in 1960. 46 It became
increasingly clear that Centralia, like so many other towns in
anthracite country, was a dying community, where social events
and celebrations became ever fewer, and even the practices of
neighboring changed as people withdrew into themselves. As
one Centralian described the changes from times past: "The older
ones would sit on the front porch. There were some Irish people,
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they'd sit on the porch, smoke their pipe, and talk Irish. That's
how they spend their time. You don't see much of that today."
More and more of those who stayed had to commute out of
the region to find work. A high proportion of the population was
elderly. Counting those who were retired, disabled (especially
with coal-related injuries and diseases such as "black lung"),
unemployed, or working for the public sector, many had become
dependent on government services in one way or another. Once
again, the communities of the anthracite region were unable to
free themselves from overriding dependence on forces seen as
"outside" or "alien."
While the centers of power over the region have shifted from
the coal companies to big government, the area has resisted many
cultural changes that have characterized more urban regions.
Centralians' values remain tied to home and church and, to a
certain degree, ethnic group. The descendents of indepen-
dent-minded immigrants, Centralians have been dominated by
outside forces and unable to develop strong social ties at the
community level. When confronted by a long-term, community-
wide crisis requiring a united response, the familial, religious,
and ethnic attachments have ironically proved divisive for the
community as a whole-a sign of weakness, not strength. It is
within this context that the birth, uneven growth, and eventual
death of Centralia must be viewed.
Portending the difficulties Centralia would experience in man-
aging its responses to the underground mine fire was the town's
reaction to a surface fire that occurred after the turn of the cen-
tury. The patterns of response to the 1908 fire are almost uncanny
in foreshadowing what would occur over half a century later.
Called "the most destructive fire in the history ofthe anthracite
coal fields,"47 the 1908 blaze began in an unoccupied store-room
at two in the morning on Friday, December 3. Fire companies
from Centralia and nearby towns responded quickly, but were
hampered severely by a water shortage. As is characteristic in
immediate-impact disasters, townspeople themselves pitched in,
forming bucket brigades and nailing wet rugs to the building
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facades to try to contain the fire. After four hours of intense
activity, sunrise revealed blackened ruins, streets filled with sal-
vaged furniture and personal possessions, and only a few walls,
posts, and chimneys left of the buildings that had occupied an
entire block. Damage was estimated at between $50,000 and
$100,000, 170 people were homeless, and fifteen businesses had
been destroyed. 48
That evening in 1908, townspeople met at the borough hall
to form a relief committee, headed by T. W. Riley, proprietor of
the company store and soon to be president of Centralia's first
bank. Under the committee's auspices, appeals went to nearby
communities for clothing and financial aid. But the lion's share
of the work of the Centralia Relief Committee was in fact done
by the committee's Ladies' Auxiliary, led by Mrs. J.M. Hum-
phrey, wife ofthe superintendent ofthe Lehigh Valley's Centralia
collieries. 49 It was not at all unusual at the turn of the century
for the coal companies to spearhead philanthropic projects within
the coal communities, nor for the wives of company officials to
do the actual work.
The Ladies' Auxiliary not only distributed the goods collected
by the Relief Committee but was also put in charge of disbursing
the money donated, which it did as conservatively as possible.
By January 8, 1909, more than a month after the blaze, $9,200
had been collected but only $1,200 had been distributed, al-
though on January 8, it is recorded, "there are still some of the
poorer people, who lost their all in the fire, who are badly in
need of aid."50 Besides being inadequate, these philanthropic
reliefefforts precluded organization and decision-making by local
residents, including the victims.
There is no evidence that the Lehigh Valley Coal Company
provided any direct aid to the victims. As a matter of fact, the
fire exacerbated a longstanding controversy between borough
residents and the company. The problem had begun a few years
earlier when the company finished mining the deep coal veins
under the center of town and as the last step "robbed the pil-
lars"-that is, removed the coal from the underground arches
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that had been left to support the surface land. When the under-
ground supports are removed, the result is surface subsidence,
or cave-ins. Indeed, it was reported that the block that burned
in 1908 was part of an area "which has been slowly sinking for
the past five years," and that it had gone down over three feet
in the preceding year and a half. 51
Not satisfied with robbing the pillars, the company was de-
termined to extract the remaining coal near the surface, at an
even greater risk of subsidence. Some concerned property own-
ers went to court to stop the company's plans, but amidst specu-
lation that it paid lawyers on both sides, the company won.
However, perhaps fearing less civilized opposition by the resi-
dents, officials held off on the mining operations. 52
The standoff ended in the fire of 1908, which destroyed the
surface dwelling above the Lehigh Valley's coal. The company
seized this stroke of good fortune by offering to lease the land
from each property owner for one year, during which time the
coal would be mined. The workings would then be filled and
"the surface made safer than at present." The company offered
$300 to lease each property on "the main street," and $150 for
land on "the back street. "53
In a way uncannily similar to what a mine fire would bring
about decades later, the surface fire of 1908 divided friends and
neighbors over the future of the community of Centralia. The
coal company had no reason to request a collective decision by
property owners, nor did the owners seize the initiative and reach
such a decision on their own. Instead, owner by owner, they
arrived at individual decisions. Some Centralians accepted the
company's offer, while others began to rebuild on the land. News-
papers have no record of public meetings on the subject, nor of
committees or groups being formed. According to the minutes
of the Centralia Borough Council for the period, the issue was
never raised in that forum. It would seem that company power
extended so far as to preclude even the rebuilding of an entire
city block as a collective issue. The ability of powerful outside
forces to define critical issues in their own terms has long blunted
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efforts by Centralians to achieve (or even develop) collective
goals, even to the present day.
By January 8, 1909, little more than a month after the company
made the leasing offer, at least three businesses had already
contracted to rebuild on their land. Others had accepted the
Lehigh Valley's terms,54 and the company wasted no time in re-
suming mining operations under the borough.
The result of mining the veins close to the surface was what
many Centralians had feared. On March 2, "huge fissures and
cave-ins . . . appeared within 25 feet of the new structures" and
the "complete extinction" of"the new Centralia" was threatened.
Many property owners were irate, viewing the mining as an
attempt by the company to force them to sell their land. In the
same spirit exhibited by many Centralians seven decades later,
the record shows that in 1909 "they refuse to be scared away,
and are defying the company to drive them from their homes. "55
The conflict festered until March 30, when company officials,
perhaps fearing that they would not fare as well in another court
appearance, decided to halt mining under the borough. The
property owners may be said to have won-but only at the price
of destructive conflict.
This pattern of mistrust and uncoordinated response would
repeat itself seventy years later, when Centralians again
perceived themselves to be at risk from forces both inside and
outside their community. Given its history, Centralia was ill-
prepared to confront a long-term environmental crisis in an ef-
fective, unified manner. Accustomed to dividing along familial,
ethnic, or religious lines, lacking economic power and deprived
of a tradition of indigenous leadership and collective decision-
making, Centralia was almost entirely lacking in the social re-
sources to confront not only a tenacious mine fire but also giant
governmental bureaucracies, which had their own interests to
pursue. Centralia's past only reinforced the insidious way in
which the underground fire ate away at the community itself.
With the discovery of the mine fire in 1962, the final chapter of
Centralia's history had begun.
2. The Engineering
Puzzle, 1962-1981
A mine fire is a disaster of a very different sort from an earth-
quake, a tornado, or a tsunami. After a tsunami, or tidal wave,
hits a shoreline, it recedes. The aftermath is frequently devas-
tating, but survivors and relief workers can proceed to rebuild
without first trying to control the disaster agent itself. It may be
possible to predict a tsunami, but nobody is expected to stop it.
On the other hand, the Centralia mine fire, like the dioxin con-
tamination of Times Beach, Missouri, was of human origin, and
only human technical intervention could halt its hazardous
course.
In the case of a mine fire, which advances slowly but steadily
through coal seams, the first and foremost problem in emergency
response is to halt its progress. The official response, in other
words, is less concerned about community relief and rehabili-
tation than about bringing the fire under control. Since advanced
technological methods, high in cost, are called for in dealing with
a manmade disaster agent, there is an exceptional reliance on
state and federal government agencies to provide assistance. 1
Moreover, because the immediate concern is controllability,
the government tends to define chronic technological disasters
as engineering puzzles rather than as human or social problems,
and to assign to technical agencies the lead role in managing the
crisis. The engineers and other specialists who staff such agencies
are used to tackling technological, not human, problems. Because
mining engineers and geologists are likely to focus on the aspects
ofan emergency that call for the skills and authority they possess,
the personal, social, and economic dimensions of the crisis are
likely to be underestimated.
So it was in the case of Centralia, which was never officially
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declared a disaster area. Although the community may have been
at a collective loss to define its crisis, there was a consensus
among state and federal officials that the fire was an engineering
riddle, not a disaster, and should be managed by technical, rather
than social service, agencies. In the end, a technical solution
eluded the specialists, and the official information regarding the
presence, extent, and severity of the invincible fire was so vague
or contradictory that it did not disallow any of the competing
definitions of the crisis that circulated among residents.
For nineteen years after the discovery of the Centralia mine
fire, local, state, and federal governments attacked the problem
of controlling the blaze. Their efforts, however costly, ended
only in frustration. Time and again, a solution to the problem
would be proposed and debated, contracts would be bid and
awarded, and the work would be completed, but the fire burned
on.
When refuse was discovered burning in an illegal garbage
dump southeast of the borough limits, near the Odd Fellows
Cemetery, in May 1962, borough workmen flooded the fire with
water and installed a clay seal to contain it. But by July the fire
had spread to a nearby outcrop of coal in the Buck Mountain
vein. Since control was clearly beyond the means of the Borough
ofCentralia, it appealed for help to the Pennsylvania Department
of Mines and Mineral Industries. 2
In 1962, the Department of Mines notified the u.S. Bureau
of Mines of the problem, and local, state, and federal officials
were soon meeting with coal company representatives to discuss
what to do. To cut short the fast-spreading fire, they decided to
excavate the burning material. Because federal funding was un-
likely without a three-month wait, the Commonwealth of Penn-
sylvania decided to assume the cost of the project. To speed
things along, the state designated the fire an emergency and
suspended the usual bidding procedures for the project, which
was budgeted at $30,000. State agencies awarded the contract
to Bridy, Inc., of Atlas, Pennsylvania. 3
Meanwhile, fire gases were spreading into active mine shafts
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around Centralia. On August 15, when the state ordered twenty-
three mines closed because of the gases, mining ended in the
Centralia area, costing 140 miners their jobs. 4
Excavation of the fire sector began on August 23. Two months
later, borehole temperatures showed that the fire had advanced
beyond the area being excavated. The project was discontinued
as futile, after removing 53,580 cubic yards ofmaterial and spend-
ing $27,658, all to no avail.
In November, K & H Excavating Company of Mt. Carmel,
Pennsylvania, began work under a new state contract that called
for drilling 80 boreholes around the fire and extinguishing it by
flushing down 10,000 cubic yards of fine breaker refuse, which
is noncombustible material separated from usable coal during
processing. In March of 1963, the $42,420 project ended when
the money ran out. As of May 1963, one year after the fire had
been discovered and after $70,000 had been spent to control it,
it still burned on and its surface effects could be seen 700 feet
from its origin.
At this point, the state was stymied, since it could not afford
the $160,000 for a combination of flushing and trenching that
looked like the best bet. 5 In July, the state awarded Bridy, Inc.,
a more limited contract of $36,225 to dig a trench to limit the
fire's eastward advance, but in October, fire was discovered on
both sides of the incomplete trench. The total by then: $106,000,
which had achieved no degree whatsoever of fire control. 6
Frustrated in its piecemeal attempts to battle the blaze with
severely limited funds, the state made no new moves to curtail
the fire for a year and a half. But in 1965, a new source offunding,
this time of major proportions, became available. In March of
that year, the 89th u.s. Congress passed the Appalachian Re-
development Act, designed "to provide public works and eco-
nomic development programs and the planning and coordination
needed to assist in development of the Appalachian Region." The
law gave the Secretary of the Interior authority over projects
that rehabilitated land damaged by previous mining practices,
including the extinguishing of mine fires.
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In June of 1965, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and the
U. S. Bureau of Mines submitted a joint proposal to the Appa-
lachian Regional Commission to stop the fire once and for all.
The first phase of the project, at a cost of $300, 000 would attempt
to cut off the air flow to the fire and to discover its exact location.
The second phase would dig an isolation trench to contain the
fire permanently. The projected cost of phase two: $2.2 million. 7
The Appalachian Regional Commission approved the project
and agreed to pay 75 percent of the cost, the maximum allowable
under the law. 8 The state would pay most of the remainder.
Under the contract for phase one, Empire Contracting Company
of Old Forge, Pennsylvania, 9 completed work on November 30,
1967, at a cost of $326,123.
Early the following year, however, when the U. S. Bureau of
Mines analyzed the data collected during phase one, the results
indicated that phase two would cost $4.5 million, or twice the
original estimate. Phase two was scrapped, and the U.s. Bureau
of Mines decided instead to construct barriers of noncombus-
tible fly ash, at the cost of a mere $519,000. 10 In April 1969, the
contract was awarded to Stearns Service Company of Wilkes-
Barre, which began work early the following month.
At this point, when the fire had been burning unchecked for
seven years, families near it were becoming fearful about the
possible health effects of gases from the blaze; some complained
of frequent headaches. 11 On May 22, three families were evacu-
ated from their homes at Wood and South Streets after a state
mine inspector found trace readings of carbon monoxide in the
basement of one of the dwellings. 12 The health risks of the fire
appeared to be officially confirmed.
The warnings, though subtle, mounted. One family in the
impact zone found its pet canary dead and concluded, 'since
canaries are very sensitive to carbon monoxide, that gases from
the fire had killed their pet. Others who lived near the fire
reported difficulty in breathing. Mter investigating the condi-
tions at one home, a state mine inspector stated: "I would not
sleep in that house if it were mine." But the inspector had no
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authority to order families to leave their dwellings. Indeed, con-
fusion reigned as to who, if anyone, had the authority to help
people driven from their homes by the fire. 13
The lack of any precedent for coping is a general problem in
chronic technological disasters. Complicating the issue, authority
for response to environmental problems in general is decentral-
ized in the United States, located in a myriad ofagencies at many
levels of government. There is likely to be an appearance, at
least, of buck-passing, and confusion in the affected community
about who is in charge of what.
Disenchanted with governmental efforts, residents of Cen-
tralia criticized the fly ash project that had just begun in the
spring of 1969. Fearing that the technology would not be ade-
quate, some demanded that a trench be dug to protect them and
their homes. 14 Indeed, the fly ash barrier was considered no more
than a demonstration project at the time, 15 and not a few residents
were incensed at the use of an experimental technology when
their health-perhaps their lives-seemed to be at stake.
Elected officials responded to their concerns. 16 In June, the
U.S. Bureau of Mines approved an emergency change in the
contract that would allow excavation to take place, in addition
to the fly ash barrier, to eliminate the fumes in homes near the
fire. Adding about $100,000 to the cost of the project,17 some
12,000 tons of coal were dug out,18 and in August of 1970, the
entire project was completed. Total cost: $582,693.
But the coal below ground was still smoldering. When bore-
hole data indicated that the fire had crossed an anticline in the
southeast portion of the impact zone, yet another contract was
awarded. The Stearns Company was to construct an eastern bar-
rier, at a projected cost of $1,352,12519 a project that took over
three years to complete.
Meanwhile, the U.S. Bureau of Mines in 1971 sponsored an
excavation to the east of Locust Avenue, the main north-south
street in the borough. Burning coal-the fire itself-was en-
countered 500 to 800 feet east of Locust Avenue. The Bureau of
Mines then asked Columbia County to contribute half the cost
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of completing the excavation, but the county could not come up
with the requested $25,000. Digging then ceased and the ex-
cavation was backfilled, leaving the coal to burn. 20 Many believe
that for lack of $50,000, a comparatively small sum, the authori-
ties lost the chance to stop the fire for good.
In government agency response to the Centralia mine fire
from 1962 to 1971, controllability became a political issue. Given
the technical uncertainties and the policy vacuum in the area of
chronic technological disasters, engineering projects became
subject to legislative debate and political intrigues. For more
than a few people, both in and out of town; the first decade of
government's management of the crisis left little doubt that tech-
nical decisions only imperfectly masked political choices.
In December of 1973, when the eastern fly ash barrier project
was completed, at a cost of a whopping $1.8 million, there was
hope that the fire had been defeated. Over the seven years of
the joint federal-state venture, 1635 boreholes had been dug,
122,556 tons of fly ash injected, 117,220 cubic yards of sand
flushed, 60,000 cubic yards of material excavated, 19,000 cubic
yards of clay seals installed; and $2,768,208 spent. The solution
appeared to hold for two and a half years. But in August of 1976,
the Bureau of Mines determined that more money was needed
to reinforce the existing fly ash barriers, and the following month
the state Department of Environmental Resources requested
funds from the Appalachian Regional Commission. 21 The pro-
posal to reinforce the existing barriers called first for drilling
boreholes to determine the extent of the problem and then for
flushing, to reinforce the existing barrier or create new ones. 22
In the spring of 1977, $385,000 was approved for the project.
What followed was a bureaucratic nightmare of endless delays
that thwarted fire control efforts.
Although the project won funding in the spring, the coopera-
tive funding agreement was disputed by the federal Bureau of
Mines and the state Department of Environmental Resources,
holding up the contract award. In September, the problem was
resolved, and the contract went to the L. R. Costanzo Company
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of Scranton. But since the low bid of $429,550 exceeded the
approved funding, the flushing project was put on hold while
additional money was sought from the federal, state and county
governments. Finally, in January of 1978, the funding was ap-
proved and the contract awarded. Work began on February 1. 23
Even as far back as the planning stage for reinforcing the
barriers, however, many Centralians were convinced that the
fire had moved past those barriers. 24 In December 1976, state
inspectors had reported evidence that poisonous gases were vent-
ing near Centralians' homes. By the time the flushing project
was completed in November of 1978, at a higher than anticipated
cost of $498,138, the Bureau of Mines had realized that yet more
work was needed. The latest strategy returned to a previous
approach: isolate the fire by digging a trench.
Seven homes in Centralia stood in the path of the proposed
excavation, and the Bureau of Mines designated twenty-one
other properties with homes to provide a "safety zone. " The plan
to acquire the homes generated heated controversy. The Bureau
of Mines lacked authority to purchase the homes, but the plan
was presented to the Centralia Borough Council, which gave its
approval at a public meeting attended by perhaps 500 citizens.
After the Bureau of Mines approved the plans, the Appalachian
Regional Commission committed some funds. But as the plans
continued to develop, cost estimates skyrocketed to $10 million,
much of it to come from state and local sources. At this point,
the state and county withdrew, the trenching project was
dropped, and no other options were put on the table. Naturally,
Centralians' confidence in the Bureau of Mines was further un-
dermined. Why couldn't the bureau make up its mind?25
Apparently, changes within the federal bureaucracy were be-
hind the lack ofalternative plans during 1978-79. In August 1977,
Congress passed the Surface Mining and Reclamation Act, which
provided "for the cooperation between the Secretary of the In-
terior and the States with respect to the regulation of surface
coal mining operations, and the acquisition and reclamation of
abandoned mines, and for other purposes." The legislation set
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up the Office of Surface Mining and Reclamation (OSM), which
would reclaim abandoned coal mine lands with funding mandated
from active mines. The OSM was authorized to purchase private
land as part of its reclamation efforts. 26
Although the Office of Surface Mining was good news for
Centralia in that it represented a new source offunding to combat
the mine fire, there were inevitable delays while the OSM geared
up. For a time, it seems, the Bureau of Mines was in a holding
pattern, waiting for an initiative from the OSM. Once the OSM
took an active role in Centralia, it became a new source of confu-
sion.
During 1979, the Bureau of Mines and state officials developed
a cheaper alternative to the abandoned trench idea. Slated to
cost $6 million, the plan called for filling a 35-acre tract of land
with fly ash slurry and other noncombustible material and sealing
it in place with cement grouting. To be completed in four or five
years, the project, like others before it, was touted as a final
solution to the problem. Bureau of Mines experts believed the
plan would work, but OSM experts disagreed. A memo to the
director of the OSM from the director of the OSM's Region 1,
which includes the anthracite fields of northeastern Pennsylva-
nia, states that "the proposed project would neither extinguish
nor confine the fire." Indeed, it was argued, previous "boreholes
have increased the air circulation in the underground fire area,"
thereby feeding the fire. (The memo also notes a difficulty in
obtaining information from the Bureau of Mines.)
The summary of Region l's position even betrays a concern
that the fire may be beyond control: "Until adequate analytical
information is made available, and pending appropriate analysis,
no further drilling should be undertaken. The technology for
extinguishing the fire may not be available. Extinguishing the
fire by known techniques could be impossible and at the very
least prohibitively expensive. After we have reviewed all the
document which we need from the Bureau of Mines we may
recommend a minimal program of sealing entries and other
sources of air which feed the fire. "27
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This memo, which was to have been "administratively re-
stricted, » nevertheless became public in August 1979,28 and Cen-
tralians were both shaken and incensed by its contents. Many
doubted the sincerity of the OSM's previously expressed inten-
tion to put an end to the mine fire. Other seized on the apparent
lack of dialogue between the Bureau of Mines and the OSM,
charging that Centralia was caught in the middle ofa bureaucratic
power struggle between the two agencies. Most agreed that too
little was being done. 29 Finally, at the end of December, some
progress appeared to be made when the Bureau of Mines and
the OSM entered into an agreement under which the OSM
would provide the bureau with $137,400 to drill boreholes, map
the status of the fire, and develop alternative strategies for final
abatement. 30
Month by month, the fire below was growing more threat-
ening. On December 8, 1979, rising temperatures near under-
ground gasoline storage tanks caused the closing of a service
station. 31 Early in 1980, the OSM declared an emergency in
removing several families on East Park Street because of rising
subsurface temperatures. Nearly $70,000 was spent on flushing
to protect the St. Ignatius Elementary School32 and nearby resi-
dences from spreading gases.
In January of 1980, an OSM document stated: "The potential
for carbon monoxide and other gases seeping into homes above
the fire area is an extreme danger to the public health and
safety,"33 specifically on eight properties where the OSM pro-
posed relocations. In April, it began making offers to acquire
these properties, and by the end of June, all but one family had
accepted the proposed relocation. 34
The "extreme danger" was not limited to these eight homes.
In January and again in March, OSM officials had been alerted
to rising CO2 levels in the basements of two homes on South
Locust Street. In late April, frustrated by the lack of government
response, the owner of one of the residences called OSM officials
in Wilkes-Barre and in West Virginia, alarmed because his
daughter had been hospitalized with respiratory problems, and
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her physician recommended that she not return to her home
because of its oxygen deficiency. He was told that nothing could
be done. When the concerned father persisted by calling the
OSM office in Washington, he finally got action. The OSM de-
clared an emergency and authorized $50,000 for drilling and
flushing under both the homes on South Locust, as well as a
third. 35 Acquisition of the properties eventually became a
consideration.
But the lack of clear legislative authority concerning chronic
technological disasters continued to make itself felt. A memo
from an OSM official concerning the acquisition of the original
eight properties expressed concern about the wording used by
another OSM official, specifically "OSM's PA Department's use
of words 'potentially dangerous area.' The words are inflamma-
tory, provocative and designed to give rise to fear. If this is a
dangerous area, and if this is the only criteria for acquisition then
everyone in the fire area can sue us and ask that OSM acquire
their homes."36
By the fall of 1980, it became apparent that the emergency
flushing activities had not protected the three Locust Street resi-
dences from dangerous gases. At a public meeting in Centralia
on September 29-30, according to an OSM memo, OSM officials
"did state conclusively that as a part of the overall plan at Cen-
tralia, upon a finding by the Pennsylvania Department of Health
that a given residence was no longer suitable for human habi-
tation due to levels of toxic gases from the mine fire, OSM would
immediately relocate or dislocate residents to temporary quarters
until some permanent remedial action could be taken. Failing
any successful remedial action, the affected residence would then
be acquired or moved." One of the affected residents was granted
OSM permission to move to a temporary residence. 37
When the OSM legal office became aware of this action, how-
ever, it raised objections. In an October 31 memo, a Region 1
field solicitor stated: "We are of the opinion that Title IV [of
Public Law 95-87] does not envision or authorize such relocation
expenses unless the property in question must be taken or va-
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cated as an actual integral part of the reclamation and/or abate-
ment process. The fact that the dwellings may have been declared
uninhabitable would not in itselfgive us the authority to purchase
the property or pick up the relocation expenses of the occu-
pants."38
Frustration at the impasse was clearly expressed by OSM's
Region 1 director: "We are faced with a very serious dilemma.
Based on the authority which was passed on to us verbally . . .
we did, in fact, make several statements in Centralia which
charted our course of action.... Now there is a very serious
question as to whether or not the assumed authority is in fact
real. We must have some relief."39
In the end, under dubious legal authority, the OSM did ac-
quire the three properties. Nevertheless, this internal OSM con-
flict illustrates how questionable information was often passed
on to Centralia residents as fact, only to be q?J.estioned, modified,
or retracted down the road. The decentralized nature ofdecision-
making on such issues, and the lack of clear legislation and pre-
cedent, was largely to blame. Understandably, Centralians were
frustrated by and suspicious of the working of government. On
the other hand, the government was so removed from the resi-
dents' perceptions that, while recognizing that Centralians were
unhappy about the course of events, officials did not see them-
selves as a major source of the dissatisfaction.
This point is made forcefully by two documents. The first is
an OSM position paper written as preparation for the September
29-30 public meeting. It reads in part: "Mter 18 years the resi-
dents of Centralia are disgusted, frustrated, confused, angry, and
exceedingly emotional. Recognizing the volatile nature of this
situation, OSM has sought at all times to be totally candid with
the community. We have made no commitments we couldn't
keep and we have met all the commitments we have made; thus
our credibility has been established with the people and the
elected officials. "40 Evidence to the contrary exists in a letter to
the OSM's director from a state Department of Environmental
Resources official: "Dozens ofletters and phone calls to this office
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seeking technical data and interpretation of the monitoring pro-
grams have evidenced both a lack of communication between
the Office of Surface Mine, U.S. Bureau of Mines and the resi-
dents, and questionable credibility of the data that is pub-
lished.Consequently, OSM's credibility is rapidly declining in
the area. "41
Or, in the words of one Centralian: "You have experts-and
you put in quotes when I say 'experts'-that work for the gov-
ernment ... they won't tell you what the truth is." His wife
added, "This js why people become disinterested. Why should
we go listen to this story? We heard three others and they were
all different. Whafs going to make the fourth one any better or
any truer?"
Indeed, over time, some Centralians came to view themselves
as being exploited by, rather than helped by, government; they
felt caught in the middle of a power struggle between the OSM
and the Bureau of Mines. 42 The father whose hospitalized daugh-
ter was advised not to return home because of low oxygen levels
suspected that political considerations were responsible for the
delay in solving the CO2 problems. 43 In our August 1982 survey
ofadult Centralians, the vast majority indicated that government
at all levels had not done a good job of handling the problem,
and one-third of the residents in fact believed that a conspiracy
was afoot to keep the fire burning.
Although much of the negative view of government can be
attributed to problems of communication and to characteristic
bureaucratic delays, blatantly political considerations were some-
times to blame. Some government agencies and elected officials
viewed Centralia in light of their own interests and agendas.
Elected officials who represented Centralia were more likely to
attempt to push for the politically popular solution, since their
jobs depended on their perceived response. Appointed rather
than elected, agency officials generally were not concerned with
political popularity. Whatever an agency's interests were per-
ceived to be shaped the agency's response to a given situation;
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therefore, technical agencies were more likely to seek a minimal
solution and to fight with the others over responsibility and turt.
Beyond the politics of the fire itself, Centralia had become
involved in a controversy over "who is running Columbia Coun-
ty,"44 in the words of one county commissioner. The Columbia
County Redevelopment Authority (CCRA) had been assigned
administrative responsibility for a Department of Housing and
Urban Development grant intended for physical improvements
in Centralia. The Columbia County commissioners protested that
funds slated to go to the CCRA would be wasted. In June 1980,
an OSM official was surprisingly candid in an internal memo that
explained what had taken place during a telephone conversation
with a county official: "Mr. McCracken and I further discussed
the real reason, i.e. political, for the County Commissioners'
actions." The memo put the conversation into this context: "The
Commissioners do not want HUD Monies to be spent in Cen-
tralia which they are convinced will be razed eventually. They
have asked the authority to divert these funds to other parts of
the county. For its part, the authority asked HUD Philadelphia
for guidance and was instructed to use funds allotted to Centralia
in Centralia. This aroused the ire of the County Commissioners
who were clearly of the opinion that the authority should be
responsive to the Commissioners' requests rather than going to
HUD."
As it turned out, the Columbia County commissioners were
correct in their assessment of Centralia's fate, but such an out-
come was far from most people's minds in 1980. Attention was
focused once ~ore on finding a final solution when the Bureau
of Mines in September issued its long-awaited report on the
status of the fire and on eleven possible solutions. 45 It was dis-
cussed at a public meeting of over 300 people on September 29-
30. The option that the bureau seemed to favor called for ex-
cavating part ofthe burning ground and constructing two isolation
trenches, at a proposed cost of $32.4 million. The September
meeting was told that the OSM was evaluating the data, and that
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the Secretary of the Interior would make a decision on a final
mine fire abatement plan by January 1, 1981.46
By early December, however, the OSM was backing away
from its commitment to come up with a plan by January 1. One
OSM official stated, "'I've got no idea when a decision on an
option will be made. It depends. I can't speculate."47
Centralians saw themselves as pawns, "shuflled through the
bureaucracy" with "nobody to make a decision or take the re-
sponsibility." One resident accused the state and federal gov-
ernments of"playing a form ofRussian roulette.... Somebody's
taking a gamble with our lives."
On the one hand, residents accepted the government's tech-
nical definition of the problem, which meant that the extremely
elusive controllability of the fire became the central issue. On
the other hand, technical knowhow failed them, and the com-
peting interests of the various sectors of government aggravated
Centralia's social problems. For eighteen years, the crisis had
only worsened. After almost two decades, the fire seemed to be
out ofcontrol, and government, whether by design or ineptitude,
had proved incapable ofdealing with it. The dilemma in Centralia
parallels that of other cases where, as Gephart points out, mana-
gerial activity itself caused an environmental disaster or aggra-
vated an existing one. 48
As in most cases of prolonged threat, tension and stress ate
away at the ability to cope. 49 How dangerous was the fire? What
might it destroy? Nobody seemed to know. Diffused feelings of
anxiety and demoralization were pervasive as Centralians faced
the kind of threat with which it is most difficult to cope, "the
generalized dread of the unknown."50
3. Ambiguous Evidence and
Contradictory Signals
Most people who are caught in a hurricane or a tornado describe
the experience as something recognized, as foreknown, even
though it may in fact have been their first encounter with such
a disaster. Beyond the immediate community, even those who
do not experience the disaster themselves share with the sur-
vivors a common definition of the calamity. The consensus of the
community and outside agencies in defining the event as a di-
saster encourages a coordinated response within the town.
Neighbor works with neighbor to rebuild, and resources outside
the town are mobilized according to established disaster policies
of government and other organizations, providing relief to the
survivors and help in rebuilding. 1
Reactions to the Centralia mine fire were at wide variance
from the typical communal response to an immediate-impact
disaster. Contradictory differences, selectively perceived, in the
sensory, emotional, and cultural evidence of the underground
fire justified Centralians' use of their own varying experiences
to discredit the claims of others. The rhetoric of everyday life
alone ("They're seeking personal gain or power" or "They're
hysterical or stupid") armed disputants with the means to explain
how others could hold their convictions in the face of convincing
evidence that the world is otherwise. 2 The shifting, elusive nature
of the fire as a physical phenomenon bred misunderstanding
among the village residents. 3
As a matter of fact, only a handful of people have ever seen
the Centralia mine fire, which is burning two to three hundred
feet beneath the earth's surface. In the spring of 1981 and again
in the spring of 1983, the fire did reveal itself on the surface.
The 1981 "breakout," which occurred just outside the borough,
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in Conyngham Township, was quickly backfilled with fly ash by
Pennsylvania's Department of Environmental Resources. In
1983, the fire surfaced at the bottom of a ravine about one mile
from the borough. Since the path to the edge of the ravine is
almost vertical, only those in good physical condition could have
hiked to see the emergent fire, but even those who can lay claim
to have seen the Centralia mine fire cannot say they saw it in
Centralia. The 1983 breakout, like the earlier one, occurred out-
side the borough. That a mine fire exists, very few will argue.
That there is a mine fire under Centralia remained a point of
contentious debate.
"Some people refuse to believe that a fire exists in town even
though it broke to the surface at one point and spews carbon
monoxide everywhere," said a fifty-year-old man whose home is
in the officially designated impact zone. "They refuse to even
acknowledge that objectionable odor." On the other hand, in the
words of a thirty-six-year-old woman living on the north end, or
"cold side," of town (in reality only a little more than a half mile
from her neighbor in the impact zone): "I don't believe the mine
fire is in Centralia itself. I think the people just want to move.
Maybe the fumes are in the houses, I don't know; that's what
they're yelling about, but the fire is going the other way."
While no one has seen the mine fire in the Borough of Cen-
tralia, there is sensory evidence that its existence has affected
some residents in the community. On days when the wind was
blowing from the south, a mixture of carbon dioxide and sulphur
dioxide-emitted from "conditioned" coal, or anthracite burning
at temperatures above 200°F-rolled off the hill at St. Ignatius
Church and traveled three to four blocks into the community
before dissipating. For residents living in the path of the gases,
there was clearly something "in the air." A mother of two small
children describes her experiences of the gases: "I get very upset
when I look out our front window and see the smoke coming up
about three blocks from us."
Burning eyes, the taste of sulfur, and an acrid odor accom-
panied by headaches, lassitude, and respiratory troubles were
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unequivocal evidence for residents on the "hot side," or south
end of town, that the gases caused by the fire were circulating
in the borough. For residents on the north side oftown, however,
gas was not "in the air." Unless they traveled through the hot
side on a day when CO2 and S02 were detectable by the senses,
they had to depend upon their neighbors' accounts for evidence.
It was possible, of course, for residents on the cold side of town,
having no personal experience of the fumes, to discredit or di-
minish the claims of their neighbors that hazardous gases were
present.
Or, with the help of official intelligence, they might claim that
the gases were not related to the mine fire, as happened in the
spring of 1980, after an eight-year-old girl was hospitalized with
pneumonia. Her attending physician cautioned against returning
the child to her home on the south side of Centralia until the
high concentration of CO2 was reduced and the quality of ambi-
ent air was restored. 4 The OSM responded by declaring a site
"emergency" and permanently relocating three families whose
south-side homes were labeled health hazards. Here, surely, was
indisputable evidence that the mine fire was a readily identifiable
crisis demanding concerted community action. A child had been
seriously ill, an "emergency" was declared, and families were
forced to relocate, all because of the gas.
But, although the OSM acted quickly in declaring the houses
unsafe and relocating residents, the agency was also quick to take
the official position that the CO2 was not connected with the
Centralia mine fire. Carbon dioxide, the OSM stated, was a
byproduct of past mining practices still present in the abandoned
mines and passageways crisscrossing the underside of Centralia.
The location of the three evacuated homes, on top of the highest
underground temperatures in the borough, was not considered
in the agency's official statement. Three years later, the Penn-
sylvania Department of Health was to list carbon dioxide, along
with carbon monoxide and methane, as a hazardous gas that
"must be addressed in relationship to the Centralia mine fire."5
Nevertheless, when the OSM officially separated the CO2from
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the mine fire, it denied credibility to those residents whose syn-
chronous experience of the gas and the underground fire was to
them sufficient evidence that the two were closely linked, while
supporting those residents who preferred to deny the threat of
the mine fire. Adopting the official position, the nay-sayers could
express sympathy for families affected by the gas, but deny any
relationship to the underground fire, a more catastrophic pos-
sibility. Those residents who experienced the fire mainly in terms
of the official government interpretation drew one set of conclu-
sions, whereas the Centralians whose senses experienced the gas
in living on top of the hot area came to very different conclusions.
Divided between two groups who experienced the world in very
different ways, the community was unlikely to arrive at a de-
finitive version of "what really was happening."
A more insidious gaseous product of the mine fire was virtually
undetectable by the Centralians themselves. Unlike CO2 and
502, which can be registered by sight, taste, smell, and physical
reactions, the deadly carbon monoxide is detectable only by gas
monitors. Colorless, odorless, tasteless, and non-irritating, CO
is formed whenever a carbon-based fuel is incompletely burned.
Considered by the Pennsylvania Department of Health to be the
most dangerous side effect of the underground mine fire, CO
combines with the hemoglobin in the blood, interfering with the
blood's capacity to carry oxygen to the cells of the body. Acute
CO poisoning ends in death by respiratory failure.
In a 1967 accident in the town of Shamokin, a fifteen-mile
drive from Centralia, five people had died in their sleep of CO
poisoning caused by an underground mine fire. That accident
was on the minds of many Centralians whose homes fell within
the area that the U. S. Bureau of Mines in 1982 called the impact
zone. 6 The hazards of CO from mine fires were familiar to most
Centralians.
In the early 1980s, the Bureau of Mines funded a project to
monitor air quality in homes to assure that the safety of residents
was not jeopardized by the seepage of dangerous gases. This
project, typical of the imperfections in the government's hazard
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management policies, ended up as little more than a source of
community discord. The' Pennsylvania Department of Environ-
mental Resources (DER), appointed to monitor homes, surveyed
the entire community in the winter of 1981. DER representatives
knocked on doors and asked residents if they wanted gas monitors
placed in their homes, an inspector to check their homes regu-
larly for gases, or both. Only nine families outside the impact
zone requested a routine check of their homes for gases. Not
one family outside the impact zone requested a monitor.
Within the impact zone, sixteen households and St. Ignatius
School were the first to sign up for the gas detectors. In the
course of the next several weeks, more hot-side families accepted
the government's offer. In all, 72 of the 106 families living in the
impact zone, or 69 percent, requested the devices.
The DER recommended that the monitors be placed in the
basement, since the mine gases were most likely to enter a house
through the basement floor. The black monitors, each with a
large red bell on one side, were designed for industrial use in
deep mines, not for residences. Each device, measuring 22 by
10 by 9 inches, emitted a clucking sound, at roughly 70 clucks
per minute. Despite the ominous sight and sound of the large
black boxes, and contrary to the government's advice, most Cen-
tralians wanted the monitors placed in the living areas of their
homes, saying that it made them feel safer. The family room,
dining room, and hallways were the most frequent spots for the
clucking black box. One or two DER inspectors would enter
most homes daily, to take carbon monoxide readings from the
monitors and to spot-check drains and faucets for traces ofcarbon
dioxide and methane.
The obtrusive presence of the monitors in the living areas of
their homes and the daily appearance of the DER inspectors
made most families on the hill feel haunted by the persistent
threat ofgas poisoning. Comparatively few residences were found
to have gas levels that exceeded the standards for ambient air
used by the DER, but many families complained ofthe symptoms
that accompany chronic exposure to higher than normal levels
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of CO and CO2 , Over time, many families expressed distrust of
the DER monitoring program, suspicious of a cover-up. Resi-
dents wondered out loud how they could feel so poorly when
they were inside their homes if the air was safe to breathe, as
the DER claimed it was. For many residents, the gases were
experienced in ways inconsistent with the official interpretation
that the gas problem was a potential, not an actual, threat.
Centralians who believed the gases posed an immediate and
real threat to their health could find support for their fears when
they picked up the local daily newspaper. In March of 1981, the
paper reported the views of a "distinguished" medical researcher
on the adverse health effects of chronic exposure to low levels
of CO. 7 Citing danger at threshold figures well below those set
by the DER, the scientist confirmed the sensory experiences of
many residents, who complained of chronic colds, fatigue, head-
aches, and various other ailments. Another official voice was thus
added to the growing babel of scientists, legislators, attorneys,
and social service personnel seeking to make themselves heard
as Centralians sought to make sense of the mine fire and organize
their reactions to it.
In contrast to residents of the impact zone, most residents
who lived as far away as the fringes of the hot-side area or at the
north end of town were not confronted by an immediate threat
of poisonous gases and the daily presence of environmental in-
spectors. Without sensory affirmation in the form of physical
symptoms, a gas monitor, or visits from the DER inspectors,
residents could simply ignore the gas problem, which many did;
or they could see the claims of their neighbors on the hill as the
product of unrealistic fear or as a conspiracy to get rich quick by
selling their homes to the government at inflated prices. Consider
the reasoning of a middle-aged man who lived at the far north
end of town: "Some people are using the problems [associated
with the fire] to achieve personal gains. And the news media are
always highlighting whatever those people have to say to make
them look like no one else cares and they are representing the
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town. Well, they're not representing me or the town as far as
I'm concerned. They're looking out for themselves."
For the Centralians who lived on the hill, the suspicions that
their experiences of fear and dread were manipulative displays
or an inaccurate perception of reality were cruel character judg-
ments that denied their fundamental right to a safe, healthy
environment. Disputes over underlying motives, typical of the
community's response to its crisis, could not be reconciled simply
by determining whether or not gases were in fact seeping into
homes.
Beyond the disjuncture over mine gases, the community also
split over the threat of subsidence, as miners call cave-ins. Sub-
sidence occurs when heat from a mine fire burns rock substrata,
so weakening the support for the ground's surface that it literally
caves in, leaving a hole anywhere from a foot to several yards in
diameter. Subsidence may also be the result of mining more than
twice. During a third mining, the underground pillars supporting
the mine shaft are "robbed," leaving only a few feet of topsoil
as a ceiling over a sizable cavern. The thin layer of soil is likely
to give way under the weight of vehicular traffic, heavy rainfall,
or even pedestrians. Most of the pillars under Centralia have
been robbed.
Twelve cave-ins have been reported in Centralia since 1980.
Though most of Centralia was susceptible to subsidence, all
twelve occurred on the hot side of town. In specific areas under-
stood to be at high risk, red signs warned, "Posted-Keep Out-
Danger." An area about a half block square was thought to be
so hazardous that it was enclosed with an 8-foot-high chain link
fence.
Were the twelve subsidences on the hot side of town related
to the fire? Centralians could not agree. Some reasoned that the
disproportionate number of cave-ins on the hill was simply the
result of having robbed a greater number of pillars from that
area. If more third mining had occurred in that area, they rea-
soned, then subsidences were more likely. Other Centralians,
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however, particularly those living on the hill, were convinced
that the twelve cave-ins were tied directly to the mine fire, and
that anyone who thought otherwise couldn't see what was really
going on.
Even if Centralians had not been polarized by the mine gases
and the cave-ins, they might have split into factions when the
social action groups came to town. Such groups focus on a set of
specific concerns such as the environment, the plight of women,
the poor, or the victims of inept or unlawful treatment by big
government or large corporations. The heavier a social action
group's caseload, and the more problems it is working on at any
given time, the easier it is to justify further funding, thereby
ensuring its continuance. Moreover, to become involved with a
case that has captured national attention adds to the credibility
of the organization, further certifying its reason for being. 8
It is thus not surprising that several social action groups con-
tacted organizations within Centralia to offer their services. Such
Washington, D.C.-based organizations as Rural American
Women, Ralph Nader's Public Interest Coalition, the Sierra
Club, the National Clean Air Coalition, and the Campaign for
Human Development were complemented by various Pennsyl-
vania-based groups, including the Harrisburg office of Catholic
Social Services and the Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for
Clean Air. Some of these organizations limited their contact with
the community to an exchange of letters; others became closely
associated with the town's predicament, unwittingly adding to
the conflict that divided the community. Surely the motivations
of these groups had strong elements of altruism. Centralia was
part of a "cause" in which they believed. At the same time, each
group also had its own organizational interests to further.
To justify their presence in Centralia, these organizations de-
fined the mine fire in terms consistent with the interpretations
of residents who saw the fire as an immediate threat to their
health and safety and who blamed government for failing to act
in their best interests. Thus, in the curious logic of mutual af-
firmation, Centralians who defined the mine fire as a menace
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justified the involvement of special-interest groups which, by
their involvement, affirmed the worst fears for life and property.
And, to the extent that the special interest groups affirmed these
fears, they challenged the beliefs of other residents who held
that the fire was a mere annoyance or at most a remote risk.
Another element in the complexity that confronted Centralia
was the number of law firms and individual attorneys who sought
by various means to represent individuals and groups in lawsuits
against the government. One attorney, for example, advised a
grassroots group at a public meeting to sue the Centralia Borough
Council. When attorneys offered to represent in a court of law
those residents who interpreted the fire as a threat, they served
to corroborate the legitimacy of feeling threatened.
In all the complex and contradictory encounters Centralians
had with the mine fire, one thing is clear: no single observation
or experience ofthe crisis could stand as definitive; every position
had at least some discreditors. Centralians thus found themselves
in the unusually difficult position of having to piece together
their own individual accounts of what the mine fire meant and
what, if anything, should be done to help their community.
The many individual interpretations of the underground mine
fire fractured the established social alignments in Centralia and
aroused anger and resentment among neighbors and friends. The
different meanings that people assigned to the fire, and the emo-
tive freight those differences carried, depended on the residents'
perceptions of the risks posed by the subsurface conflagration.
Many families in Centralia perceived the poisonous gases and
the threat of subsidence as hazardous agents with a high degree
ofphysical risk. One woman claimed to have kept an "emergency
suitcase containing valuables and necessities under the bed and
a pet carrier nearby in the event of a disaster." Other families
saw the risks posed by the fire as having a low probability of
endangering their health or well-being. In the words of a young
man living next to the impact zone: "The fire and gases may
reach this far. I don't know. Right now I'm in the clear." Still
other families conducted their lives as if the fire was at most an
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annoyance, hardly a risk. Unlike the therapeutic community that
emerges in the wake of immediate-impact disasters, the product
of chronic technological disasters such as the Centralia mine fire
is likely to be multiple groups, who experience and interpret the
ecological threat as a concern to "USH and not to "them,H or to
"themHand not "us. H
Many Centralians who felt themselves to be at high risk re-
sponded to the threat of the gases and subsidence through in-
formal gatherings around kitchen tables or, more formally, by
joining an organized group. On such collective occasions, their
fears were reinforced and intensified; the perception ofimminent
danger and the need to respond became more important than
the preservation of the community. Under the conditions of col-
lective stress, individuals detached themselves from any com-
mitment to the town. In fact, many of these residents perceived
the community as an obstacle in their efforts to find some relief
from the dangers posed by the fire.
Understandably, those Centralians who perceived the risks
posed by the fire to be low also began to perceive neighbors who
feared imminent danger as a threat to the preservation of the
community. In a community where 47 percent of the residents
have lived in their homes twenty-five years or longer, the threat
to community existence was met with dread and anger toward
neighbors who had, from the long-timers' perspective, clearly
misjudged the seriousness ofthe problem. Many Centralians who
saw the high-risk believers as themselves a peril to the com-
munity began to organize to "save their town. H
Thus emerged what many perceived as two irreconcilable
goals: the pr~servationof health and safety, and the preservation
of Centralia. For most residents who would become involved in
the conflict, achievement of one goal meant sacrificing the other.
Since the stakes were high, the dissension left little room for
compromise, and since the evidence was equivocal, contradic-
tory, and vague, even contradictory interpretations were offi-
cially and experientially confirmed.
Under some circumstances, conflict can serve to solidify a
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group. 9 The conflict that emerged in Centralia, however, did not
strengthen the consensual bases of the community; it put the
assumption of basic consensus in question. Centralians did not
resolve their differences on the basis ofan underlying unity; quite
the contrary, they splintered on the basis of their differences.
Fragmented at its core, the community could not generate col-
lective pressure on the state and federal agencies to respond
promptly and competently to the crisis. What social energy there
was expressed itself in the form of mutual opposition, or "tension
without action-a form of social paralysis. "10
4. A Group Emerges
and the Town Divides
Taking their cue from the hostage crisis in Iran, several residents
on the south end ofCentralia began to think of their predicament
as being parallel to the forceful, illegal detaining of Americans
in a hostile environment. One family painted a sign, roughly 3
feet by 3 feet, worded "Mine Fire Holds Families Hostage!!!"
and secured it to a fence next to the street for all to see.
In January 1981, the warning device on the carbon monoxide
monitor in one Centralia home started sounding almost every
other day, alerting the family by a loud, persistent ring that the
air in their home was hazardous to their health. But not until
three weeks later, on February 9, did the Pennsylvania De-
partment of Health list the home as unsafe because of higher
than acceptable levels of carbon monoxide.
Although that home was the third in Centralia where high CO
levels warranted an official declaration of the hazard, no state or
federal funds were made available to help families in relocating.
At the time, the only assistance forthcoming from government
agencies was advice to "ventilate" their "unsafe" homes by open-
ing the windows. This advice was the first hard evidence for
many families living on the hill that official declarations were not
necessarily followed by official actions. They shared their feelings
of vulnerability and entrapment around kitchen tables and over
the phone.
On February 14, 1981, a twelve-year-old boy narrowly es-
caped death in Centralia when the ground he was walking on
collapsed under him. In his words, "I just sort of started sinking
down, down to my knees, then down to my waist, then I went
all the way down."1 Grabbing desperately for anything to break
his fall, his fingers found the root of a tree protruding from the
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side of the mine cave-in. He clung to it, literally for life. His
screams for help alerted his nearby cousin, who managed to pull
him to safety. Later in the day a DER inspector recorded a
temperature of 350°F in the pit, and the CO level exceeded the
scale on the inspector's gas detector. Borough of Centralia offi-
cials reported that had the boy remained in the hole for longer
than three minutes, he would have died. 2
This near-fatality occurred within a hundred yards of the three
homes declared unsafe by the Department of Health. Ironically,
as the earth was collapsing under the boy, state and federal
legislators and several government scientists were across the
street inspecting one of the homes plagued by toxic gases. On
learning of the incident, one of the state legislators appealed to
the governor of Pennsylvania to declare a state of emergency in
Centralia. The governor decided against this course of action but
appointed a task force to review the community's predicament.
Less than four weeks after the near-fatality, a sixty-three-year-
old man was overcome by carbon monoxide in one of the three
homes across the street that were listed as unsafe. Unconscious,
he was rushed to a hospital where emergency staff revived him
with oxygen. When DER inspectors measured the oxygen level
in the man's home, they found it to be dangerously low. Within
a week of the incident, the man's family was moved from its
home of twenty-eight years to a trailer several blocks away, pro-
vided by the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency.
A child's narrow escape from a searing gaseous pit, an elderly
man's near-asphyxiation, the health department's advice that the
windows of unsafe houses be kept open rather than relocating
families, for which no money was available-these events pushed
angry, frightened residents toward one another. Some citizens
felt that the costs of the Centralia mine fire were being meted
out in a high degree of personal risk and the progressive dete-
rioration of both the environment and the community. Such a
toll, they assumed, would be reason enough for residents of a
small town to forget their differences and unite to protect one
another and their way of life.
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Such was the perception of the first citizens' group to organize
in response to the mine fire. On April 9, 1981, articles of incor-
poration were filed in the Columbia County Courthouse for the
Concerned Citizens Action Group Against the Centralia Mine
Fire, called CC for short.
The CC initially understood the hazardous conditions wrought
by the fire as a common problem perceived by everyone in town.
Though the group was originated by Centralians who saw their
health and safety as being in immediate danger, the founding
members believed they would receive the support of the wider
community. Surely, they reasoned, any competent witness to
reality would' arrive at the same conclusion they had reached:
the threats posed by the fire were unacceptable. Presuming a
community of others concerned about the dangers they were
experiencing, the CC assumed that no one in town could define
the crisis in terms other than those used by the group. "We just
thought everybody would join up, or most people anyways,"
mused one of the founding members of the organization.
Nothing could have been further from the truth. The CC was
quickly identified by other Centralians as a renegade band bent
on destroying the placid, tranquil life of their community. "Get
rid of Concerned Citizens," railed one man. "They're making
our town look like a three-ring circus." "Nobody can agree on
nothing in this town," said an elderly woman, "because the Con-
cerned Citizens open their big mouths all the time and never
know what they're talking about."
At the heart of the discord between the two sides lay different
perceptions of the immediacy of the risk. Although our 1982
community survey revealed that 67 percent of adult Centralians
felt that their health or safety was at some degree of risk because
of the mine fire, proximity to the fire influenced the perception
of how immediate the risks were. For example, 23 percent of
those living outside the impact zone agreed that "the mine fire
is just not as dangerous as most people think," while only 14
percent of impact zone residents were in agreement. Concerning
their own safety, 49 percent of cold-side adults felt no threat
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from the fire, while only 22 percent of hot-side residents felt
safe. At the opposite extreme, a sense ofbeing "very threatened"
was expressed by only 17 percent of those living on the cold
side, but by 36 percent of impact zone residents.
In other words, Centralians tended to evaluate the chance of
being harmed by the fire according to where they lived in the
borough. Those living outside the impact zone perceived a po-
tential danger to themselves and the community from the mine
fire, but the risk was seen as a remote problem, to be tolerated
while government engineers worked out a plan for relieving the
dangers. Risk remained an individual issue, a relatively infre-
quent topic of conversation. On the other hand, many of the
impact zone inhabitants perceived danger to be a fact and risk
an urgent problem requiring an immediate solution. The im-
mediacy of their experiences of the fire pushed the hot-siders
toward one another, setting the stage for the founding of the CC.
The contrasting risk assessments ofcold-side and hot-side resi-
dents were expressed in the thirty-eight conversational inter-
views conducted during this study. In twenty of these interviews,
Centralians who lived outside the area of town designated dan-
gerous all recognized the threat posed by the mine fire, acknowl-
edging with varying degrees of certainty their personal concern
about its catastrophic potential. But not one of these cold-siders
identified the risks as immediate. In the words of a woman living
at the far north end of the borough: "That fire has a mind of its
own. You know, it's outsmarted the government for years. What's
stopping it from burning right under our home? ... I don't have
the problems some of those families have up on Park and Locust
Streets. And I don't want them."
An elderly man living on the west end of town, who had
pneumoconiosis, or "black lung disease," brought on by work in
the mines, feared that gases from the fire might seep into his
home and aggravate his breathing problems. To assuage his fear
that the gases might be threatening his health, he periodically
called the local DER office to hear in the reassuring words of
the inspector that the gases were potentially hazardous only for
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residents living "on the hill." "As long as they tell me it's 'on
the hill,' " the elderly man reasoned, "I can live with it."
A forty-two-year-old man living on the west side was person-
ally concerned about the fire "only to the extent that I have
vague suspicions that it's detrimental to my health sometimes
when I walk around the place, because of a cardiac condition."
The same man "put severe restrictions" on his eight-year-old
son, denying him permission to ride his bicycle on the hot side
of town: "Oh yes, I will not allow him to Park Street and beyond.
He knows this, he respects it. For what it's worth, I've threatened
him literally with a licking if he goes up there . . . I don't want
him anywhere near there."
In these and other ways, Centralians living outside the impact
zone made minor adjustments in routine to manage whatever
potential risks they saw in the fire. Their individual perceptions
of any threat as being relatively remote precluded collective
action.
For many hot-side inhabitants, however, the fire represented
an immediate threat to their health and well-being that pushed
them toward a collective response. The hot-siders felt powerless
to reduce the threat to manageable proportions and doubted the
government's ability to help them avoid the fire's consequences.
They interpreted the mine fire in terms quite different from those
of their neighbors across town. 3 An eighty-two-year-old woman
admitted to being "afraid of the gases and afraid of subsidences."
By that point, she was also "tired of being afraid ... and the
government's no help either. They don't seem to care, and when
they do do something, it doesn't seem to help."
"My home is not safe, my yard is not safe, my town is not
safe, and no one does anything about it," declared a thirty-two-
year-old mother of two. "My children have great cases of res-
piratory infections. We have emotional problems in our
family.... It [the mine fire] has affected us greatly."
A middle-aged man described his personal responses to living
in the impact zone in this way: "I don't lay awake at night wor-
rying about it, but I do worry about it quite a bit. I do have
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gases in my home, and I keep thinking, Oh my God, my brain
cells. I forgot something. Is it because of the gases? I go to bed
and I think, Oh, I wonder if I'll wake up tomorrow morning."
"Scared, that's what I am," explained a fifty-eight-year-old
woman. "My brother had to move out of town because his home
was full of gas. When I went down and seen them moving, I
cried my heart out, because they were very close to me. I felt
bad, but I never dreamt that the government wasn't going to do
something to stop it [the fire] before it came to us. Now here it
is in my backyard. You know, my mother and father died of
cancer, and I think the gases are going to give me a cancer."
An immediate risk demands more than minor, individual ad-
justments in routine. Frightened and unsure of how to cope on
a day-to-day basis with the threat of the fire, many of the hot-
side inhabitants began to seek out others who felt the same,
taking comfort in the knowledge that they were not alone. Gradu-
ally, over the course of several informal meetings, the idea of an
organized response to the crisis emerged. Simply in the act of
creating the organization, the founding members of the CC re-
duced uncertainty and took the opportunity to help one another
manage the tensions associated with life in the impact zone.
But of deeper significance was the emergence of a shared set
of assumptions concerning the extent and kinds of danger CC
members and their families were facing. Over time, these as-
sumptions acquired permanence supported by personal com-
mitment, becoming a belief system that would serve CC
members both in appraising threatening circumstances and in
acting as a group. Because the beliefs focused on danger and the
threat of loss, we refer to these linked assumptions as a threat
belief system. 4
Whereas risk perception can be understood as part of an in-
dividual's personal reality, a threat belief system is a supra-
individual, or cultural, phenomenon. Quite unlike an individual's
risk perception, threat belief systems constitute paradigms for
collective action. 5 Organizational life takes place in the name of
these belief systems. Members of the new group that emerged
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in Centralia regulated their conduct and explained their behavior
on the basis of a set of beliefs about the extent and nature of the
danger that a disaster agent posed for them, their families, and
their community. The emergence of this new group, with ideas
about the quality of community life and the safety of the local
environment that differed radically from those of their neighbors,
polarized social relations in the town.
The failure of the CC to appeal to a representative portion of
the town was also related to the generational differences between
the group's members and other residents. CC members were
primarily young or middle-aged adults with children. In a town
where close to 60 percent of the adults were more than fifty years
old and 40 percent were more than sixty-two years old, the typical
CC member was considered young. The designation "young"
often carried, in Centralia, the added meanings of impulsive,
heedless, and brash. It was not infrequent to hear others in town
refer to the CC as a "young bunch of hotheads" who lacked a
sense of responsibility or proper regard for the consequences of
their actions.
A seventy-six-year-old man attributed divisiveness in the town
to "a certain element who wants to get a lot of money and move.
They are the young Concerned Citizens, who never saw a mine."
A sixty-one-year-old retired miner rejected the CC as being
"mostly too young to know much about mining and mine fires."
In the words of a seventy-one-year-old woman: "The Concerned
Citizens are acting like greedy children. Give them some money
to get out of town. That's all they want." Dismissing the CC in
this fashion precluded a thoughtful consideration of their pre-
dicament and made it impossible to consider seriously the claims
of the organization.
Several members of the CC responded in kind to the remarks
of their senior neighbors, emphasizing the generational differ-
ences. From a twenty-three-year-old CC member: "Our biggest
problem are the older people in town who are ignorant of the
dangers of the fire and are too stubborn to leave their homes."
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A young father of two found the older people "too comfortable
in their homes and too old to give a damn [about us]."
The demographic differences between the CC and a majority
of the town's residents led not only to name-calling, but also to
significant differences in attitude toward the fire. With their
children raised and gone, with an emotional commitment to their
homes and neighborhood as a good place to live out their re-
maining years, Centralia's elderly were less inclined to interpret
the fire as a life-threatenting crisis demanding a quick solution---
particularly if that solution would unsettle their way of life. In
interviews and on public occasions, several of Centralia's elderly
expressed the desire to be left alone to live, as one man phrased
it, "those years God has left for me in peace."
For the members of the CC, however, there was plenty of
life yet to be lived. There were" children to raise and careers to
pursue. As they interpreted it, the fire had already unsettled
their way of living, had indeed endangered their very lives. For
them the situation was intolerable.
Clearly, geographic proximity to the fire was a major variable
in distinguishing those prepared to believe the worst from those
who interpreted the fire as a minor annoyance. But even within
the impact zone, generational factors differentially encouraged
the quest for information about the fire and predisposed some
residents to fashion these data into a coherent interpretation of
what was happening.
The threat belief system of the CC did not develop slowly,
over the several months of the group's existence. Even by the
time of the organization's first formal meeting, the outlines of
the beliefsystem were common knowledge to most ofthe original
membership. In fact, it could be argued that the basis of the
founding members' original attraction to one another was their
common set of threat beliefs regarding the scope and seriousness
of the fire. As an organization, the CC served to intensify those
beliefs and to disseminate them within and outside the borough.
Because the founding members of the CC had constructed a
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meaningful interpretation of their predicament before the group
even existed, the CC did not encourage alternative interpreta-
tions of the dangers posed by the fire. Indeed, alternative inter-
pretations were considered heresy by the core members, who
were passionately concerned with convincing others that their
beliefs were the only logical and morally correct positions. In
the minds of CC members, people who disagreed with them
were either ill-informed (they didn't live close enough to the fire
to see its effects) or lying (they had some ulterior motive for
making false claims). This intolerance of alternative interpreta-
tions was at the root of some of the problems the CC was to face.
The fervor with which CC members expressed their beliefs
arose in part from their identification with the most severely
affected families. It is true that personal experience of toxic gases
or the subsidence above mine workings helped to shape the
threat beliefs, but the fire did not create hazardous conditions
for every resident ofCentralia, and the hazardous conditions that
existed varied in the degree of danger, with some families ex-
periencing a single incident of elevated gas readings and others
subject to repeated or continuous incidents. Not everyone who
held the threat beliefs could recount personal experiences to
confirm the legitimacy and intensity of the danger, and even
personal encounters with the fire varied in number and intensity.
But their shared assumptions about the danger of the fire had their
sources in accredited public information: the worst-case experiences
of several families who lived in homes with persistently high gas
readings and the crisis events that occurred on the hill. 6
Interviews and discussions with the founding members of the
CC suggest that those families most jeopardized by the mine
gases and the subsidences became reference points when others
on the hill wanted to make some sense out of the type and degree
of risk to which they and their families might be exposed. The
severe, atypical cases were frequently talked about as if they
were the common experience-as if the most extreme were also
the most representative. 7 For example, when dangers associated
with the fire were the topic of conversation, it was the testimony of
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those whose homes had been declared unsafe by the state De-
partment of Health, and the experiences of others who would
be offered relocation money in 1981, that served as points of
reference. In formal testimony during a hearing in Centralia of
the Mines and Energy Committee of the state House of Rep-
resentatives, the most severely affected residents reported on
their experiences of the fire and the gases. The worst-case ex-
periences of the fire were used as evidence by others on the hill
to affirm their interpretation of the problem:
When you look at TV, next thing you know [you wake up and] an
hour and a half has gone by and the program is over. If anyone of
you have any trouble sleeping at night . . . all you have to do is
come to my apartment and sit there and I guarantee you you'll fall
asleep.
A Bureau of Mines representative told us a home could be
checked out ok when the inspector comes in the morning, but that
afternoon a strong surge of gas could come and kill every living
thing in the house. Nobody knows when that surge is going to
come.... It's really scary.
Today, my [carbon monoxide] monitor alarm sounded three
times, and now carbon monoxide is in my home. The time for being
complacent and hoping for a miracle is over. 8
The worst-case families served as reference groups even after
they had been relocated, and even though no gas levels of com-
parable magnitude were recorded in any of the other homes in
Centralia. 9
Moreover, the two most dramatic effects of the fire, the sub-
sidence that the twelve-year-old boy fell into and the carbon
monoxide gas that overcame an elderly man, were evoked by
the original CC members most frequently when the subject
turned to how dangerous it was to live on the hill: "What hap-
pened to [the man overcome by gas]-and we can only thank
God, and the rescue boys, that he is not dead-could happen
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to anybody living on top of this fire." "A young lad almost lost
his life and the kids are getting sick because of these mine
gases.... It's like the government is waiting for someone to die
before they say, 'Hey, this mine fire is serious.' "
Only the most extreme and statistically unrepresentative cases
served as the standards by which other, perhaps less severely
affected, families were to evaluate their own living conditions.
Presentiments of loss or harm from the fire were founded on the
relatively few catastrophic events and obvious threats in the his-
tory ofthe blaze, not on the long and tedious chronology ofevents
that might have encouraged a less dreadful apprehension of the
crisis. It is not hard to account for the significance that some
residents attributed to the dramatic events in town. A mine fire
generates as much uncertainty as it does gases-prolonged un-
certainty about the high-stakes issues of health and safety and
economic well-being. Even though extreme cases may be statis-
tically unrepresentative of residents' experiences to date, there
is no way of calculating the statistical probability of harm in the
future. Hot-side residents, uncertain as to what dangers might
befall them, naturally feared the worst, and they reinforced each
other's threat beliefs through CC activities and informal gath-
erings. Ironically, the construction and dissemination of this
threat belief system only heightened the fear and hostility. On
the one hand, CC members became ever more convinced that
their worst fears would inevitably come to pass; on the other,
cold-side residents viewed the CC as responding hysterically to
an unfounded account of danger.
The local newspaper's coverage of the fire reinforced the threat
beliefs of the CC. Our survey indicated that fully 90 percent of
the people living in Centralia received information about the fire
from the local newspaper. 10 In fact, the paper became part of the
divisive struggle between Centralians. Opinions of the paper's
trustworthiness, for example, differed dramatically, depending
on attitude toward the fire. Of the 67 percent of Centralians who
thought their safety was at least somewhat threatened by the
fire, 62 percent believed that the information they received from
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the paper about the fire was accurate. Indeed, the founding
members of the CC saw the paper as a credible, unbiased source
of information, critical to their efforts to cope with the hazards
of the fire. On the other hand, only 38 percent of the Centralians
who did not feel threatened were confident of the accuracy of
what the newspaper printed. Many of these residents saw the
paper as exaggerating the dangers of the situation and taking
sides with the CC against the rest of the community.
In the first few weeks of 1981, the editorial board of the news-
paper decided to "bring the town's plight to national attention
and to help the townspeople."11 The paper's coverage before that
time, however, indicates that the paper was moving toward an
advocate role for residents on the hill well before the editorial
board's announced decision to publicize the issue. As early as
December 12, 1979, the paper printed an editorial accusing the
federal Office of Surface Mining of a "do-nothing attitude" about
the mine fire and a lack of concern for the health and safety of
Centralians. The editorial criticized the inability of the OSM to
decide what to do about the growing threat from the underground
fire.
The latest development is the fire forced the closing of a gasoline
service station as a safety precaution. Heat generated by the . . . fire
warmed the ground beneath the station, a threat to the gasoline-
filled tanks, which were emptied. . . . If gasoline-filled tanks are
hazardous, the [natural gas] pipeline is even more of a threat to the
safety of community and its residents. . . . To say the entire com-
munity is in jeopardy is not overstating the situation. . . . Another
certainty is the fire has the potential for serious, if not tragic
consequences. "12
Two themes in this editorial would serve the paper in the
coming months as the primary foci in its coverage of the fire: the
failure of government agencies and legislators to find a response
to the disaster, and the growing peril to health and well-being,
particularly for families living on the hill. Repetition of these
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themes would intensify the perceptions of many Centralians on
the south end that they lived from day to day with imminent
disaster and could expect little help from the government, which
appeared to have no control over what was happening.
The paper relied heavily on reporting worst-case situations in
carrying out its stated intention ofbringing the plight ofCentralia
to national attention. The persistent emphasis on dangerous,
chaotic, irrational happenings made them appear, to Centralians
predisposed to believe the worst, to be typical consequences of
the fire. 13
In its studied concern with the extreme case, the local paper
made regular use of the human interest story. Within a couple
ofweeks of the first organized meeting of the CC, the local paper
ran a four-part series on families who lived in homes with the
most serious levels of toxic gases, where gas monitors were reg-
istering excessive levels of carbon monoxide almost daily. These
conditions were not typical of Centralia, and in any case the
families, along with more than two dozen others, were about to
be relocated at the government's expense. In such articles as
"Family's Nightmare Ending," however, the newspaper empha-
sized the dramatic. Identifying carbon monoxide as "a lethal gas
in heavy concentrations and a health destroyer . . . in lesser
ones," the article describes a "nerve shattering alarm" and por-
trays the efforts of the family to "combat the gas." It ends on an
editorial note: "The federal government will demolish his home
after the family leaves and the mine fire will have the last laugh."
Two days later, the story "Gas Victim 'Free At Last' " depicted
the plight of another family in similarly vivid language. 14
In late March 1981, a front-page story carried the headline
"Two doctors say: mine fire gases harmful for susceptible per-
sons. "15 The article began with a reminder ofjust how dangerous
the situation was: "To someone living in Centralia, there are few
things as frightening as the possibility that dangerous gases from
the mine fire beneath the borough might some day find their
way into a home and sicken or kill somebody's family-possibly
one's own." The stated intent of the article was "to inform the
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people of Centralia about the dangers they face from the mine
fire gases. 77 Note that the intent was not to inform residents about
the possible dangers or the likelihood of harm from the gases.
The assumption was clearly that the residents were in fact en-
dangered, but that not all of them were aware of just how im-
periled they were: "It is well known to borough residents that
high levels of carbon monoxide or carbon dioxide, low levels of
oxygen-all byproducts ofthe mine fire-can kill or cause serious
illness. But they perhaps are not aware medical researchers have
found that even low levels ofcarbon monoxide-lower than found
in some Centralia homes-can cause serious health problems for
c~rtain people. 77
The story quotes at length a "distinguished7' researcher whose
studies suggest that exposure to even low levels of carbon mon-
oxide can aggravate the condition of those predisposed to upper
respiratory illnesses. According to another expert, representing
the Pennsylvania Department of Health: "It is possible that a
subsidence could occur in the basement of a Centralia home and
allow a strong surge of carbon monoxide to enter it, possibly
overcoming and killing a family before they could take notice
and escape. 77 Noting that the people of Centralia "are very, very
frightened,77 he added, "I think I would be if I lived up there. 7'
In such stories, the "possible77 was transformed to "probable. 77
On several occasions, members of the CC referred to this article
and others like it in testifying to the dangerous conditions they
were forced to live with.
The media, in particular the daily that had publicly assumed
an advocacy role for the most severely threatened segment of
the community, were perceived as a more accurate source of
information about the fire than the government experts. 16 In
bringing the "plight of Centralians77 to national attention, re-
porters were predisposed to focus on instances of government
mismanagement that would confirm the belief that the experts
were not in control.
The local daily also used the editorial page on a regular basis
to sound the same themes. Of the twelve editorials on Centralia
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appearing between January 1 and April 30, 1981, nine have titles
that make direct reference to danger or to government inertia
and dishonesty. With few exceptions, the twelve editorials make
pronouncements of imminent danger and unscrupulous govern-
ment response. To cite but three examples:
Despite all their rosy promises, federal officials still show a shocking
lack of sympathy for Centralians.... [In the meantime] the un-
derground fire keeps burning, posing increased danger to life and
property."
While the debate on the future course of the mine fire project
is pursued at a snail's pace by the federal bureaucracy, people's lives
remain in constant danger.
Will it take the loss of human life to persuade the federal gov-
ernment to step in and extinguish the fire ?"17
In three editorials appearing February 19, ~larch 16, and April
28, 1981, the paper pronounced the mine fire serious enough
for an official declaration of disaster. Another editorial during
this period warned Centralians that government delay might
itself cause a disaster: "We believe that efforts to resolve the
mine fire are moving too slow, and waiting ... only courts di-
saster. "18 In other words, the local daily did more than just report
the "facts."
Because the paper adopted a worst-case interpretation, its
greatest appeal was to those residents who were also inclined to
view the crisis in the most negative way-a mutually affirmative
dynamic. It was the founders ofthe CC, a small, unrepresentative
group, to whom the local reporters turned when they wanted an
inside story on Centralia. It was the threat beliefs of the CC,
based upon the most extreme assessment of the dangers asso-
ciated with the fire, that received the most extensive coverage.
Indeed, the relationship between several families on the hill and
the little daily was so close that when the gas warning bells
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sounded, residents called the newspaper along with the DER
inspector, to ensure that a reporter would be on hand to observe
the inspector's visit and write it up for the next day's edition. In
turn, the almost daily coverage of the hardest-hit families could
only confirm the worst fears of others on the hill. Hot-siders
found their extreme interpretations of the fire validated by what
they understood to be a reliable, unbiased authority, an ally in
their attempt to convince others of the desperate nature of their
predicament.
In the view of one of the original members of the CC, the
local daily "saw the problem like we saw it and told it straight."
"This paper doesn't even come from our town,)) observed another
member of the group, "but it understands what we're facing,
which is more than I can say for a lot of the people that live in
this town.)) The symbiotic relationship between the local press
and the CC gained in complexity when the daily began giving
information to the group several days before printing it. On more
than one occasion, a reporter supplied information from sources
outside the borough that served to legitimate the belief that the
fire represented an imminent danger. Such information would
then be used by residents to claim that, no matter what the
government said, they were at risk because the official monitoring
of their homes was too crude to detect the presence of low levels
of poisonous gases.
To some extent, the local paper influenced regional and na-
tional coverage ofthe mine fire, since print or television reporters
who made the trip to Centralia would seek to interview those
Centralians most frequently cited in the local daily. Six men and
women, four of them members of the CC, were interviewed
more frequently by the extra-local media than anyone else. Such
national attention added credibility to the coverage of the local
press. As one man put it, "You can say the local paper plays
favorites. . . . But when the same stuff is on national TV and
makes the New York Times, you've gotta sit up straight and take
notice."
Families in the impact zone, including the founders of the
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CC, saw the local daily as their advocate in facing the real peril
of the fire. This alliance was praised in a letter to the editor
headed "A Cry For Help," signed by nine families living on the
hill (five of them members of CC at some point):
What a great feeling to know our local paper is behind residents of
Centralia. You showed us you care, you sympathize. The families
in the impact area appreciate this.
Now if only we can get the support of our neighbors. Today I
have gas [in my home], tomorrow it could be you crying out for
help.... We need your support now. 19
The local newspaper was not without its detractors among the
many in town who did not accept the threat beliefs of the CC:
"People don't know all the facts! The newspaper blows everything
out of proportion to scare people." "I am fed up with the media's
lies. It [the mine fire] isn't as bad as they say it is." "The real
problem with this fire is the local news media reporters use this
confusion to twist everything to suit themselves." Not a few of
the cold-side residents explicitly linked the local paper to the
CC: "The fire has bothered me and my family only due to the
anxiety caused by the local newspaper and the 'Concerned
Citizens.' That group should be run out of town."
In protest against the perceived bias of the paper, several
Centralians at one point suggested that reporters be excluded
from a proposed community meeting. The paper naturally re-
sponded by defending its coverage: "We believe that we have
acted in a responsible way to call public attention to Centralia's
serious problem.... We are sincere in our concern for the wel-
fare and safety of Centralia residents.... We are not 'the
enemy' or a dangerous entity that needs to be controlled."20
Nevertheless, on several occasions throughout the tumultuous
months of 1983, the local reporter assigned to the story was
barred from attending community meetings. A councilman jus-
tified the action on the grounds that "we just can't trust he'll get
his facts straight." Nor was the Centralia Borough Council the
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only group to close some of its deliberations to the local press:
of the several grassroots groups to emerge during 1983, only one
permitted the press regular access to its meetings. Indeed, dis-
satisfaction with local coverage of the mine fire became so acute
during the spring of 1983 that several Centralians, who ironically
could not agree on a course of action for the town, did agree that
the local paper should remove its reporter from the Centralia
beat. Their appeal to the editor of the paper fell on deaf ears. 21
The role of the local newspaper in Centralia was addressed in
a feasibility study of resident relocation by the Institute on Man
and Science in October 1981. The purpose of this study was to
evaluate the social environment in Centralia and to determine
what role the institute might play in coordinating a relocation
program for the borough. Regarding the local newspaper, the
institute concluded:
The fire is, of course, nationally newsworthy, so it is a big fish for
a small town newspaper to have in its pages every day. The desire
to make the most ofsuch journalistic good fortune is understandable.
Nevertheless, the paper has not earned a reputation for impartiality
among those opposed to relocation of Centralia. They see it as a
mouthpiece for the Concerned Citizens.... Unfortunately, the di-
vided perceptions among the townspeople of the value of their local
paper creates an additional impediment to unification of the town
behind a solution: the largest accessible source of information is
easily discounted by a large number. Intervention by an outside
agent would require a careful aloofness from this little daily. 22
After a disaster ofnatural origin, the print and electronic media
provide information on where to go and what to do. While the
extent of physical damage, human loss, and social disruption
caused by the disaster agent are frequently subject to unrealistic
reporting, media distortion is not a major factor in defining re-
sponses to the disaster. In a chronic technological disaster, on
the other hand, residents are much less sure ofwhat is happening
to them and their community. The evidence of the hazard is ill-
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defined and contradictory; government response is marked by
discontinuity and uncertainty. The case of Centralia suggests a
relationship between the degree of uncertainty associated with
an aversive agent and the likelihood that the media will expand
their role of providing practical information into shaping per-
ceptions and beliefs about the scope and seriousness of the haz-
ard. It appears that the greater the perception of potential loss
and the higher the degree of uncertainty, the more dependent
a person or group becomes on the media's interpretation of a
warning or threat cue. As we see it, the newspaper's one-sided
orientation helped shape the beliefs of some residents about the
fire and reinforced the opinions of others.
The threat beliefs that developed among the founding mem-
bers of the CC centered on the perceived loss ofability to protect
themselves and their children from toxic gases and mine cave-
ins. They believed that their homes were no longer safe habi-
tats; that parts of the community itselfwere now life-threatening;
and that they had been abandoned by neighbors who did
not understand or accept their interpretation of the crisis as life-
threatening; and that the government would not, or could not,
protect them.
The CC perceived a loss of control over essential areas of
everyday life. The house, the yard, and the neighborhood were
no longer predictable arenas in which to conduct the affairs of
communal life. Moreover, this loss of control was not seen as a
temporary inconvenience, to be corrected within a reasonable
period of time. There would be no quick solution, given the
technical difficulties in abating the fire and the inconsistent, po-
litically motivated, seemingly conspiratorial response of govern-
ment. The sociological message of the threat beliefs was that the
members of the CC were victims, attached not to the community
as a whole but to one another in the anticipation of imminent
danger. 23
Given the conflicting information as to the dangers of the fire,
many Centralians on the hot side of town feared the worst. They
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began to confirm each other's fears. The irony is that the vague-
ness and uncertainty ofa chronic technological disaster, the terror
of anticipating the unknown, call out for firm beliefs to interpret
the threat. But beliefs based on worst-case interpretations evoke
stress responses that may ultimately be more damaging to the
person and the community than the hazard agent itself; there
need not be a close fit between the nature of a threat and the
nature of the reaction. In other words, the meaning of a high
gas reading or a subsidence resided not in the event itself but
in the interpretation of the event. In a very real sense, the
members of the CC were victimized twice: once by the mine
fire, and once again by the chronic state of apprehension gen-
erated by their threat beliefs.
The fears arising from the group's beliefs pushed it to adopt
what we will call confrontational coping from among the possible
range of behaviors for preventing, avoiding, or controlling the
sources of stress. In its confrontational tactics, the CC relied on
emotional displays of anger to dramatize the danger and to con-
front others, both within and outside the town, with their moral
responsibility toward the victims of the fire. 24
This confrontational coping had both expressive and instru-
mental functions. On the one hand, it served as a safety valve
for releasing a portion of the frustration and anger that members
of the CC were feeling. On the other hand, confrontational cop-
ing can be seen as an emotional crusade to control the way in
which neighbors and extra-local agencies and legislators inter-
preted the predicament. CC members, who wanted to be seen
as victims of a disaster agent that was out of control, demanded
swift and drastic action to reduce the immediate risks to health
and safety. Other Centralians, however, feared that the CC might
bring about destruction of the community itself. In the end,
although the confrontational tactics did help to move the federal
and state governments toward greater accountability in Cen-
tralia, they also alienated the CC from those in the community
who viewed the fire's dangers as minimal and the CC's tactics,
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therefore, as self-serving and destructive. The nature of the con-
troversy in Centralia shifted from disagreements over technical
issues to rank antagonism, pitting those who sought to preserve
the borough from what they perceived to be a controllable prob-
lem against those who demanded to be relieved from a chronic




We lived all our lives in Centralia;
It's here that our families have grown;
But fire's now threatening our city.
It's driving us out of our home.
The coal companies took all our riches;
Big money they made and amassed.
And now they left us in Centralia,
With nothing but poisonous gas.
-"Mine Fire Ballad," by a CC member
The Concerned Citizens Against the Centralia Mine Fire had
an impact on the town that was completely out of proportion to
its brief existence. In the twenty-one months from its first meet-
ing, in March of 1981, until the officers of the organization re-
signed in November of 1982, the CC polarized the community.
The mine fire itself took second place to the schisms between
competing groups, displayed in anger and hostility and sustained
by disagreements over specific issues associated with the fire. l
Many Centralians outside the CC were concerned about the
fire and wanted to do something about it but could not accept
the confrontational style of the CC. As one cold-side resident
explained: "Do the CC think that they are the only ones that are
concerned? I'm worried and so is my neighbor across the street.
So are a lot of people. But yelling and pointing fingers is not
going to solve the problem. But that's all they [CCl do as far as
I can tell."
Through the tactics of confrontation, the group sought to im-
pose on other Centralians its definition of the crisis, based on its
ecologically specific experiences of the fire. The belief that group
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members were in extreme danger left them little choice but to
confront their neighbors with the awful "truth" that Centralia
was a perilous place to live. The CC did not want to alienate
their neighbors, they wanted to warn them. Ironically, however,
it was the group's confrontational style and not the content of
their warning message that most Centralians responded to.
The CC's first public meeting sent a clear signal to many
Centralians that, for the group, "doing something" about the fire
outweighed any considerations of preserving the community. In
late March 1981, after reading newspaper accounts of the for-
mation of the group, an attorney from a nearby town contacted
the president of the CC to bring up the possibility of litigation.
The attorney offered to meet with the group to discuss strategies
for bringing legal action against the government, forcing it to
respond to those residents who were suffering the effects of the
fire. In a move they would label naive months later, the group
accepted the attorney's offer and decided to make their first
meeting public, inviting anyone from the community to attend.
At the meeting, on March 30 at Borough Hall, the attorney listed
several options for litigation. In his view, the initial lawsuit would
be brought against Centralia's Borough Council, the next one
against the state, and the third against the federal government.
Hearing that legal action against the Borough Council was pro-
posed, the mayor of the borough stormed out of the meeting and
called the other council members to tell them that this fledgling
group was going to sue the borough. Word quickly spread
through the small town.
Although the CC decided against pursuing the attorney's
strategy and did not invite him back, the damage had been done.
From the perspective of many in the borough, the CC members
wanted to protect themselves even if it meant sacrificing the
interests of the community. Not in a mood to placate its oppo-
nents, the CC made no effort to correct the community's mis-
perception of its intentions. In fact, one councilman reported
that for several months after the initial meeting, he had expected
every day to receive notice that he was being sued.
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Meanwhile, although deciding against litigation, the CC did
not give up its confrontational coping strategy. On April 22, 1981,
the group, now officially called the Concerned Citizens Against
the Centralia Mine Fire, held its first meeting as a chartered
organization. The meeting began with a discussion ofwhat group
members could do to alert the rest of the town, as well as gov-
ernment agencies and legislators, to their plight. "We wanted
to do something that would make this community get off its duff
and realize how serious this problem was," observed a former
member of the group. With the sense of urgency that comes
from living in a constant state of fear, the group decided to stage
a protest march down the center of town, to dramatize their fears
and convince others in town of the dangers they too were facing.
Although the protest was originally to take place on April 26,
the group rescheduled it to May 12, when a community meeting
would be held in the evening at the Borough Hall to discuss a
nonbinding referendum on the fire. The CC's postponement of
the protest gave the local paper time to report the CC's plans
in advance. In its first news article on the organization, the daily
reported that the "Concerned Citizens plan to stage a protest
march just before the start of a public meeting May 12 on the
May 19 referendum in the borough."2
This article led to several complaints from residents regarding
the propriety of the march. An elderly man complained that
"protests were for college kids. This is a quiet town. We don't
need a riot here. It won't accomplish anything." His wife was
equally opposed to the march: "It's embarrassing to have a few
people running around with signs telling the world that my town
isn't a safe place to live." The treasurer of the CC admitted to
the reporter covering the story that he was "getting a lot of
questions about the march. Some people don't like the idea."
In the late afternoon of May 12, twenty CC members met at
the north end of town and marched south to Borough Hall. The
marchers wore red ribbons on their clothing and tied ribbons to
their porches and on telephone poles, to symbolize both the
mine fire and the governmental red tape that had allowed the
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fire to continue for twenty years. Not wanting to overdramatize
their situation, group members had decided to forgo wearing gas
masks. The signs that the marchers carried proclaimed: "Ask not
what your government can do for you, it doesn't give a damn";
"Watt [the u.s. Interior Secretary] is the problem in Centralia";
"Save our town! Put out the mine fire."
Several children and reporters were in the audience, but very
few Centralians were on the streets to watch the marchers. Some
people opened their curtains to catch a glimpse of the group as
they passed, but many were already at the Borough Hall, waiting
for the community meeting to begin. Contrary to the CC's ex-
pectations, the protest march did not dramatize its beliefs or
impress on Centralia the need for action. Instead, the march
called attention to the group's apparent disregard for the pro-
priety of community life in Centralia. "That march was like a
bunch of silly children trying to get their way," one woman
objected. Another resident offered a more practical appraisal of
the CC's march: "I understand their fears and I too would want
to do something about my situation if I lived on the hill, but
marching down the center of town like a bunch of crazies is not
going to put the fire out."
Community disapproval of the march was expressed by more
than name-calling. Many in town began avoiding the members
of the organization. Neighbors crossed the street rather than
encounter a member of the CC, and even long-standing friend-
ships dissolved. CC leaders began receiving anonymous phone
calls from mumed voices: "How can you be so goddamned stupid
to spout off like that" or "Keep your mouth shut. There is no
problem." As the months went by, the calls became more vicious,
threatening bodily harm and even death.
Confronting the community, first with an attorney who rec-
ommended suing the Borough Council and then with a protest
march down the center of town, the CC signaled loud and clear
to many Centralians that its ties to its threat beliefs were stronger
than its ties to the unity and identity of the borough. For most
Centralians, however, the group's beliefs were not supported by
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sufficient evidence to warrant their displays. "If they are so sick
from the gases, Hreasoned one man, "how come it is that they
have all this energy for marching and meetings?"
Living in a state of chronic vigilance, CC members did not
pursue a rational plan of organizing the community, and their
emotion-driven strategies backfired. Although the group had
hoped to mobilize the town around its beliefs, its initial attempts
at emphasizing the harm done by the fire were interpreted by
many as a rejection of the community. Seeking to convince their
neighbors that Centralia was in imminent peril, CC members
themselves began to be perceived by many Centralians as en-
dangering the preservation of the town. Thus emerged what
George Simmel has called the phenomenon of "social hatred."3
The CC members viewed many of their neighbors as enemies
who callously disregarded the dangers to which residents on the
hill were exposed. In the view of many Centralians, however,
CC members were traitors to the community, willing to sacrifice
the borough for their own ends.
Both sides could find support for their positions in the endless
parade of conflicting interpretations of the fire that came from
various government agencies. During the second week in March
1981, the Office of Surface Mining publicly designated the area
on the hill between Second Street and South Street as "most
critical." About fifteen homes were within this area. A smaller
plot adjacent to South Street was labeled "less critical. HOne CC
member was able to find some humor in the latter classification:
"Does less critical mean that I can be less careful than if I lived
in the most critical area, but should be more careful than if I
lived in a least critical area?H When asked what the designation
meant in terms of protecting family members from harm, an
OSM official responded predictably: '~l am afraid that is an issue
the state of Pennsylvania will have to address. This agency's
responsibilities begin and end with the technical aspects of the
problem."
With the official announcement of a "most critical" and a "less
criticalHarea in the borough, we might expect that public per-
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ception of the extent and kind of danger from the fire would shift
toward the threat beliefs of the CC. But within a few days of the
OSM's official designation of danger areas, the typical pattern of
contrary evidence emerged, ensuring that, like a Rorschach ink
blot, the mine fire would be interpreted according to personal
convictions rather than objective fact.
Several days after the official pronouncement of "most" and
"less" critical sections of the community, the Roman Catholic
Church assessed the safety of students in its parochial school,
which was located adjacent to the "most critical" section. Easily
visible from the school were the gaping ends of large pipes that
vented carbon gases from the underground blaze. The school
was monitored daily for the presence of carbon monoxide gas,
and the DER had recorded levels of CO in excess of 35 parts
per million in the school on nineteen separate occasions during
January and February. (Anything above 10 ppm is considered
dangerous by the Pennsylvania Department of Health. Thirty-
five ppm is considered uninhabitable.) But a DER official was
quick to point out that many of the high readings were related
to such routine events as cooking in the school cafeteria, power
surges in the electrical system, or smoking cigarettes. Concerned
about the welfare of the children in the school, the bishop of the
Harrisburg Diocese sent a representative to Centralia to assess
the hazard and determine what should be done.
At the conclusion of his visit, the diocesan representative's
evaluation was: "At this point I don't have any good reason to
recommend closing the school." In paraphrasing the representa-
tive's remarks, the local paper wrote, "the Diocese of Harris-
burg . . . indicated that occasional presence of carbon monoxide
gas in the school in non-life-threatening amounts would be tol-
erated by the diocese."4 Once again, this time in the form of
official pronouncements from both state and church, residents
of Centralia were presented with contrasting judgments of the
scope and severity of the mine fire crisis. Many residents would
interpret these official conclusions as mutually exclusive, focusing
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on one or the other as authorized proof of their particular defi-
nition of the problem.
Mirroring the confusion in March 1981 about what harm the
fire might do, several families responded ambiguously to offers
from the government for temporary housing. Five of the families
most at risk from gas emissions and subsidence (four of them
members of the CC) had asked the Pennsylvania Emergency
Management Agency to provide house trailers for them to move
into until a decision could be made about permanent relocation.
The Pennsylvania Department of Health approved the families
for trailers, citing the danger of subsidence, the threat of poi-
sonous gases in the homes, and the medical histories of the family
members as reasons for approval. The department's official cer-
tification of the potential for harm and the agency's recommen-
dation for temporary relocation seemed to be a clear signal that
several families were immediately at risk. Yet three of the five
families rejected the government's offer to move into the trailers.
One resident feared his family would become "forgotten people"
in a trailer, like flood victims who accept interim housing. 5 Other
families complained of the expense of maintaining two dwellings.
Whatever their reasons, the refusal of some families to accept
the government's offer was evidence for many Centralians that
the problems the families had complained about were really not
very serious. To quote one cold-sided resident: "Here the gov-
ernment comes along and says 'Okay, we're going to help you
with your problem. Here are some trailers. Move in.' And what
do these yellers and screamers do? Make excuses for not mov-
ing." Once again, confirmation of the fire's hazards was followed
by discreditation in a cycle that defeated any possibility of com-
munity consensus.
On April 25, 1981, the local paper printed a story headlined
"Fire Threat Is Minimized." The story quoted the deputy legal
counsel to Governor Richard Thornburgh of Pennsylvania in de-
scribing the U. S. Department of the Interior's assessment of the
fire: "They explained to us that they view the threat as one that
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will dissipate, given the configuration of the coal seams and other
conditions of the fire." Later in the article, however, the writer
cited a contradictory report from the u.s. Bureau of Mines on
the consequences of allowing the fire to burn uninterrupted:
"This . . . would result in the fire's lasting many years. . . . Over
one-half of the borough of Centralia . . . could become involved
in the fire hazards.... It is clear that the 'do nothing' approach
would require relocating the entire community of Centralia."6
Even when one source ofharm was ruled out, another replaced
it. The community was relieved to hear in June of 1981 that the
deadly gas methane had not been detected in a sewer trench
opened on the hot side of town;7 perhaps the gases were not the
problem the CC claimed they were. A month later, however, a
representative of Nader's Public Interest Coalition formally re-
quested the state Department of Health to test the air in Cen-
tralia homes for gases other than CO and methane, including
sulfur oxides and benzopyrene. The president of the CC said of
the request: "There's a lot more danger here than at Three Mile
Island. "8
During the summer, Interior Secretary Watt and Governor
Thornburgh signed what was officially known as a memorandum
of understanding, which was to have clarified the roles that the
state and the OSM would play in finding a solution for Centralia.
This memo, however, was interpreted differently by the federal
and the state governments. The federal interpretation of the
memo reduced the OSM's responsibility in Centralia to carrying
out the planned purchase of twenty-seven houses in the impact
zone. According to the OSM, its responsibility in the Centralia
mine fire was finished upon completion of the buyout. As the
state executive office interpreted the memo, the OSM's active
role would continue until the crisis ended. The question of the
OSM's responsibility received it's full share of media attention
and became a source of anxiety for many Centralians who knew
that the state's resources were too limited to abate or extinguish
the fire. A memorandum, however, is not a legal document, and
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the u.s. Congress ensured that the OSM continued to take the
lead agency role in the Centralia crisis. The "Memorandum of
Misunderstanding," as it was called in Centralia, faded from
public concern, but not without seriously discrediting the image
of Interior Secretary James Watt and his agency.
Even more significant than the memorandum in compromising
the credibility of the OSM was the agency's purchase of twenty-
seven homes in July and August. In 1980, when the OSM had
purchased six properties on East Park Street, homeowners were
satisfied that the OSM had appraised their properties fairly, and
few complaints were voiced. In contrast, the buyout during the
summer of 1981 aroused the ire of many Centralians, who com-
plained vociferously. The owners of the twenty-seven properties,
located in the most dangerous area of town, received appraisal
figures for their homes and then had ten days to decide whether
or not to accept the government's offer. The homeowners, other
residents, and local officials assumed that the prices offered would
be calculated in the same manner as the 1980 appraisals, which
took no account of the mine fire. Almost everyone was surprised
and dismayed to learn that the twenty-seven families eligible for
relocation would lose an average of 20 percent in the appraised
value of their homes because of the mine fire. The OSM justified
its change in appraisal policy by citing the 1977 Surface Mining
Control and Reclamation Act, but few people were satisfied with
this argument since the legislation had not been a factor in the
1980 buyout. An OSM lawyer had warned the Department of
the Interior several months before the 1981 buyout that it was
debatable whether or not mine fires fell within the jurisdiction
of the 1977 law. 9
Amidst all this confusion, the fledgling CC was having little
success. When strategies to win community support had quite
the opposite effect, the CC spent less time in trying to elicit
community support and more time in writing to newspapers and
government officials. The group also turned to social service
agencies for assistance. Although the CC had not been successful
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in organizing the community around its threat beliefs, writing
letters to the press and government agencies was an effective
means of affirming these beliefs. Unable to control the com-
munity's interpretation of the crisis, the group began to write
emotional, frequently accusatory letters to elected officials, em-
phasizing their moral obligation to support and assist a com-
munity that lived in a constant state of dread. Through their
letters, group members found ready allies in environmental and
community action agencies ready to affirm and intensify the
worst-case interpretation of the crisis.
On May 5, 1981, the CC wrote to the editors of eleven news-
papers and five months later to more than a dozen newspapers.
A steady stream of correspondence was also directed at govern-
ment officials. Indeed, one member of the group admitted to
getting quite tired of typing letter after letter, particularly since
very few were answered. Despite the lack of response, the letters
provided a means for the group to ratify its interpretation of the
crisis by giving it permanence through the written word. 10 Just
as neighbors turned away from this hostile group, however, so
did most upper echelon officials of government agencies (though
for different reasons).
On April 26, 1981, the CC sent its first letter to Governor
Thornburgh. The purpose of this and other letters to officials was
not to ask for specific, practical assistance. Instead, the letters
were intended to convince the officials of their moral account-
ability to the town for relief from the fire. The following are
excerpts from the April 26 letter.
As President of the Concerned Citizens Action Group Against the
Centralia Mine Fire ... I am most anxious . . . over the news that
the Department of the Interior . . . is abandoning the Centralia
Mine Fire Project. I cannot strongly enough protest such action,
particularly since toxic gases from the mine fire are becoming more
and more prevalent. . . . When someone dies from these toxic gases
it is going to be too late, and the Government expressing sympathy
and regret will fall on bitter ears ... It .seems to me that OSM's
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decision to pull out . . . smells of some sort of conspiracy on the
part of the Government and because I feel this way, I must ask for,
no, demand an investigation. 11
Copies of this letter were sent to two U. S. senators, President
Ronald Reagan, Interior Secretary Watt, and others. Other let-
ters to President Reagan, Watt, and several minor officials were
also couched in the emotional language of the CC's threat beliefs.
A letter to the president of the United States from the presi-
dent of the CC read:
I live in . . . Centralia Pennsylvania, a community that has watched
a bad dream grow into a horrible nightmare. The nightmare ... is
an underground mine fire that has been raging for nineteen
years....
Dangerous . . . gases emitted by . . . the fire are seeping into
homes endangering the lives of the people who live there....
Please help Centralia slay its . . . fire breathing dragon before
[it] claims the life of even one innocent person. "12
In their first letter to Watt, CC members threw down the
gauntlet:
We have written asking what is to be done about the fire and are-
told that [the] situation is being closely watched and that the prob-
lem has been temporarily solved by the acquisition of a 16 acre area.
Hogwash! ... More and more homes outside the 16 acre area are
having problems with gases, both Carbon Monoxide and Carbon
Dioxide, the latter of which, in some cases, is creating dangerously
low oxygen problems endangering people's lives. . . . Because our
lives have been greatly endangered by this fire, I am compelled to
ask must people here die like people in Carbondale, Pa. died from
their mine fire before positive action is taken. "13
As we argued earlier, guided by the democratic ethos of rep-
resentation and the more practical need for the vote, legislators
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were generally supportive of the group. Indeed, on more than
one occasion, an elected official felt the need to document his
concern for the crisis by relating his activities on behalf of the
community: "Since I took office on January 5, 1981, my staff and
I have spent an average of20 to 30 hours per week on the problem
in Centralia. It has my utmost attention""14
More than simply verifying their concern, however, legislators
had the propensity to accuse, blame, and generally malign vari-
ous technical agencies at the state and federal levels. The CC
was a receptive audience for lawmakers frustrated in their at-
tempts to champion a cause that was receiving national attention.
In one letter to the group, a member of the state House of
Representatives accused the Pennsylvania Emergency Manage-
ment Agency (PEMA) and the governor of failing to disclose a
critical document. At the request of the governor, PEMA had
conducted and turned over to the governor's office a study
assessing the real dangers of the fire. Subsequent efforts to have
the document released to the public were stonewalled by the
state executive office. The state legislator wrote to the hyper-
vigilant CC: "Please be advised that I have attempted to obtain
a copy of the 16 page report of the Pennsylvania Emergency
Management Agency to Governor Thornburgh, regarding the
Centralia Mine Fire." The Governor's office, he continued, "re-
fused to turn over the Report and added that at this time there
are no plans to ever make that Report public. . . . I can't tell
you how upsetting the Federal and State Administrations' atti-
tude disturbs me [sic]. Centralia is being treated as a pawn in a
cruel chess game. No one wants to pay the fiddler, only pass the
buck. "15
Buck-passing was an experience with which CC members
were too familiar, as the following letter to them from a deputy
director of the Bureau of Mines illustrates: "We have been re-
quested by the Assistant Secretary for Fossil Energy of the De-
partment of Energy to respond to your letter ... to that
agency.... On February 1, 1982, the Secretary of the Interior
transferred mine land demonstration and reclamation projects
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conducted by the Bureau of Mines to the Office of Surface Min-
ing. Since this transfer includes all bureau activities relating to
the Centralia mine fire, we are taking the liberty of referring
your letter to OSM.... If we can be of any further assistance,
please let us know."16 OSM did not respond to the CC letter.
Doing nothing for the image of the OSM, a U.S. congressman
wrote the CC complaining of the recalcitrant behavior of this
federal agency: "It is most frustrating that even when the Con-
gress provides the Department with clear directions for use of
these funds, OSM still fails to develop a plan to provide some
meaningful assistance in addressing the mine fire problem. "17
In view of letters like these, CC members came to regard
themselves as victims of infighting between legislators and gov-
ernment agencies. Their confidence in the capacity or the will-
ingness of extra-local government to bring the fire under control
continued to erode in the face of letters from key legislators
openly accusing executive agencies and officials of cover-ups,
negligence, and dilatory behavior. Indeed, in one particularly
inflamatory letter, a state representative advocated that "the
United States Congress cite Secretary James Watt for con-
tempt. "18
Technical agencies, quite independent of the lawmakers,
wrote letters that did little more than intensify the highly charged
emotions of fear and anger among the group. A common tactic
of the Department of the Interior was to respond to inquiries by
sending the same letter or portions of the same letter to different
members of the CC. Several portions of a June 22, 1981, letter
to a young married couple active in the CC reappeared in a July
14 response to an inquiry by the president of the CC. In this
case, both letters were signed by the same OSM official. The
group was even more incensed when it received identical letters,
sent within three weeks of one another, from two different OSM
officials. "They [the OSM] must have a form letter," observed
one CC member, "that they just pull out of a file and mail.
Sincere, aren't they!"
On more than one occasion, representatives of the governor's
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office wrote to CC members to chide them for their confronta-
tional posture, as in a letter from Thornburgh's deputy general
counsel: "A positive attitude on the part of all concerned would
seem to be particularly appropriate under these circumstanc-
es. ~?9 At least one member expressed the feeling of entrapment:
"Here we sit. Caught between our town who doesn't care and
our Governor who cares about only one thing, his political
future."
Certain passages from letters were read aloud and reread dur-
ing CC meetings, giving the group ample time to interpret their
meaning according to the logic of the threat beliefs. For example,
on August 11, 1981, the group received a letter from the Interior
Department's assistant director of abandoned mine lands: "OSM
will continue, as it has in the past, to make all reasonable efforts
to protect the health and safety of the people living in the fire
area. "20 In group discussion, the phrase "as it has in the past"
took on a meaning quite different from that presumably intended
by the assistant director. "If they continue as they have in the
past," commented a Concerned Citizen, "this fire will burn for-
ever." In addition, the group found quite inappropriate the use
of the word "reasonable." When the stakes are health and even
life itself, they mused, should the efforts be limited only to those
considered "reasonable"?
All in all, the CC sent more than eighty letters between March
1981 and November 1982, and received more than fifty letters
in response. 21 This correspondence was a major means of main-
taining the threat belief system that had been created to reduce
the anxiety of uncertainty. Far from alleviating the CC's fears,
the pattern of the letters responding to the group's inquiries
served to confirm their worst-case interpretations. Commiser-
ated with by legislators, patronized by technical agencies, and
admonished by the governor's office, the group grew in political
acumen as it witnessed the incapacity at all levels of government
to act decisively on Centralia's behalf.
The operations of the CC were isolated from the community's
influence. The group met regularly in public as well as private
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sessions, but nonmembers rarely attended the public meetings.
Indeed, most Centralians avoided CC members and their ac-
tivities entirely, leaving no opportunity for the expression and
resolution of conflicting beliefs about the fire. In an open dem-
onstration of the town's opinion of the CC, the Centralia Borough
Council eventually prevented the group from holding its formal
sessions in Borough Hall, claiming that the CC was a disruptive
influence in the town. Their enforced separation from community
life made CC members even more dependent on group meetings,
where they reinforced their threat beliefs and reaffirmed their
differences from their neighbors. As the group failed to legitimate
itself in the public life of the village, its public meetings became
fewer and its private meetings more frequent. Early in the
group's career, public meetings were held once a week, but then
lapsed to twice a month, and in the last several months of the
CC's existence, to only once a month.
The structure of both public and private CC gatherings was
much the same: both emphasized the sharing of fears and the
expression of anger. A typical formal meeting opened in the
routine way for a business meeting, with a financial report from
the treasurer and a review of the minutes of the previous gath-
ering. Various officers then read aloud letters received or to be
sent, which frequently accounted for as much as thirty minutes
per meeting. When the president opened the way for contri-
butions from the floor, the meeting would almost invariably break
down into a cacophony of voices, as the following field note
illustrates:
After reading several letters, the president opened the meeting,
looking at the group and saying, 'Well what's on your mind tonight?'
That question triggered a series of seemingly random statements by
several people: "I'm worried that we are losing steam. I guess we
need another subsidence to put a spark under everyone." Another
person responded with, "Regardless of what happens the townsfolk
will find a way not to believe it." "They all stand behind their
curtains," observed another person, "watching what's going on."
90 The Real Disaster
Seeking to bring the discussion around to something useful, the
Vice-President asked, "Does anybody have any suggestions?" "How
about selling bumper stickers?," suggested one woman. "I wonder
if it's safe to go in my backyard," responded another woman to no
one in particular.... These disconnected expressions continued
for over twenty minutes.
The social isolation of the CC ensured that no alternative
interpretations ofthe crisis would be introduced into its meetings
for consideration by the group. Without any voice to speak for
a less dreadful, more manageable perspective on the crisis, CC
meetings became occasions for reinforcement of personal fears,
disbelief in neighbors' ability or willingness to appreciate the
dangers of the fire, and generalized anger toward a world that
could no longer protect the CC members: "There are people in
this town who would see us die before they admitted that there's
a problem.... I mean can you believe it? There are rumors
that CC planned to have fall in that subsidence to get
attention! Now, how can you fight that ignorance?"
The security ofthe group encouraged expressions of the heart,
not the mind; of passionate feelings, not deliberate, reflective
thought. In short, the CC's meetings did not function to reduce
the emotive means of coping, but to intensify it.
The CC found no ally in local government. CC members saw
the Borough Council as representing primarily the residents of
the cold side of town. In trying to fulfill its mandated role of
representing the will of all Centralians, the Borough Council
provided the arena in which the different factions met to do
verbal battle. Often turning into emotionally charged shouting
matches, Borough Council meetings were the most visible sym-
bol of the divisiveness that wracked the town, attesting to the
above-ground disaster that was destroying the social community.
Beyond providing the stage for conflict, the Borough Council's
role in the mine fire was relatively limited: it sponsored two
referenda on mine fire issues, became the liaison between state
and federal agencies and community residents, and would oc-
Confrontation and Conflict 91
casionally go on record as favoring a certain course of action. But
by and large, the Borough Council failed to take a strong lead-
ership role, creating a vacuum that the CC attempted to fill.
The fact that the Borough Council failed to provide effective
leadership throughout this prolonged crisis is not surprising,
given the nature and structure of Centralia's government. 22 The
borough is governed by a system that strictly limits the mayor's
authority and gives the bulk of what executive power there is to
the council. Composed of citizens who volunteer their time and
effort, the Borough Council's functions are clearly custodial dur-
ing normal times. Untrained volunteer leadership may be suf-
ficient for taking care of the everyday business of a small
municipality. But when confronted with a crisis that jeopardized
the community's health and safety, indeed its very existence,
this form of local government could not be expected to respond
effectively to the myriad demands.
Indeed, as the mine fire burned on, few citizens were willing
to take on formal leadership roles. At the reorganization meeting
of January 7, 1980, over a year before the CC was organized,
four new Borough Council members were sworn in, but nobody
was willing to take on the responsibility of council president. It
was not until the fourth nomination that a new councilman re-
luctantly agreed to serve. At the June 2 meeting, to improve the
handling of information, the Borough Council designated its
president as the liaison with other government agencies-against
the president's will; his was the only "no" vote on the motion.
Throughout 1980, mine fire issues for the council were largely
of an informational nature. A representative of the Bureau of
Mines regularly presented a report on the status of a drilling
project that was gathering information as the basis for an OSM
decision about the fire. At times, the council expressed frustra-
tion that no representative with authority (from the OSM) was
present to answer questions about possible options. 23
The few other matters that came before the council seem to
have been handled with dispatch. Council members forcefully
protested attempts by the county to divert federal Housing and
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Urban Development money from use in Centralia. 24 They also
expressed concern about Centralians' safety. When two residents
who attended the August 4 meeting stated that a Bureau of Mines
official had told them they were living "in a mine atmosphere"
because of the influx of gases in their home, the council wrote
to the OSM insisting that something be done to guarantee the
safety of this family.
At the same time, there is no evidence from the minutes of
its meetings that the council exercised any leadership role in the
mine fire crisis; given the history ofthe borough and the custodial
nature ofcouncil, this would have been expecting too much. And
yet the absence of forceful local leadership would have critical
consequences during the first half of 1981.
The Borough Council clearly failed to act forcefully in response
to one of the more critical events in the Centralia story, the
narrow escape of the twelve-year-old boy from a subsidence on
February 14, 1981. The only mention of the subsidence in the
minutes of the council's March 2 meeting was made in reference
to the continuing presence of gas in the area. It was in reaction
to the boy's near-tragedy that the CC was formed. One can only
speculate that had the Borough Council taken decisive action at
this point, the formation of the CC might not have been nec-
essary. At the same council meeting, in response to a suggestion
by the U.s. congressman for Centralia's district, a motion was
passed to ask Columbia County to place a referendum on the
May primary election ballot asking Centralians: "Do you favor
Excavation & Relocation of the entire Community as a solution
to the present Mine Fire and/or dangers created by the Mine
Fire?"25 In a letter accompanying the motion, a councilman
stated: "This referendum is direly needed by the Council so that
it ... can act according to the will of the majority of its Citizens.
I make this motion because I feel that Council should not have
such a heavy and unfair burden placed on its shoulders. "26
The proposal to hold a referendum was one ofthe few occasions
when the Borough Council and the CC agreed on a course of
action, and when the vote was held the fledgling CC lobbied
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their neighbors to get out and vote. But the interpretation of the
vote was open to debate. On the surface, it appeared that a "yes"
vote would indicate that the voter favored digging the fire out
and relocating the community. Yet differing interpretations
abounded. Even the author of the referendum motion stated that
it did not really mean what it said: "Councilman ... said a 'yes'
vote means a voter wants the federal government to come up
with a just and workable solution to the mine fire. He said a 'yes'
vote does not mean a voter favors only total excavation of the
mine fire or complete relocation of Centralia. "27
In the end, the referendum carried, with a two-to-one majority
voting "yes." The CC interpreted this as a solid vote for relo-
cation. But the Borough Council decided that the vote meant
Centralians favored an engineering solution to the fire-total
excavation-and not relocation, a solution that might mean the
end of the town. At its July 6 meeting, the council moved that
a resolution be sent to the Secretary of the Interior stating that
the council favored total excavation as a solution to the fire. The
resolution did not mention relocation.
Before the council could follow up on its resolution, however,
a newly elected council took office. The new council was even
more reluctant than the old one to take any position that might
jeopardize the continued existence of the borough. The first of-
ficial indication came at the November 2 meeting, when "Council
went on record as being opposed to having serve as liai-
son for Centralia with the Mine Fire Task Force. As early as
1969 was known to be a strong force behind relocation
movement in Centralia." Apparently, the referendum results did
not govern this council's view of what should be done about the
fire. Indeed, at the November 2 meeting, the council "went on
record to make a decision concerning the mine fire after the
borehole project is completed and results are known."
The decision by the new council to disregard the referendum
results and wait for additional research before taking action an-
gered the CC. Members of the CC attended council meetings
and vociferously demanded that the council force the state and
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federal governments to take immediate action to protect health
and safety, even to the point of relocating the borough. The
council would respond that action that could destroy the borough
was unnecessary and rash; moreover, council members resented
the CC's attempts to take over decision making for the bor-
ough.
Unable to win the Borough Council over and lacking the re-
sources and expertise to organize the community alone, the CC
looked to outsiders, finding allies in various social service agen-
cies. In reaching outside the community, CC members continued
Centralia's historical pattern of external management of internal
community affairs. Commenting in retrospect, an officer of the
CC explained why the group sought leadership from organiza-
tions outside the community: "Let's face it, what did we know
about community organizing? We were just a bunch of people
who said 'Hey, we've got a problem' ... and we were glad, I
think, for any help we could get."
During April of 1981, the CC sought assistance from Ralph
Nader's Center for Responsive Law. Several days later, a Nader
representative and a member of the Washington, D.C.-based
Energy Action Group visited Centralia to meet with the CC. The
two met exclusively with group members; no effort was made to
talk with others in town. In fact, the CC purposely changed the
meeting location at the last minute because ofrumors that several
townspeople were going "to crash it and cause trouble." The
CC's concluding minutes of the meeting note: "If we send all
information-they will read same and possibly investigate on a
Federal Level-representatives were very optimistic in our
favor. "28
The Nader agency assigned a toxicologist to examine data on
the amount and kind of gases to which residents were exposed.
At one point the toxicologist recommended that the DER test
for a wider range of gases than CO and methane. Aside from the
limited assistance of the Nader scientist, however, the CC re-
ceived no further support from either the Center For Responsive
Law or the Energy Action Group.
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By June, only three months after the group had organized,
morale was already low. Attendance at meetings was falling off.
Letter writing "in the hope of getting some action from the
officials" was too limited an activity to engage the group as a
whole. It was now clear that the referendum, with its unequivocal
message that a majority of the town wanted relief from the fire,
was not a vote in favor of the CC. By this time it had become
painfully clear to group members that their neighbors were not
willing to support them. Indeed, friends and acquaintances had
banished them, as if they and not the fire were the problem.
Commenting in retrospect on the community anger directed
toward the CC, one of its founders said, "We knew we were
going to be a minority group."
In this period of growing despair, a representative of Rural
American Women (RAW) called the vice-president of the CC,29
asking for an invitation to Centralia to talk with the group about
their predicament. At this point, the group was embracing any
sign of support, and a meeting was scheduled to hear what this
community organizer had to offer.
Like other social activist agencies, the RAW would visit a
community only if invited by a local group. This policy is similar
to the standard practice of clinical psychologists who, with few
exceptions, work only with people who voluntarily submit for
counseling or therapy. The principle is simply that personal or
collective change is accomplished only when the person or group
desires change. In the case of social agencies, an invitation from
a host group is the first step in mobilizing a town.
As did Nader's Center for Responsive Law and the Energy
Action Group, the RAW worked exclusively with the Concerned
Citizens, their host group. It was the CC that drew the RAW's
attention to Centralia, and it was the CC's threat beliefs that
structured the RAW's interpretation of the crisis. From the be-
ginning, the RAW accepted without question the worst-case
interpretation of the crisis, an approach typical of social activist
organizations, which routinely base their organizing strategies
on the host group's definition of the crisis. The activities of the
96 The Real Disaster
social activists are initially directed toward assisting the host
group to become an effective organizing agent. The implicit as-
sumption behind this strategy is that the host group represents,
or has the potential to represent, the community.
The following, from a pamphlet distributed by the RAW,
"Why we are involved in Centralia," illustrates the typical host
group strategy: "We are involved with the citizens of Centralia,
Pennsylvania-the Concerned Citizen's Action Group Against
the Centralia Mine Fire-because they asked RAW to assist
them in their organizing efforts. We felt we had the capabilities
to do this, and believed the citizens had done the major work of
mobilizing local people to assume some responsibility for the
future of their community.... We work in communities where
there is the reality of community togetherness. "30
This description of Centralia citizens as organized and em-
bodying "the reality of community togetherness" is clearly dis-
torted. What is described in this passage is the RAW's ideal
model of grassroots action, not the reality of what was going on
in Centralia. Ironically, far from serving the ideal functions of a
host group, the CC, renegades in Centralia, ensured that any
agency linked to the group would be prevented from gaining
access to the community. Throughout its time in Centralia, the
RAW would remain identified with the CC, considered by many
Centralians to be part of the problem.
Almost immediately after entering Centralia, the RAW inten-
sified the already antagonistic relationship between the CC and
the Borough Council. On the basis of one informal meeting with
several councilmen, the RAW reported to the CC that local
government "was afraid to act" and would be a "stumbling block"
to the efforts of the group to achieve its aims. Corresponding to
the CC's view of local government, this information justified the
group's anger toward the council.
By late July 1981, the RAW was sending a representative from
Washington to attend the CC's biweekly meetings. The RAW
sought funding for the group and was successful in securing sev-
eral small grants to subsidize its activities. Using its extensive
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network ofsocial activist organizations, the RAW also encouraged
CC members to contact several environmental action groups to
express concern over the dangers of exposure to mine fire gases.
Over several months, the CC received responses from various
environmental organizations, several of them confirmed the CC's
worst-case interpretation of the fire. In a letter from the director
of the organization, Appalachia-Science in the Public Interest,
CC members were urged to "accept my recommendation that
your town be monitored for sulfur oxides and other pollu-
tants.... You are close enough to Donora where an inversion
caused a number of pollution-related deaths back over a decade
ago. "31
In a similar reply to the CC, the executive director of the
Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air wrote: "I read
your letter and background information on the gases from the
Centralia fire. There is little doubt in my mind that sulfur dioxide
is being emitted by that fire, and the levels of S02 may pose a
serious health threat to the community. "32
Despite the executive director's warning, at no time was 502
detected in more than normal rates in the impact zone. But more
significant than the warning is the closed information loop im-
plied in this excerpt. At the request of the RAW, the CC had
sent the initial letter explaining the CC's perception of the dan-
gers of the fire, along with data attesting to the truth of its claims.
In replying with an honest appraisal of the only first-hand infor-
mation it had received about the fire, the Council for Clean Air,
in turn, affirmed the CC's worst fears. The RAW thus assured
the CC of a sympathetic audience, but ironically, the more cor-
roboration the group received from sources remote from the
borough, the more intense the conflict became with it neighbors
within the borough.
After attending several CC meetings, it must have become
clear to the field organizers, irrespective of their public relations
pamphlet, that the CC's confrontational coping was doing little
more than alienating its neighbors. Nevertheless, the RAW pur-
sued its normative model of community organizing, suggesting
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to the CC that it sponsor two community trips, the first to Wash-
ington and the second to Harrisburg. The purpose of the trips
was twofold: to lobby for an $850,000 borehole project that would
at last determine the parameters of the fire, and to create two
collective occasions in which everyone in town could participate.
The Washington and Harrisburg trips would establish the CC as
a serious group with concrete goals.
The RAW encouraged the CC to create a high profile in the
weeks before the Washington trip. Media exposure was pro-
moted. PM Magazine and several major newspapers, including
the New York Times, the Baltimore Sun, and the Washington Post,
were given exclusive stories, restricted to the CC's perceptions
of the fire. As another way to publicize the CC and raise money
for the Washington trip, the RAW suggested selling bumper
stickers. After a spirited discussion, the CC decided that the
bumper stickers, selling for a dollar apiece, would best express
the feelings of the group if worded "Centralia, Pa. Mine Fire-
HELL ON EARTH." The phrase caught the attention of many
residents, but not with the results inteOnded. ~'It's a crime that
they [the CCl should be allowed to call our town a 'hell on
earth,' " commented one woman. "Ifthere's any hell in this town,
it's the doings of CC that's causing it." In preparation for the
Washington trip, the RAW issued a news release that opened
with an expression of the CC's threat beliefs. "'Listen,' says
Ms. , standing by that hole, 'you can hear the fires
roaring.' For over 20 years, the fires have been burning near
Centralia.... Now the fires have caught up with the people.
The presence of hazardous gases in the homes and the cave-ins
of the earth have already caused 31 families to move. . . . The
Concerned Citizen's Action Group Against the Centralia Mine
Fire will travel to Washington ... October 19 and 20 to work
toward resolution of this problem plaguing their community."33
Counseled by the RAW to use the Washington, D. C. , journey
as a basis for a "new spirit of cooperation" between the CC and
the borough, the CC attended a Borough Council meeting to urge
community residents and members of council to accompany the
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group to Washington. But CC members couched their appeal in
a confrontational style. In fact, as the following quote from an
officer of the CC indicates, the group fully expected to fail in its
efforts to engender a "new spirit of cooperation": "It would be
nice ifa crowd went down to Washington just to show the federal
government that we care about the problem. The trouble is, not
enough people in Centralia care." The local press, reporting on
the council meeting, captured the style ofthe CC appeal: "Mem-
bers of CC lamented the lack of unity in the community and
some townspeople's apathy about the mine fire." The council
president, himselfa member of the CC (but a cold-side resident),
admonished the CC: "You have to appreciate other people's val-
ues. People are entitled to their own opinions. You should re-
spect them."34
The fact is that most Centralians saw the Washington trip as
a CC event, not a community effort. In the end, only six Cen-
tralians, all of them CC members, went on the bus to Washing-
ton-outnumbered by social service personnel who made the
trip. Nonetheless, the CC viewed the mission as a success, if for
no other reason than that it went beyond letter writing and
emotional displays.
The RAW planned the group's two-day stay in the capital hour
by hour, making sure those in attendance made the best use of
their time. The itinerary planned by the RAW for October 14
and 15 included lunch with a law firm interested in representing
beleaguered communities against big government, meetings with
legislators from Pennsylvania and one from New York, and a
meeting with an undersecretary for the Department of the
Interior.
What is important for us about this trip is the dependence of
the CC on the RAW for suggesting, organizing, and carrying out
this activity. From the time of the RAW's initial involvement
with the group early in the summer of 1981, it had steadily
increased its directive role. Not surprisingly, the more direction
the RAW provided the CC, the more dependent the group be-
came on this social agency. Given the RAW's normative model
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of community organizing, it is reasonable to assume that had the
CC constructed a solid base of community support, the RAW
would have tapered offits participation. But the distance between
the CC and the rest of Centralia's residents only lengthened with
time, in part, ironically, because ofthe RAW's very involvement.
The RAW's presence in Centralia and its advocacy role for the
CC legitimated the threat beliefs of the CC. With most of their
neighbors unsympathetic to their beliefs about the dangers of
the fire, CC members grew dependent on the RAW and other
agencies for assurances that their fears and anger were plausible.
Several days after the Washington trip, the efforts of the CC
to persuade the community that its threat beliefs were plausible
suffered a major setback when the newly appointed chief of the
Division of Environmental Health in the Pennsylvania Depart-
ment of Health publicly announced that the Centralia mine fire
had never posed health and safety problems for the town's resi-
dents. It is not known what sources Dr. James Fox used to reach
his conclusion. Repeated calls to the health department by both
the CC and the press went unanswered. What is known is that
conclusive evidence on the extent and severity of the fire awaited
the data from the federal borehole project, which were released
in the summer of 1983, almost two years after Dr. Fox's state-
ment. The borehole data would discredit Fox's statement, but
meanwhile his official pronouncement backed up those in Cen-
tralia who were predisposed to discredit the CC.
Even at the time of Fox's official declaration in October 1981
that the fire was not a threat, there was contradictory evidence.
A few days before Fox's statement, one family in Centralia woke
to the sound of their gas monitor, warning them that the CO
level in their home had exceeded 35 parts per million. The chil-
dren were removed from the home, and windows and doors were
opened to permit the gas to escape. Word of this incident spread
quickly among neighboring families. The day before the CC trav-
eled to Washington, a car had almost been swallowed up by a
subsidence, which left a gaping hole 8 by 12 feet. At the time,
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the car was being loaded with the household goods of a family
forced to relocate because of the fire.
Both of these families must have been surprised in November
at the local newspaper's bold headline "Watt believes mine fire
safe."35 As he was boarding a plane in New Orleans, Interior
Secretary Watt had been overhead remarking that the Centralia
mine fire posed "no threat to health and safety." Although Watfs
public relations staffwould try to modify his ill-timed assessment,
arguing that what he really meant was that the fire was not a
threat to everybody living in Centralia,36 here was another piece
of official intelligence for those who could not accept the threat
beliefs of the CC.
Many Centralians, however, needed no official confirmation
of their perceptions that the fire had only remote risks. In the
words of one woman living on the hill, as reported by the paper
on the day before Watfs statement: "Why would we give up our
home? ... We have freedom of choice. And we choose to stay.
We do not feel we are in any danger ... and we will be adamant
in our position." "She believes," the paper continued, "that many
things besides carbon monoxide from the mine fire are causing
monitors to show the presence of carbon monoxide. She sug-
gested that cigarette smoking . . . hair spray, cooking odors from
sauerkraut or brussels sprouts, kerosene stoves and stove gas jets
left on caused many of the gas readings. "37
Against the jumble of official reports, personal experiences,
and residents' perceptions, the CC planned its trip to Harrisburg,
under the guidance of Catholic Social Services (CSS). On several
occasions from early summer to November 1981, a CSS repre-
sentative had accompanied the RAW spokesperson to CC meet-
ings, and the task of managing the CC was gradually transferred.
After the trip to Harrisburg, it was clear that the CC had shifted
its dependence on the RAW to CSS. In her account of the RAW's
withdrawal, a spokeswoman admitted that the seeming unwill-
ingness of the town "to follow the lead of the CC" was causing
RAW to reconsider its involvement in Centralia.
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Catholic Social Services is a regionally based human service
organization serving fifteen counties within the Harrisburg Dio-
cese. Similar to RAW, CSS has as its primary mission to "organize
and empower groups to become their own advocates for social
change,"38 and it too relies on the host group strategy. Like the
RAW, CSS viewed the CC as the first block in building a com-
munitywide organization, but its results were equally disappoint-
ing. The hostility that followed the CSS efforts to work through
the CC culminated in death threats, slashed tires, and a fire
bombing.
The first CC venture in which Catholic Social Services played
the lead role, the Harrisburg trip, was widely advertised, but
only nineteen CC members showed up and once again the Bor-
ough Council declined to accompany them.
CC members, who had been relatively composed in Wash-
ington, were emotional in their behavior and speech in Harris-
burg. Among the comments directed at Pennsylvania officials:
"We're asking for the truth, not half-truths and half-falsehoods";
"Why should we give up our lives to get help for Centralia?";
"This is unbelievable. How can you sit back and do nothing?"
In an apparent effort at appeasement-the full meaning of which
can only be appreciated against the backdrop of the official state-
ments made by Watt and Fox several days earlier-the deputy
counsel for Governor Thornburgh called the mine fire "an un-
precedented disaster" comparable in magnitude and seriousness
to the accident at Three Mile Island's nuclear plant. The CC
returned from Harrisburg more convinced than ever that its
worst-case interpretation of the crisis was indisputable. 39
On their return from Harrisburg, fortified by contact with state
officials, CC members lashed out at neighbors and local govern-
ment for their apparent lack of concern. More and more fre-
quently, in making judgments about responsibility for their
misfortune, the CC pointed to the apathy of others in town. In
time, CC members came to believe that they were victims as
much of their neighbors' indifference as of the fire. Indeed, it is
fair to say that the group was so preoccupied with the emotions
Confrontation and Conflict 103
of fear and anger that the precipitating cause of the emotion, the
fire, became subordinate to the states of emotional arousal.
Driven by their threat beliefs, CC members were unable to
manage the emotional consequences of their fears. One irate
resident said of the CC's tactics: "Certain individuals in the com-
munity ... make others suffer terribly, to the limit." Former
friends and acquaintances blamed the group for disrupting their
way of life. In the face of hostility or indifference, CC members
shifted from trying to recruit their neighbors to blaming them
for their calamity. In the months to come, as other grassroots
groups emerged, reciprocal blaming would characterize the
town's response to its crisis.
At this juncture in the history of the fire, the only organized
group at which CC members could direct their volatile emotions
was the Borough Council. Indeed, at first glance this elected
body was quite a likely target, being immediately responsible
for the welfare of the borough. Well placed to push for a solution
to the fire, the Borough Council was vulnerable to the CC's
charge of failing to assume a leadership role. As the year 1982
began, the council elected its third president in two years. 40 At
the first meeting of the reorganized council, arguments arose
over the new president's desire to dispense with the reading of
the minutes, and over the manner in which the borough solicitor
was appointed. These disagreements were only a prelude to the
dissension that would characterize the council meetings over the
next year and a half.
The 1982 council supported the federal government's $816,000
borehole project to delimit the fire, although the Borough Coun-
cil had been wary from the beginning of its possible outcome.
Not trusting the impartiality of the forthcoming analysis of the
data by a federal consultant, the council discussed hiring an
independent engineer to evaluate the data. As early as March,
members of the Concerned Citizens were pushing the council
to take a stand on what should be done after the borehole project
was completed. With fhe encouragement of the CC, the council
had earlier drafted a letter to Interior Secretary Watt, urging
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approval of the borehole project and periodic public reporting
of borehole data. But beyond that, the council avoided taking a
position, insisting that it must wait until the project was com-
pleted and the data studied. 41
In anticipation that the borehole project would lead to a final
solution, the level of community activity accelerated dramati-
cally. Beginning in March, the council scheduled a second
monthly meeting, which would deal exclusively with mine fire
matters. 42 Throughout the spring and summer, a tremendous
amount of information flowed through the council; correspon-
dence was voluminous, and government officials appeared at
council meetings to explain what was going to happen.
Much-perhaps too much-was expected of the council as
the intermediary for communication between the federal and
state governments and the community. In April, the council
secretary put a memo on file stating that since assuming office,
the new president had not been routing correspondence and
other business records to her. In obvious frustration, she stated,
"I cannot be held accountable for maintaining files when I am
not given the documents to maintain as required by the Borough
Code. "43
Criticism of the council for the lack of communication was
widespread, usually directed at the president. It was impossible
to know objectively where the "blame" should lie. It was clear,
however, that Centralians were focusing on the personalities of
members of the various factions in fighting for their own per-
ceived interests. This personalizing of the issues led to the de-
velopment of much hostility and bitterness toward individual
members of the community and did much to ensure that rec-
onciliation between the different factions and groups would be
impossible.
Mer accompanying the CC on the Harrisburg trip, Catholic
Social Services sought money to subsidize the CC from the Cam-
paign For Human Development, a granting agency within the
United States Catholic Conference. Although CSS personnel
were certainly aware that there was antagonism between the
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group and the rest of the community, they apparently did not
know just how hostile the CC's relationship with the town had
become. It is reasonable to assume that had CSS been aware of
the extent and severity of the conflict among the townspeople,
it would not have sought the funding. It was in the best interest
of CSS to secure such a grant, because helping to address the
celebrated problem in Centralia, where the greater part of the
residents were Catholic, would indicate clearly the effectiveness
of this social agency.
The grant was yet another idea that did not originate within
the CC but with a social agency outside the community. It was
CSS personnel who arranged meetings between the CC's officers
and representatives of the Campaign for Human Development.
It was, admits the officers of the CC, CSS grant writers who
actually wrote the proposal. As in the other two major projects
of the CC, the trips to Washington and Harrisburg, plans were
made and goals accomplished not by CC members but by social
service professionals. '
In September 1982, the campaign for Human Development
announced that it had awarded the CC a grant of $30,000, which
surprised the group and horrified many Centralians. Working in
isolation from the rest of town, the CC had informed few people
outside the group about the grant proposal. Community reaction
to the grant itself was swift and hostile. "What would possess
anybody to give this group that wants to destroy our town
money.... Can you believe it?" Letters from Centralians
started pouring in to the diocesan bishop's office, protesting the
grant, and several church members threatened to cancel their
yearly pledge. Within days of the announcement, several CC
members were harrassed by telephone calls, many of which
threatened their lives. In telephoned death threats repeated over
several weeks, a muflled voice would chant the phrase "You will
not live to spend a penny of this money," then hang up. Ethno-
religious prejudices revived. One woman observed, "The Irish
and the Ukrainians in this town have always disliked one another.
Now they're calling one another names again! I can't believe it!"44
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The Borough Council moved quickly to deny the CC access
to the Borough Hall for its meetings. Council members agreed,
with one dissenting vote, to close its doors to the CC as a dis-
ruptive influence on the town. In a public meeting, the president
of council said: "I'm appalled the people in the Catholic Church
who approve such grants would give this money to Concerned
Citizens. . . . The name of your organization is appropriate. All
residents of this town have a right to be concerned about your
organization. "45
CC members had no idea that the grant would create such
conflict in town. Indeed, how could they? The group did not
have a clear idea what the grant was for. After the money was
awarded, personnel from both the Campaign for Human De-
velopment and CSS came to a CC meeting to describe the pur-
pose of the award. Recognizing the volatile atmosphere that the
grant had created, CSS suggested to the CC that it invite mem-
bers of the Borough Council to attend the meeting. An· excerpt
from the minutes of the CC meeting reflects the tension: "[CSS]
attempted to explain the Grant and showed a film titled 'With
One Voice.' ... Father K. attempted to explain the grant ...
but not to the satisfaction of certain ones in attendance."46 In-
deed, the exchanges between certain members of council and
representatives of the funding agency became so emotional that
several people walked out of the meeting.
The work done by organizers for the Rural American Women
and by CSS in securing a grant that the CC did not even un-
derstand suggests that it is very difficult for these organizations
to modify their normative approach to community organizing to
meet the unique challenge posed by a chronic technological
disaster. 47
On November 9, less than a month after the grant was
awarded, the CC officers, with the exception of the president,
resigned amidst bitter controversy. Interim officers were ap-
pointed, but for all practical purposes the CC became a paper
organization. Quarterly meetings were scheduled, but only a
handful of people attended. The fact that the group did not
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officially disband, however, would pose serious problems for the
second major grassroots group to emerge, the Centralia Com-
mittee on Human Development.
A former CC officer reflected on why she and the others
resigned: "I was tired. We all were. All that seemed to be hap-
pening was one squabble after another. I still think the grant
was a good idea. We were all just tired of the struggle." As the
following exchange makes clear, "the struggle" that was exhaust-
ing the group and others in town was not against the fire but
with neighbors and former friends who, over the course ofseveral
months, had become bitter enemies. A telling exchange between
a former resident of Centralia, active in the CC, who was forced
to relocate because ofthe fire, and a member ofBorough Council:
CC: You told me to keep my kids out of town, my wife out of town,
and me out of town. . . . I don't want that to happen again.
Councilman: I never said that.
CC: Yes you did. You called me and told me to keep my kids and
wife out of town.
Councilman: You're full of it. 48




For one and a half years, the Concerned Citizens struggled to
persuade the political system and their own neighbors that the
mine fire represented a serious threat to health and safety and
to the well-being of the community. The activist group helped
to bring Centralia to the attention of the state and federal gov-
ernments, and generated the kind of public sympathy conducive
to political action. Moreover, the CC's trips to Washington and
Harrisburg were effective tactics in pushing the mine fire toward
the front of political concern. Their constant reminders that the
government's responsibility to protect health and safety went
beyond mere observation and measurement of a mine fire kept
moral pressure on legislators and agency directors to be account-
able to the needs of Centralians. It is reasonable to assume that
relief from technological hazards of chronic duration depends in
part upon the persistent reiteration of worst-case scenarios to
keep public interest alive.
The success of the CC with political powers remote from the
borough must be measured against its marked failure to organize
the town around its beliefs. The only allies it won in its brief
existence were reporters and social service agencies-sectors
outside the local structure that had vested interests in adopting
a worst-case interpretation.
Centralians who lived outside the direct path of the fire found
it much easier to deny the CC's warnings of the threat-
particularly since the admission of that threat would have jeopar-
dized the very existence of their community. What could not be
ignored were the severe emotional disturbances that disrupted
collective life. For most Centralians, the rancorous conflict that
developed between the hot and cold sides of town became more
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anxiety-provoking than the fire itself. "It's my neighbor," ob-
served one man, "and not the fire, that bothers me most."
Against this backdrop of mounting hostility, the government-
sponsored borehole study began to reveal some startling figures.
As if fed by the social hatred above ground, the fire began to
spread rapidly. In September of 1982, twenty years after the fire
was discovered, Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Re-
sources personnel were still refusing to speculate publicly
whether or not the fire was in fact within the boundaries of the
borough. On October 1, however, officials admitted in a public
meeting that the DER and the OSM had been aware since May
that the fire had advanced within the boundaries of the borough.
It is not clear why the government did not tell Centralians earlier;
what is clear is that the imperfect hazard management strategies
of government had cut the community off from the opportunity
to respond effectively to the peril.
On October 5, basing its story on borehole temperature read-
ings being collected by the government, the local newspaper re-
ported, "New borehole results show that the ... mine fire is
advancing into the borough along a 200-foot front." "A 'gigan-
tic fire,' )) the paper reported the following day, "part of
the . . . Centralia mine fire-is fast approaching the village of
Byrnesville south of Centralia."1 On October 14, the Pennsyl-
vania Emergency Management Agency announced that tests of
several homes on the south end of Centralia, east and west of
Locust Avenue, had determined them to be endangered by fire-
related gases.
"It's hell on earth," exclaimed one young mother. Another
woman, whose 20-inch-thick basement walls had recently
cracked in' the heat from the fire, lamented, "I can't sleep. I'm
coughing all night. You just wonder if you're going to be the one
sacrificed." An engineer employed by the OSM sympathized
with the residents on the south end of town: "[They] have been
on borrowed time for a long time. It's only been a miracle that
there hasn't been a loss of life.... Something has to be done.
Do you have to wait for five people to die in bed?"2
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As the fire heated up below ground, tempers flamed above.
For many in town, the affront of the CC's grant from the Cam-
paign for Human Development eclipsed even the bad news that
the fire was spreading. The resignations of the CC officers in
November of 1982 surprised Catholic Social Services and sent it
scurrying to fill the vacant offices. Survival of the CC itself wa~
not at issue for CSS; the primary concern was the survival of the
grant. The agency, and the Harrisburg diocese it represented,
would suffer not a little embarrassment if a grant had to be
withdrawn only weeks after it was awarded, because the recipient
group had collapsed under the community's antagonism toward
the grant. From the ranks of the CC's membership, a slate of
temporary officers was drawn up. This new group, including a
young Russian Orthodox priest known regionally for his skills at
conflict resolution, would take over the grant. Having completed
its backstage management of the death of the CC and the birth
of a successor to administer the grant, CSS was content to step
back and watch its investment.
The fledgling five-member group, charged with managing
what for many was a considerable sum of money, began its career
with a serious handicap: since the $30,000 grant had been
awarded to the organization named Concerned Citizens, the new
group's official name must include the words "concerned citi-
zens." (This label would hamper many of the new group's efforts
to reorganize the coping style of the community.) It was clear
that the new group needed a new name before it could attempt
to forge an identity independent of the CC, as the minutes from
its first meeting attest: "Discussion ensued on the advisability of
Concerned Citizens being part of the title, and it was pointed
out that the grant was awarded to Concerned Citizens and the
name of the organization must be included, although it could be
played down and put in smaller print." The Russian Orthodox
priest, seeking to influence the meaning and purpose of the
group, suggested calling it the Centralia Committee on Human
Development. It was decided that the organization's letterhead
would read:
A Thwarted Struggle III
CENTRALIA COMMITTEE ON HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
A project of concerned citizens
The humanistic, nonpartisan ring of this name promised a new
approach to the mine fire crises.
Meeting on a weekly basis, the CCHD began to take shape,
although not without considerable bickering and maneuvering
for advantage. In fact, the first few CCHD meetings bordered
on chaos. Accustomed to CC-style meetings given over to expres-
sions of fear and anger, CCHD members spoke at random, in-
terrupting one another, lobbying for their particular solutions to
the problem. The first several assemblies began at 7:00 in the
evening and finally broke up four or five hours later, having
accomplished nothing substantial. The group knew that the man-
date of the grant was to build a coalition of residents to make
government accountable for the health and safety of Centralians.
But, as the following excerpt from the minutes ofan early meeting
make clear, some members of the CCHD had other ideas about
their goal: "Some committee members felt that to halt all direct
action until the community is organized would be self-defeating,
and the community is more likely to join a successful group,
rather than yet another group that is floundering."4
In other words, some members were more inclined to push
for a solution to the fire than to organize a town. After all, hadn't
their predecessors tried to build a community organization, only
to be contemptuously rebuked time and again? In an apparent
effort to align themselves with CCHD members who advocated
seeking a more direct solution to the fire than organizing the
town, several former CC officers asked the CCHD to use the
money to sue Borough Council and other levels of government.
One CCHD member, in apparent exasperation, explained that
she would rather "spend her personal time and energy in com-
bating these problems . . . rather than attempting to organize a
community which other groups have already attempted to with-
out success."5 The fire was not waiting for CCHD to become
organized, nor for Centralia to become organized.
The minutes ofone CCHD meeting sum up the gloomy feeling
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members shared as they faced the task of building an organiza-
tion: "No optimism was demonstrated, no strategies offered, no
methods were suggested."6 The suggestion to use the grant
money to hire an attorney became a critical issue in the first
several weeks of the group's existence; fighting various levels of
government in court would be a logical extension of the CC's
struggle with recalcitrant authorities who would not accept its
worst-case interpretation of the fire. The question of whether or
not to use grant money to pursue litigation became a contest of
wills between the two members who viewed confrontation as the
most promising route to crises resolution and those who wanted
instead to forge a model for communal action.
At one CCHD meeting, a motion was formally made to "hire,
as soon as possible, an attorney . . . in order to balance CCHD
with Borough Council."7 The motion was resisted, in open hos-
tility among several group members. Mter several meetings,
CCHD members realized that their group was nothing more
than a mirror image of the town: fractured, easily goaded into
confrontation, incapable of working collectively. The volatile,
antagonistic interpersonal exchanges that characterized the first
several meetings of the group were of serious concern to the
priest who had agreed to sit on the committee. He challenged
the group to put aside its differences, threatening to quit if the
direction of the committee did not change appreciably. Out of
deference to his vocation, members appointed him chairman of
the group, a move CSS had hoped would occur.
It was apparent to everyone, not just the clergyman, that the
group must first change its pattern of interaction, its group dy-
namic. If Centralians as a whole were going to put aside their
differences and work together, they needed at the very least a
model for communal action. The CC and Borough Council had
served only as models of self-destruction. A principal goal of the
new group would be to serve Centralia as a credible model of
communal organization, available within the town. But first the
group would have to learn to resolve its own disputes peacefully.
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At the request of the chairman, members agreed to conduct
themselves during a CCHD meeting according to three basic
rules that would later prove effective in organizing the town into
neighborhood meetings. The rules were: only one person could
speak at a time; other members were forbidden to interrupt the
person speaking; and members were prohibited from criticizing
one another for the ideas they presented.
Each CCHD member agreed to abide by these rules, and
gradually meetings became more orderly affairs, where whoever
was speaking was respectfully attended to and differences were
expressed and resolved (or left as differences) in a context of
mutual respect. When it became clear to the two committee
members given to a confrontational approach that not only were
they unable to convert the group to their preferred strategy, but
that the volatile emotions of anger and fear were not going to be
entertained during CCHD meetings, they resigned. They were
replaced by two hot-side residents who had also been active CC
members.
Partly in reaction to the two former members' inclination to-
ward confrontation, the CCHD realized that it must reach a
common understanding of itselfas a group, by which all members
would abide. Recognizing that it had no allies in its attempts to
suppress hostile outbursts and mobilize residents, the CCHD
decided to forgo any public activity until the group itself had
worked out a method of conflict resolution. If the CCHD was
to become a model for reorganization of the town, it must first
tend to its own internal workings. Although the group had formed
in November of 1982, it was not until the end of March 1983
that it first sponsored a public meeting. 8
When the CCHD discussed the volatile exchanges that had
marked its first several meetings, the young cleric warned that
continued expressions of rank discord would demoralize the
group. He asked members not to deny the reality of the mine
fire and the threats it posed (real or otherwise), but to isolate
whatever emotions the fire triggered, at least while participating
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in the group. He asked that members discourage one another
from emotional displays and excited discussions of the dangers
of the fire.
In a logical extension of its decision not to discuss the fire in
the language of fear, the group agreed to refrain from adopting
a definition of the fire as either a threat or a nuisance, and from
attempting to convert the town to its interpretation. Unlike its
predecessor and the other groups that would emerge in the next
year, the CCHO adopted a policy of noninterpretation. Unable
to address the source of the threat and unwilling to respond
emotionally to it, this fledgling group took the high ground of
nonpartisanship. Members agreed not to address the mine fire,
its potential effect on health and safety, or the method of dealing
with it, in terms of any of the reductionist definitions extant
within the town. One member summed up the reasoning of the
group: "We are not engineers. There's a mine fire problem, but
we aren't DER ... so why should we be running around trying
to tell everybody where the fire is and how bad the gases are?"
As we shall see, this strategy of noninterpretation, aimed at con-
trolling the volatile emotions of group members and other Cen-
tralians, would prove an elusive goal, more suitable for individual
tension management than community problem-solving.
Rather than set forth a specific interpretation of the fire and
adopt a confrontational coping style, the CCHO decided to po-
sition itself within the community to help the conflicting parties
address their emotional responses to the threat and reach a mu-
tually satisfactory settlement of differences, as stated in the
group's quarterly report to the funding agency: "We have no
technical experience to determine what option would best ad-
dress the mine fire.... Since we are not qualified to address
the technical problems in dealing with the fire, we centered our
efforts around keeping the borough as much intact as possible."9
The CCHO sought to use the political leverage that comes
from nonalignment to become a mediator in the town. Taking
the perspective of the community as a social unit, rather than
focusing on any single section's interpretation of the fire, it was
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clear that neighborhoods were experiencing very different levels
of stress and social disruption. Adopting the motto "We're all
hurting but in different ways," the group sought to convince the
conflicting parties that no one living in Centralia was escaping
the pain and turmoil. The essential task the CCHD set for itself
was to direct the attention of the community away from the fire
and toward what it perceived as a disaster of even greater mag-
nitude: the social destruction of the borough.
Within a few weeks of its first meeting, the emergent group
had hammered out an ambitious agenda, including a mandate to
adopt none of the interpretations of the fire, to become a model
for communal affiliation and thus position itself as a mediator
group, and to influence the terms that Centralians used to discuss
and define the crises. lO
Although it was not until March that the CCHD held its first
public meeting, the group was very active during the preceding
months. Its strategy-to redefine the terms of the conflict while
serving as a model for conflict resolution-encouraged the
CCHD to look for ways to address what it perceived to be the
real crises in town. After a vigorous discussion ofpossible courses
of action, the minutes of one meeting concluded by noting:
"Committee agreed [that the] course of action now is how to
help the people, not the fire."11
The CCHD decided first to investigate the possibility of es-
tablishing a mental health unit in town. A call to the county
mental health services agency revealed that thirteen Centralians
had sought assistance in managing emotional problems in the
past eight months, or double the number who routinely sought
such help. The CCHD members suggested that, since the forty-
five-minute drive from Centralia to the mental health office
probably deterred many other residents, a mental health re-
source in Centralia itself would encourage residents to examine
the costs of the social hatred they lived with day to day. The
CCHD persuaded the county agency to apply to the state De-
partment of Public Welfare for a grant to establish a mental health
satellite in Centralia, which opened its doors in May of 1983,
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staffed by a secretary and a therapist. At first, residents were
reluctant to be seen walking into the facility for fear of neighbors'
gossip. But gradually more and more Centralians sought the
services of the clinic, which acquired a reputation in town as an
anxiety-reducing resource. People also began to talk favorably
about the CCHD, the group that had provided the town with a
noncontroversial, problem-solving resource.
The CCHD acquired a wider reputation when its chairman
and others spoke via the local radio station about the human
problems facing the town, during a weekly program that origi-
nated in a community four miles from Centralia. Using a call-in
format, giving Centralians an opportunity to comment or ask
questions, the show focused on the human costs of the crisis.
Included among the topics were the roles of rumor and gossip,
the health and psychological costs of chronic conflict among
neighbors, and the multiple ways in which everyone in town was
affected by the fire.
Recognizing that Centralia's youth were victims of the com-
munity conflict, the CCHD paid for refurbishing the town's Teen
Center and making it a more attractive place for teenagers to
congregate. To reach those of all ages, the CCHD in February
1983 hired as coordinator a Roman Catholic nun who was ex-
perienced in organizing southern Appalachian groups. The sister
began by visiting Centralians in their homes and simply listening,
as she put it, "to anything that was on their minds." Her purpose
was "not to persuade but to support."
It was becoming clear to Centralians that the CCHD was
approaching the crisis in a fashion quite different from that of
the CC or the Borough Council. The mental health clinic and
the radio program encouraged residents to rearrange their inter-
pretation of the problems besetting Centralia. The remodeling
of the Teen Center and the coordinator's door-to-door visits re-
minded Centralians that youth and neighbor were important to
them as a community. The chairman of the CCHD was well
aware that not only was the group meeting basic needs in town,
but it was also acquiring a reputation for nonpartisanship that
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would help it play the role of mediator. As the group worked to
position itself as an organization independent of the prevailing
factions in town, it was also developing internally as a consensus
group, a model for communal association.
The resources the CCHD introduced into Centralia were ap-
preciated by many, but they did not result in attachment to the
group. The mine fire had become a volatile emotional issue that
did not lend itself to reflection and reconsideration. In a typical
response, a former councilman said, "I appreciate what this group
is doing for the town, but the real issue is the fire and nobody
around here thinks otherwise." Another man, referring to the
money the CCHD had donated to the Teen Center, commented:
"They have a lot of money to spend. It doesn't surprise me that
they're giving it away." Expressing the incapacity of most resi-
dents to trust in the benevolent intentions of their neighbors,
another man condemned the group's unselfish behavior as noth-
ing more than a front to hide its real intentions: selling the town
to coal companies for a profit.
It was difficult for most Centralians to accept that a group
would seek to be noncontroversial, concerned only about the
welfare of the community. Because it would not come down on
one side or the other of the conflicting interpretations, the
CCHD was a difficult group with which to identify: its greatest
asset, its nonpartisan position, was also its greatest deficit. Bor-
ough Council members, former members of the CC, and many
other felt a need to attribute blame for the social demoralization
of their town; attributions help to explain events. Beyond that,
blame attribution, as we shall see, sets the accused off from the
rest, investing the accusers with a semblance of control over
their predicament. 12 The CCHD seemed to be saying to every-
one, "Live with the ambiguity of the mine fire and let's address
together the bitterness of your neighbor." This would prove dif-
ficult for most residents, who were without the support of an
intimate group like the CCHD to nurture patience and benevo-
lence. In the end, in a desperate effort to bring residents to-
gether, the CCHD would respond to the community's predi-
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lection for emotional displays, embroiling itself in the town's
vicious cycle of blame attribution.
The internal structure of the CCHD was not the only factor
that inhibited its acceptance by most Centralians. As the con-
tinuing advance of the fire increased the antagonism in town,
competing groups emerged, each expressing its own vested in-
terest in the outcome of the crisis.
Within two months of the founding of the CCHD, a small
group numbering no more than ten active members formed in
the adjacent village of Byrnesville, a community of twenty-five
families one-halfmile south ofCentralia. By all accounts, Byrnes-
ville was in the direct path of the advance of the fire. Calling
themselves the Citizens to Save Byrnesville, this group began
to meet secretly, permitting no outside access to their delibera-
tions, even by the press. The group made little effort to establish
a liaison between itselfand groups in Centralia. A founding mem-
ber's explanations for this strategy of isolation is instructive:
"When the DER said the fire was coming our way, we knew we
had a big problem. We felt the press wouldn't help us. Our local
paper confuses people and distorts things. We didn't seek any
help from Centralia because they can't even help themselves.
Look at Council, they can't agree on when to hold a workshop.
And no one wants anything to do with the CC, or that new group
[the CCHD]."
The Citizens to Save Byrnesville adamantly rejected the fire
as being a serious threat to anybody. Several families in Byrnes-
ville refused to have their homes monitored for gases, against
the recommendation of the Pennsylvania Department of Health.
Indeed, in the face ofmounting evidence that the fire was moving
south toward their village, residents scoffed at the idea that they
were endangered. In the words of a member of the Save Byrnes-
ville group, the real threat to Byrnesville was not the fire but "a
bunch of assholes in Centralia that think they're going to get
some money from the government at my expense. I'll die here
before I see that happen."
Convinced that their neighbors "up the hill" were to blame
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for the troubles they were experiencing, the Citizens to Save
Byrnesville disrupted several public meetings in Centralia,
shouting down anyone who expressed an opinion differing from
their own. Indeed, as one member revealed, this "shout down"
strategy was formally adopted by the group to ensure that its
interpretation of the problem received public attention. It is also
possible that these hostile outbursts were related to the coping
style of the group: it makes little sense to scream at an under-
ground fire, but when the "real" sources of misery are human
agents violating moral standards, venting hostile impulses ap-
pears quite reasonable. Externalizing blame by attributing re-
prehensible characteristics to others, the residents of Byrnesville
had no trouble in explaining why their lives were so seriously
disrupted.
Although the Citizens to Save Byrnesville exacerbated the
tensions in Centralia, the group played a relatively minor role
in the complexity of events during the mine fire crisis. The group
did, however, serve as a model for-in fact, merged with-a
Centralia group that organized in the latter weeks ofAugust 1983:
Citizens to Save the Borough. Moreover, although the CC and
the Citizens to Save could not have been further apart in opinions
on the scope and severity of the fire, both groups practiced
confrontation and blame attribution. This convergence of cop-
ing styles between two groups that held diametrically opposed
views of the fire illustrates our central idea that it was the way
people responded to one another's attempts to make sense out
of the underground fire that constituted the real disaster in
Centralia.
As federal and state governments continued their borehole
study to determine the perimeter of the fire and devise a plan
to stop it, heat from the mine fire was disrupting the daily lives
ofmany people. In early January 1983, underground heat cracked
the state highway running north and south through the borough.
The crack across the highway, roughly 10 feet long, occurred in
the impact zone at the southern edge of town. Mining maps of
the area under the crack showed that mining had robbed the
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pillars of coal, removing the support of the highway. A natural
gas pipeline adjacent to the highway became a serious concern
when temperature readings under the highway climbed above
770°F. Few people were reassured by the government's pro-
nouncement that the natural gas pipeline had been built to with-
stand temperatures in excess of I,OOO°F. On a cloudy or damp
day, steam from the fire rose on either side of the highway,
engulfing the road and reducing visibility to zero. A DER official
summed up: "We have a pretty nasty situation along Route 61.
There is not a lot of cover, there's a big void and high tem-
peratures. "13
In the course of several days, 9,000 tons offly ash barrier were
pumped into the ground under the highway at a cost exceeding
$330,000. But the heat under the road did not abate. The 10-
foot crack widened, and steam continued to belch from the
ground, hovering over the road like a dense fog. After a rear-
end collision involving a DER state vehicle, the state closed the
highway, one of the region's major thoroughfares. Sawhorses
placed end to end with flashing yellow lights strapped to their
crossbars confronted those travelers who ignored the 200 or more
detour signs in the area and drove to the site of the subsidence.
A twenty-four-hour police watch kept an eye on the barricade.
As the government was closing the highway, interrupting the
travel of thousands of area residents, two families on the hill
awoke one morning to a thunderous, reverberating crash that
shook the houses when a cave-in tore out pieces of their basement
walls. A few weeks before, a subsidence had occurred in the
basement of an adjacent house. Subsidences had torn up yards
and fields before, but these were the first recorded incidents of
fissures under homes.
Frightening as the latest cave-ins must have been for families
on the hill, it is doubtful that many cold-side community resi-
dents would have reacted forcefully to these incidents alone. The
closing ofRoute 61, however, was a major inconvenience to many
Centralians who now had to drive more than six miles to reach
a neighboring town that before had been only one mile away.
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The rerouting of school buses forced families to rearrange their
morning and evening schedules. Routine was disrupted every
Sunday for the Roman Catholic majority in town, who attended
mass at Saint Ignatius church on the southern edge of the bor-
ough, no more than thirty yards from the roadblock. It was one
thing for a few families to complain about gases and subsidences
in their homes; it was quite another for everyone in town to be
inconvenienced and made anxious by the closing of a major thor-
oughfare. Within days after the highway was closed, a new group
emerged in town, calling for unity.
The timing was right. The community still lacked a viable
organization through which residents could put concerted pres-
sure on state and federal governments. The CC was now little
more than a memory, although a vivid one. The CCHD was still
developing internally, and the Citizens to Save Byrnesville could
hardly serve as a foundation for collective action in Centralia.
The Borough Council itself was mired in internal squabbles, not
to mention the day-to-day business of running the borough.
At a community meeting set up by Pennsylvania agencies
responsible for closing Route 61, several Centralians expressed
the desire to start a new community group to attack the seemingly
endless problems associated with the fire. In yet another attempt
to band together, some forty citizens representing all areas of
Centralia, as well as Byrnesville, gathered on January 20, 1983,
at Borough Hall. The United Centralia Area Mine Fire Task
Force, as they decided to call themselves, was to focus both on
the community conflict and on federal and state funding-after
the results of the borehole study were made public.
The discord and animosity in town was ofconcern to everyone
at the first meeting of the Task Force. The question of how to
overcome the divisiveness, reduce the misunderstanding, and
establish a common cause was the first task at hand. A retired
priest in the group recommended that a day be set aside for the
expression of unity-a day dedicated to reaffirming Centralians'
commitment to one another and their town. The whirlwind of
activity that followed promised at first to heal the divisions in
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town. Neighbor worked with neighbor on the various concrete
tasks necessary to, as one man put it, "strike up the band and
announce to everyone that the town is united."
In the weeks that followed, Task Force members asked vol-
untary associations in town, including the Fire Company Aux-
iliary, the Teen Club, and the American Legion, to help in
planning the day. Neighboring communities were invited. A Task
Force petition was circulated not only within the region but
throughout the nation, where more than 10,000 names were
signed beneath these words:
SET CENTRALIA FREE IN '83
I/We the undersigned, urgently request the allocation of funding
necessary to expedite work on the mine fire immediately following
the completion of the . . . borehole drilling project.
Several committees, set up to manage the practical side of
sponsoring a day ofunity, worked in apparent harmony to arrange
refreshment, transportation, press releases, and fund raising.
The process of planning Unity Day was a noncontroversial, anxi-
ety-reducing experience that served to inhibit the display of con-
flict. Even in such a unifying activity, however, differences
between residents were not entirely suppressed, as the following
fieldnote indicates: "Immediately after announces that St.
Ignatius church would be the setting for one part of Unity Day
events, a woman interrupted the speaker to say that many people
will refuse to go into St. Ignatius because it is an Irish church."
After a lengthy debate on whether or not any church in town
would be acceptable to all Centralians, St. Ignatius was chosen
because it was Centralia's largest church and close to the bar-
ricades blocking Route 61.
A few differences over the nitty-gritty details of staging the
Unity Day event, however, did not fragment the group; coop-
eration in this expression of unity was paramount. Indeed, an
elderly woman found the whole affair "most different for us. I
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see people working together who last week wouldn't speak [to
one another]." People compared the planning of Unity Day to
the planning of Centralia's centennial celebration in 1969. Many
residents recalled the staging of the town's one-hundredth birth-
day celebration as the most recent social event that involved the
whole town, rather than just a single auxiliary or parish.
During the weeks leading up to Unity Day, many Centralians
were optimistic that their town was healing itself as it prepared
for an occasion arguably more significant than its centennial
party. Even during the early stages, however, there were por-
tents of troubles to come, notably the spatial arrangement at the
United Committee Task Force meetings, which mirrored a com-
munity history bereft ofa tradition of concerted action in a crisis.
At each meeting of the Task Force, there were at least twenty
people who had committed themselves to some task associated
with staging the event. Those who were immediately involved
in planning activities sat at the front of the room around the
outside of long rectangular tables arranged in a square open on
one end. The thirty-five-foot distance between Task Force mem-
bers on opposite sides of the square created problems in simple
communication. People were frequently asked to repeat them-
selves because others could not hear them. The distance between
members also encouraged those sitting near one another to with-
draw from group discussions and engage in two- or three-person
conversations, oblivious to what was occurring around them. It
was not uncommon for two, three, even four separate conver-
sations to be in progress while the leader of the group was at-
tempting to direct attention to the issue under discussion.
A strong leader might have been able to link the separate
groups in communication, but the Task Force had decided against
formal leadership, in the name of cooperation and, as one man
put it, "to be a democratic organization." Someone, however,
had to moderate, open and close the meetings, bring issues to
the floor for discussion, and move the group along in its meeting
agenda. The role ofmoderator shifted between members ofcoun-
cil and the mayor. Eschewing a leadership role, the moderators
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had difficulty in claiming the group's attention, and they fre-
quently admonished members for not cooperating by discussing
the concerns that had been introduced. Not only did the mod-
erators fail to assert leadership, but the group itself would not
allow the moderator's role to shift to one of leadership. At one
point in a particularly uncoordinated meeting, the mayor, acting
as moderator, attempted to claim the position ofhis elected office
to redirect the group. "I'm your mayor," he began, "I must have
your attention. We have business to conduct." One member
of the group was quick to respond, "you're not mayor of this
meeting!"
This loosely structured organization nevertheless managed to
function adequately as it concentrated on Unity Day. Planning
transportation for the elderly, circulating the petition, organizing
a hoagie sale to raise money, planning the agenda for the day,
and notifying the press of the schedule-the group accomplished
all this within a matter offive weeks. During this planning period,
there was practically no discussion of the fire, its scope, or its
seriousness.
March 7, 1983, was Unity Day. Accounts vary, but it is es-
timated that five hundred people, Centralians and others from
neighboring communities, participated in the event. 14 The day
began with a nondenominational ceremony at the Roman Catho-
lic church, followed by a march from the church to Borough Hall
initiated by the release ofseveral hundred helium-filled balloons,
and over two hours ofspeeches and activities and the hall. Several
politicians and regional dignitaries addressed the need for a
united Centralia: 15
In the unity that is shown here by the men and the women and the
children of Centralia coming together, you have made a beginning
in doing what must be done.-Congressman Frank Harrison
I would urge you not to make this just Unity Day, but the first day
of a great unity movement.-R. ("Bud") Dwyer, former Penn-
sylvania State treasurer
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I know you're hearing a lot of good words from a lot of speakers,
but when it comes down to it, it is going to be you yourselves who
are going to be able to effectuate a change in the ... mine fire.-
Richard Kulick, international auditor, United Mine Workers of
America
Be candid with each other. Be fair with each other. Be sensitive
with each other and employ common sense in the solution of prob-
lems for which no perfect solutions exist.-General DeWitt Smith,
director of the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency
These words made sense to residents on both sides of town.
The wise counsel offered by representatives of powerful orga-
nizations concerned about the plight of the town coincided with
the perceived need of many Centralians for a broad-based coa-
lition to demand relief from the social and ecological ravages of
the fire. To recognize a need, however, is only the first step in
creating a communal organization. The next critical step is de-
veloping an organizational means ofpersuading people that action
governed by criteria of mutual respect and common belonging
is preferable to rank discord.
Unity Day was a successful media event in terms of the dra-
matic, though temporary, expression of unanimity. But in the
end, it could not serve as the foundation for collective action to
rescue the town from the underground fire. Without such a
model, the Unity Committee was left with only the blueprint
for group action that had typified the town's twenty-one-year
response to the fire. The results were disastrous.
On March 8, the day after Unity Day, the Unity Committee
held a meeting, chaired by the Borough Council president. The
seating arrangement was again a square open at the end facing
the audience. Unlike the pattern of previous meetings, however,
when members distributed themselves around the tables in an
ad hoc fashion, the post-unity day seating expressed the social
cleavages within the borough. As if anticipating the need for
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group support, Unity Committee members sat next to those
whose interpretations of the scope and seriousness of the fire
were similar to their own. The three members of the committee
who had remained neutral on the issue of the correct interpre-
tation of the crisis huddled together at the end of one table. As
the meeting progressed, the spatial distance between residents
symbolized, in spite of the apparent strides made on Unity Day,
their continuing personal and social differences.
For the first forty-five minutes of the meeting, the committee
congratulated itself on having planned and staged Unity Day.
Then, taking advantage of a lull in discussion, the chairman
brought this segment of the meeting to an abrupt end with the
comment, "Okay, now that all the backslapping is done, let's get
down to business." Sensing that he now had the group's full
attention, he asked, "Should we be chartered?"
A cacophonous debate ensued. Someone suggested that a
charter was needed if the group was to seek federal grant money.
Someone else shot back, "Why do we need federal grant money?
I'm against looking for grants." The discord lasted for several
minutes, until one man succeeded in introducing another issue,
leaving the question of the charter unresolved; the Unity Com-
mittee remained unchartered by default. The group switched to
the question ofwhether or not the Unity Committee should work
closely with the OSM and the DER to impress upon them the
needs of the community. The vice president of the Borough
Council responded quickly that this was the proper task of the
local government, not the Unity Committee.
The discussion then drifted to a proposal by one woman that
Centralians charter busses and travel to Washington to meet with
Interior Secretary Watt. Sharp objections were expressed to the
propriety of this suggestion. When one man revealed that he
had written Secretary Watt requesting a meeting, the mayor
angrily denounced him for acting without the consent of the
group. The man explained that he had been asked by one of the
Unity Day subcommittees to write the letter. Angry words were
exchanged, and the meeting had all but collapsed when several
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elderly women who had been sitting in the audience rose and
announced that they were going to leave if this hostile exchange
continued.
Tempers subsided for a brief time. The borough solicitor then
accused several former CC members of trying to acquire prop-
erties in the impact zone to sell at inflated prices should a gov-
ernment buy-out occur. A young woman stood up and tried to
explain that the CC was in the process of reorganization, that
although the old group had disbanded, the conditions ofthe social
service grant required the CC to remain in existence, if only on
paper. Ignoring her explanation of the status of the CC, the
attorney announced loudly, "I do not want you to make decisions
that will affect me against my will." Angry and embarrassed at
her treatment by the solicitor, the young woman walked out of
the meeting. A few minutes later, the mayor asked a priest in
attendance to give the closing prayer.
Had the Unity Committee attempted simply to manage the
melange of conflicting emotions about the "real" threat of the
fire by holding further expressive events to dramatize unity, it
might have minimized internal conflict. That might have been a
more reasonable strategy for the committee. In any case, the
group's shift from emotion management to problem solving
brought the Unity Committee up against the insoluble. Com-
munal affiliation was devalued in favor of one or another inter-
pretation of the crisis, a form of radical subjectivity that would
express itself throughout the career of the group.
At the next meeting, a resident of the impact zone, who ada-
mantly rejected any suggestion that the fire was dangerous, sug-
gested in good faith that families with gas monitors remove the
devices from their homes and deposit them at the steps of the
local DER office. Such an act, she argued, would attract media
attention and force the government to respond. A young man
whose children were experiencing chronic upper respiratory
problems diagnosed by a physician as CO2-related, found the
suggestion ludicrous. As a parent, he argued, he would be ir-
responsible to remove the gas monitor from his home. The
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woman who had made the suggestion countered: "I, for one,
have no gases in my home. And I have a strong feeling that if
we turn in the monitors, we will force them to do something."
The young father responded, "How on earth do you know wheth-
er or not you have gases if you don't have a monitor?"
A week later the group met again, this time to read aloud and
discuss a letter that had been drafted to Secretary Watt. One
woman suggested deleting the sentence "We want the fire put
out under any conditions." She argued that this phrase would
signal to the government that the group favored any means to
extinguish the fire, even if that meant destroying the town. A
caustic exchange followed in which some residents accused others
of caring more about the town than about human health and
safety. Their opponents claimed that the fire could be managed
without destroying the town and that those who thought other-
wise were not interested in the welfare of the community. "I'm
not selling my house to save any of you," one man shouted.
Another man yelled back, "Save yourself. I'll take care of my
business!" At one point in this volatile discussion, the suggestion
was made to put the issue to a vote. One of those who objected
to a vote argued that it would be "undemocratic."
In exchanges such as these, residents became aware that what-
ever common ground there might have been at one time had all
but disappeared as factions desperately defended their own in-
dividual interpretations of the crisis. Strategies and proposals
were evaluated not on the basis of intrinsic merits, but simply
on the grounds of who had suggested them. Uncompromising
adherence to any exclusionary interpretation ofthe fire precluded
behavior governed by criteria of common belonging.
In a perhaps foreseeable turn of events, committee meetings
began to attract fewer and fewer residents from the south end
of town. "We've got enough grief with council and DER," rea-
soned one resident of the impact zone, "I don't need to go to
these crazy Unity meetings anymore." With the steady attrition
of residents from the south end of town, the Unity Committee
came to represent, not multiple interpretations, but the single
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firm belief that the fire was a problem, not a crisis. It resembled
both the CC and the Citizens to Save Byrnesville in being or-
ganized around a unilateral understanding of the fire, ready to
call anyone who disagreed with its interpretation not only a de-
ficient witness to reality, but morally suspect.
The Unity Committee continued to meet biweekly through
July 1983, primarily to plan a community trip to Washington,
even though letters sent to Interior Secretary Watt requesting
a meeting went unanswered. Although there was general agree-
ment on the worth of a trip to the capital, the group could not
agree on what it would do once it got there. The suggestion of
inviting a former CC member to advise on what they might do
in Washington was roundly condemned. In a bitter tone, one
woman flatly stated that she would "have nothing to do with that
group." "Whatever we do," observed one member, "we have to
look like professionals when we go to Washington. Or they're
going to think we're a bunch of hicks." It was his proposal that
the committee "buy an easel and draw up a lot of charts that
could be flipped back and forth during our presentation." These
props, he argued, would help the group convince "the bureau-
crats in Washington that we mean business." Several members
of the group responded enthusiastically but others were more
realistic. One asked, with more than a touch of wryness, "And
what do we put on these charts that we flip around?" A more
basic question followed: "What do we want?" It was this fun-
damental question that the Unity Committee failed to collectively
answer.
Nor did the Unity Committee ever make it to Washington.
Secretary Watt's refusal to answer the inquiries puzzled the
group. Recalling a brother who had received a letter from Presi-
dent Gerald Ford in response to an inquiry about physical fitness,
one man could not understand why a "secretary" would refuse
to answer their letters. On this score, at least, veterans of the
CC could have helped the committee. The obvious lack of com-
munication between members of the two groups meant, in effect,
that the Unity Committee was destined to repeat the failures of
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the CC. It finally became apparent that Watt had no intention
of corresponding with the Unity Committee.
In one of the last meetings of the group, resignation, frustra-
tion, and feelings of impotence were openly expressed. "Maybe
we should not hope to see Watt," commented one woman. An-
other agreed: "Maybe if we see a deputy secretary or an under-
secretary, that will do." "What makes you think we're going to
see anybody in Washington?" asked the mayor. Throwing his
hands in the air, another man asked angrily, "And if we get to
Washington and ifwe see even the President, what are we going
to say? We don't even know what we're going to say." "We're a
democratic group," counseled another member. "We should say
what the community wants us to say." "What is that?" two or
three people asked almost in unison. "We want the fire out.
That's what we want," affirmed an elderly man. "We're not a
decision-making group," countered another member. "Ifwe start
making decisions for everybody, I'm walking out now. I'll be no
part of a group that thinks it can make decisions for the com-
munity." In a loud and exasperated voice, one man quelled the
discussion as ifhe had caught the group doing something shame-
ful: "I'm always hearing now when I go out of town, 'What's
wrong with the people in Centralia? Why can't they do something
about their problem?' I tell you, if they were here now they
would soon find out."
The failure of the Unity Committee can be traced to several
factors, including its acephalous structure (leadership being
passed around from meeting to meeting); its tendency to fracture
along preexisting differences regarding the "real" sources of
threat and conflict in the borough; and a painfully obvious lack
of agreed-upon rules for appropriate conduct at the meetings.
The Unity Committee was mistaken in assuming that a single
day set aside for unity would heal the deep-seated divisions in
town. Having achieved Unity Day, members felt that they could
resolve their crisis by appealing to a common identity and shared
rules for corporate problem solving. When the Unity Committee
shifted from staging an event to the politics of the mine fire, the
A Thwarted Struggle 131
group divided into competing factions, each blaming the other
for the common problems of the uncommon fire.
The failure of the Unity Committee to accomplish anything
beyond Unity Day was a clear signal to many that even the
unanimity of reaction to the closing of a vital highway was not
enough to unite Centralians. "Nothing works in this town,"
mused one man, "not even us."
7. One Town, Many Groups
In late March 1983, as the Unity Committee was facing the true
difficulties of forging a cooperative organization, and as the Cen-
tralia Committee For Human Development was planning its first
public meeting, the federal Office of Surface Mining released an
interim report from the borehole study, which was then in the
final stages. Based on examination of 189 boreholes, the report
noted: "The high temperature area (400-1000°F) covers a larger
area than was originally conceived." Of the sixty-seven borehole
temperature readings listed in the report, forty-one were higher
than normal, some hitting 1000°F.l
The borehole study not only revealed a dilemma much worse
than originally thought, but by itself threatened the health of
some residents, since a few of the boreholes were venting CO
and CO2 into nearby houses. In one hOlTIe a few hundred feet
from a borehole, the gas monitor registered a CO level of 14
parts per million for twelve consecutive hours; the official thresh-
olds for dangerous exposure were 9 ppm for nine hours or 35
ppm for one hour. Other families, too, complained of elevated
gas readings after boreholes were drilled near their properties.
In early April, the fire broke cover in a ravine, visible to
sightseers who were curious enough to climb a sharp incline and
then peer downward. Supported by sensory evidence and official
intelligence, the fire became more and more difficult to deny.
Within a period ofthree weeks, four subsidences were discovered
in Centralia and one occurred a few hundred yards away, in
Byrnesville. The Byrnesville subsidence, 20 by 15 feet across
and 30 feet deep, severed the water line into the village, de-
priving Byrnesville of running water for several days. Only a few
days later, two more holes in the earth opened up in Centralia.
Even the county emergency management director was con-
cerned about one of the holes: "It looks ugly down in there. I
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can't tell how deep it is."2 He advised residents to stay away
from the subsidence area and instructed the Borough Council to
fence it off, but local officials, unable to find sufficient fencing,
put up a rope barrier instead. The rope was untied within a day
or two, and no further efforts were made to cordon off the area.
Within a week, two more cave-ins occurred in the borough.
In early June, two months after the interim report, the Office
of Surface Mining reported that in the previous four months the
fire had spread under an area of approximately three acres. Even
many residents on the north end of town believed the problem
was approaching emergency proportions. A middle-aged woman
living there acknowledged in late April that she and several of
her neighbors were about to request that gas monitors be in-
stalled in their homes. "If you'd have asked me a few months
ago if I thought this fire was a real danger to the town," she
reflected, "I would have said 'I don't know. I hope not.' But I
know it's serious now, for everybody."
As the fire advanced into the borough and surrounding areas,
legislators chastised the technical agencies for unnecessary delay
in responding to the blaze. A state representative who chaired
the House Mines and Energy Management Committee, citing
the millions of dollars spent on flood relief in Johnstown, Penn-
sylvania, compared the mine fire to the 1889 Johnstown flood:
"So what's the difference between a flood tragedy and a mine
fire? . . . Something has to be dorie and I can assure you that
our committee cares." A member of the federal House Interior
Appropriations Committee, after visiting Centralia, described
the fire as "worse than I thought."
Despite expressions of concern from elected officials, how-
ever, government agencies were slow to respond. In late March
the Pennsylvania Department of Health complained that the
DER was slow in turning over tapes collected from gas monitors
in homes. An administrator from the health department publicly
challenged the DER to "get a better handle on gas monitoring
practices. "3
Even before the public, agency representatives showed little
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concern for the residents' plight. At one public gathering, a young
mother told neighbors and government officials of her family's
unexplained headaches and dizziness, which had occurred only
after a borehole was drilled near their home. The woman was
convinced that drilling the borehole had shunted gases into her
basement-hardly a new concern. Officials had in fact suggested
on other occasions that this might be a problem for some residents
near the drilling sites. On this occasion, however, the DER
representative immediately put the woman on the defensive: "It's
probably something in your home. I wouldn't jump to any con-
clusions that it is the mine fire." It was only a matter of weeks
before the health department offered temporary housing to the
family living next door to the woman, because of consistently
high gas readings in their home.
This was hardly the only public discreditation of citizens' at-
tempts to interpret the effects of the fire. On one telling occasion,
a retired miner suggested to DER officials that he and other
miners might help: "I have walked underneath this town. I can
tell you where the pillars are and where they've been robbed.
Doesn't it make sense to talk with me and others who worked
in the mines? We might have some ideas on how to put this fire
out." A DER official assured him that government engineers
were doing everything possible to abate or extinguish the fire.
"I do, however, appreciate your concern," the official conceded.
Failure to legitimate this retired miner's claim to know something
relevant to the problem was humiliating for him, and several
minutes later he walked out of the meeting.
Not only condescension but confusion was often the result of
official reports on technical aspects of the fire. When one official
reported to the community that 502 monitoring had revealed no
appreciable increase of this noxious gas in ambient air, a council-
man asked why, if the readings were within normal limits, there
was a heavy smell of sulfur on the south end of town. The official
then admitted that the monitoring device was probably not al-
together accurate. "If they can't pick it up, 1 suggest they get
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new equipment," the councilman said. The DER official did not
respond.
In late May, the OSM announced that it would fund the dig-
ging of a trench to stop the southwest march of the fire. This
disclosure pleased many residents who viewed it as the govern-
ment's first concrete step to address the crisis. A week later, the
OSM announced that it was no longer certain the trench was
needed. Shortly after this announcement, the OSM declined to
discuss the trench idea further.
In other words, the state and federal governments' response
to the fire was no less confused and disorganized than the com-
munity's. Incapable of improvising when faced with a chronic
technological disaster, both these levels ofgovernment only mud-
dled along, blaming one another and the victims themselves for
their incapacity to act.
In the meantime, the CCHD continued to work on its internal
organization. The CCHD did not intend to engage in direct
action to mitigate the hazards associated with the fire, because
the group had concluded that the climate of social hatred was
taking a heavier toll on the community than the gases or subsid-
ences. Not being committed to a particular interpretation of the
fire, the CCHD had considerable time to work on itself as a
group. At meetings, members were to suppress their individual
views about the technical dimensions of the mine fire and instead
to cooperate in providing various services to the community.
Each member volunteered to accomplish something concrete
each week, even if it was only making a telephone call, then
report progress on that specific task to the group at large and
listen to its collective opinion. Physical sharing was also encour-
aged within the group. At the close ofa meeting, members would
frequently hug one another. The group would also gather pe-
riodically with their families to enjoy one-day retreats, to learn
that they could playas well as work cooperatively. Having worked
for over three months on its internal organization, the group
decided it was time to hold its first community meeting. The
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goal was to show Centralians "that it was possible to meet in an
orderly fashion, listen to one another, accomplish concrete busi-
ness and adjourn. In short, we have to show folks in this town
that meetings can work."4
The strategies to accomplish this purpose were based on mem-
bers' perceptions ofproblems in conventional mine fire meetings.
To avoid disorganization, each person attending the CCHD
meeting would receive a copy ofan agenda that would be followed
closely, with an eye to a two-hour time limit. All would be wel-
comed and introduced to the rules for group discussion by which
CCHD normally operated. Each member of CCHD was to de-
scribe some facet of the group's activities-an overview of the
CCHD organization, say, or the objectives of the group and its
accomplishments to date. In addition to presenting itself as a
model for communal action, the CCHD intended to position itself
publicly as a group that was not going to interpret the fire. It
would serve as mediator by offering residents a neutral ground
for a meeting place, by interpreting each side's position to the
other, and by communicating in the context of a public occasion
the optimistic attitude that compromise was possible.
Although the CCHD's first public meeting on March 29, 1983,
had been advertised in the newspaper and on the radio, only
twenty residents attended, most of whom lived in the impact
zone. If the group was to provide the basis for the communal
reconstitution of the village it knew it must reach more than
twenty people per meeting.
At the CCHD's next public meeting, a month later, people
were asked to write on a card three personal concerns about the
fire and the future of the town and to read aloud the first concern
written on their cards. The concerns were then listed on sheets
of newsprint taped to the wall. This "group memory" served to
orient discussion and permitted all to participate, as the goal of
this meeting was to show participants that an orderly exchange
ofideas was possible. Many residents commented on the meeting
as quite an unusual social occasion. One man said it was the first
meeting he had attended in years where "no one was shouted
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down." A woman observed that it was the first mine fire meeting
at which she had entered the discussion.
The CCHD had succeeded at cooperative activity, but its
agenda would work only if it could convince its neighbors that
fighting over the technical details of the fire ensured an endless
cycle of discord. At that, the CCHD was failing. Indeed, the
members admitted to one another that they were able to dis-
engage themselves from their emotive interpretations of the fire
only while working with the group. Mter the second meeting,
it was clear to the CCHD that it would have to address residents
by entertaining, not changing, their interpretations of the crisis.
The divisiveness and the low attendance-twenty residents
at the first meeting and only thirty-five at the second-were only
symptoms of the severe social fragmentation among Centralia's
population of only nine hundred. The mine fire was indeed a
multidimensional reality in Centralia, institutionalized in several
competing groups by early 1983: the CCHD, the Borough Coun-
cil's Mine Fire Task Force, the Unity Committee, the Citizens
to Save Byrnesville, and the remnant of the Concerned Citizens.
Other, informal groups were also springing up to represent con-
flicting interpretations of the crisis. One of these emerged from
the ashes of the Unity Committee: the Residents to Save the
Borough of Centralia, which advocated a position fundamentally
opposed to that of the CC.
The Borough Council was chiefly concerned with maintaining
community order and ensuring that it remained the principal
authority in town. The Citizens to Save Byrnesville interpreted
the mine fire as a threat to their particular neighborhood. The
Unity Committee had come to support the cold-side understand-
ing of the crisis as manageable, if only government could be
prompted to act. The Residents to Save the Borough represented
a more radical interpretation of the problem than its parent
group, the Unity Committee. The CC members, as we know,
continued to view the problem as an immediate threat to their
health and safety.
Divergent though they were, the groups had a common style
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of coping-blaming other groups for the misery besetting the
town. The CC blamed the government, the "unconcerned
citizens," and the CCHD (for succeeding it while being incon-
sistent with the CC's goals). The Borough Council blamed the
CC and the CCHO for challenging its rightful role of political
leadership. The council also accused the groups of disregarding
the residents who did not find the fire threatening. The Citizens
to Save the Borough accused the CC and the CCHD ofdestroying
the peace and tranquility of the old Centralia in the name of
personal gain. Unity Committee members accused the CC of
selfishness that threatened their way oflife. This pattern ofcoping
with the environmental crisis by holding others morally culpable
created a degree of social stress more severe than the stress of
the fire itself.
The CCHO found it impossible to function in a mediating role
amidst this whirlwind of competing groups. An additional obsta-
cle the CCHO confronted in its effort to become a model for
communal association was a haphazard and ineffective pattern of
interaction common to the groups. Although each of the groups
subscribed to a different interpretation ofthe crisis, all functioned
in the same manner. Participants interrupted one another at
meetings, which had no agendas; issues debated were left un-
resolved; leadership was a shifting, competitive proposition; and
unrealistic goals were all too frequently pursued. It was the fac-
tious, conflict-ridden CC, rather than CCHD, that served these
successor groups as a model for collective action.
Frustrated by low attendance at its initial meetings, the
CCHD quite unwittingly sacrificed its goal of mediating the con-
flicting interpretations for the shorter-term goal of bigger turn-
outs at a series of meetings, each one targeted at a specific area
of town. Approximately fifty residents attended the first meeting,
most of them residents of the impact zone, but at least forty of
them new to CCHO workshops. The CCHO was beginning to
reach the community. The meeting contrasted sharply ~th the
typical Centralia gathering. As people walked in, they were given
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a meeting agenda, which included a statement of purpose and
guidelines for workshop behavior; 3-by-5 cards were handed out
on which participants were to answer the question, "What do
you want as residents living in the impact zone?" Thirty-one of
the forty-one people who turned in a card expressed a desire to
relocate.
The discussion then shifted to what resources were available
to impact zone residents to work toward their goal of relocation.
Led by several former CC members, the discussion identified
legal help as the first resource available. The group decided that
it was time to contact a Washington law firm that had worked
previously with the CC. With collective enthusiasm the group
adopted a suggestion that impact zone residents take their con-
cerns immediately to the Borough Council. Residents were to
request a public meeting with the council to tell their local po-
litical representatives what the group wanted. "What should we
say to Council, exactly?" asked one man. "We're going to tell
them," answered another, "that we, the residents of the impact
zone, will make decisions from now on about what should be
done about what we want." A round of applause followed. The
chairman of the CCHD, sensing a confrontation in the making,
reminded the residents to "approach Borough Council respect-
fully!"5
The meeting had accomplished what CCHO had set out to
do; it provided a structure for collective decision making. At the
same time, the CCHO had unwittingly created an occasion for
residents holding one interpretation of the fire to reinforce their
beliefs and seek an immediate resolution to their predicament.
Trouble started the day after the workshop meeting, when word
spread quickly around town that residents from the impact zone
were planning a showdown with Borough Council. The council,
in fact, simply ignored the CCHO's request for a special meeting.
It was not inclined to a confrontation, and it had other concerns
to pursue.
In the meantime, several impact zone inhabitants circulated
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a petition among their neighbors on the hot side of town. Sixty-
seven people signed the petition, later known as the Citizens
Proclamation. It read:
For more years than we care to remember, we affected citizens have
remained mute over many issues as related to the Centralia Mine
Fire, and its silent aftermath, gases . . . we residents will no longer
accept being treated as second class citizens. . . . The will of the
people should be respected and honored. It is about time the horse
is placed in front of the cart, instead of vice versa. Our four priority
points are:
Those who wish to be removed from the impact zone be given
the opportunity and resources to do so.
We request, those who are relocated, be given fair market value
for their respective properties.
We request the fire itself be addressed, other than occasional lip
service.
Regardless of peoples' course of actions, their decision is theirs,
and as such, must be respected.
A CCHO member whose wife had circulated the petition
requested at the CCHO's weekly meeting that the organization
sponsor it. The group debated the idea and decided to remain
neutral, given the obvious conflict already generated by the pe-
tition and the proposed meeting with the Borough Council. The
word "proclamation" was troublesome for the CCHO's chairman,
who reminded the group that to proclaim something is not to
seek a communal basis for cooperative action. A proclamation is
a tactic that confronts others with a foregone conclusion, de-
manding compliance instead of requesting cooperation.
On May 26, 1983, the Borough Council held a special meeting
to discuss the possibility of hiring an independent engineering
firm to provide a "second opinion as to data on the mine fire."7
Ouring a lull in the discussion, the eCHO member who had
championed the petition stood and announced that he was not
speaking as a member of any group, but as a resident of the
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impact zone. Several council members, anticipating what was
coming, tried to ignore him and continued their discussion of
the independent engineer. He was not to be ignored, however,
and started reading the "Citizens Proclamation." Immediately
after the proclamation was read, the council minutes report, "A
motion to adjourn ... was made." The motion did not carry and
was followed by a motion that the council back the proclamation. 8
A heated debate ensued between members of the council and
residents of the impact zone. Threats and counter-threats were
exchanged, tempers mounted, and several councilmen walked
out of the meeting before adjournment. The CCHO's plans to
organize the town around a model for communal action were not
working.
Several members of the embattled Borough Council blamed
the CCHO for creating a public occasion designed to embarrass
them, assuming that the proclamation originated with the CCHO
and was a personal attack on the council. Many residents on the
hill, however, counted the reading of the decree as a significant
victory. Enjoying the council's obvious anger and annoyance at
being forced to listen to and debate their demands, one woman
crowed, "We got them right where it hurts, in front of the press
and everybody."
The CCHO's model of cooperative conflict resolution was
meeting stiff, if not insurmountable, opposition. In fact, at this
juncture in the history of the town's efforts to cope with both
the fire and the emerging norm of social hatred, none of the
groups was succeeding. The pattern ofgroup failure suggests that
once set in motion, the tyranny of the town's social hatred pre-
cluded any self-conscious effort to rearrange the tragic pattern
of interpersonal relations. 9
The fire, however, was making progress. An Associated Press
release, printed in the local paper on June 2, announced that
the fire was moving and that gas samples from boreholes revealed
"concentrations ofcarbon monoxide, carbon dioxide and methane
that [are] hundreds and thousands of times above normal."lO
Not only was the fire becoming of concern to more and more
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residents of the borough but cold-siders were being told "un-
officially" that the underground water table separating the south
from the north end of town was not as high as first thought.
Tunnels that had originally been thought to be under water were
now believed to be above the water line and dry. In other words,
there was no wall of water to stop the fire's advance into the
north end of town. On June 14, the OSM officially announced
that several tunnels leading from the south to the north end of
town were indeed above the water line and quite capable of
carrying the fire to the cold side of Centralia. 11
On June 8, only a week before the announcement, approxi-
mately forty residents from the north side of town had attended
the CCHD's second workshop, organized like the first. At the
door, residents were given a meeting agenda stating that "index
cards will be handed out, and everyone will write three responses
to the ... question: In terms of Centralia as a community, what
do you want?"12
The results were surprising, in that twenty-four of the thirty-
seven cold-siders who filled out a card listed relocation as their
primary need. It would appear, then, that by early June 1983,
Centralians were becoming aware that the mine fire posed a
greater threat to their well-being than had been imagined. For
some who wanted to relocate, concerns over health and safety
were paramount. For others, it was not gases or subsidence that
threatened their sense of security, but the confusion and mis-
understanding perpetuated by the twenty-one-year-old fire. For
many Centralians, the quality of life had so deteriorated that
relocating to another community was viewed as problem-solving
behavior.
No matter what individual conclusions had been reached about
relocation, the results of the government-sponsored study on the
fire marked the beginning of the end for Centralia. On July 12,
the OSM made public the long-awaited conclusions of its study
of the boundaries of the mine fire, along with the various options
to abate or extinguish it. In an unusual display of media under-
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statement, the local paper announced, "Mine fire news not
good." In its "Engineering Analysis," GAl Consultants, the en-
gineering firm that had conducted the study, reported that there
was not one fire but many: "The Centralia mine fire is not a
single . . . entity . . . advancing through the coal field on a
broad, uniform front. Instead, the fire is composed of somewhat
ill-defined, irregularly shaped zones of combustion. "13
The report identified four separate fires, or "zones of com-
bustion," which were moving in both southerly and northerly
directions. The fires "could conceivably burn beneath the north-
ern portion of Centralia" and would most definitely move under
the borough of Byrnesville. Indeed, the fires were moving in
the general direction of several contiguous communities and
"could conceivably spread over an area of approximately 3,700
acres,77 roughly six square miles. The report noted that anthracite
mine fires are extremely difficult to control and, if left to burn
themselves out, might last for "a century or more." The study
recommended total excavation as the only proven method for
extinguishing an anthracite mine fire, estimating that in Cen-
tralia's case the cost would exceed $663 million. Short of that,
four trenches could be dug in strategic places to stop the advance
of the fire, at a cost of more than $120 million-no small sum,
but only one-fifth the cost of total excavation.
The main trench of the four would cut a swath 3900 feet long,
450 feet deep, and an undetermined number of yards across.
Because the trench must be dug ahead of the fire, the report
warned that selecting this option meant digging a monstrous pit
through the "heart of Centralia," shoveling out an estimated 9
million cubic yards of earth. Not only would this mean relocation
for more than one hundred families and most of Centralia's busi-
nesses, but even the families that remained would have to resign
themselves to "noise, vibrations [from blasting], dirt ... [that]
could continue for a period ofseveral years." In fact, a spokesman
for the engineering consultants estimated that such a large trench
would take approximately thirty-six months to complete-if
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"shifts working twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week en-
countered no major obstacles" in the course of their work. "In
view of these factors," the consultants wrote, "the relocation of
households and businesses in response to local conditions
brought about by the fire would appear to be a course of action
worthy of consideration. "
The engineers also candidly observed that despite the appre-
ciable monetary, human, and environmental costs of the trench-
ing options, "the success of the fire control measure is not
necessarily assured." The report went on to mention other en-
gineering options-bulk filling of mine workings beneath the
community, inert gas injection, and incremental flooding-but
cautioned against these techniques as being even more experi-
mental and less predictable than either trenching or excavation.
The magnitude of the problem reported by the engineering
firm prompted one politician to comment shortly after the report
was made public: "The world changed as of this morn-
ing. . . . The potential area of risk is so much greater than we
thought it was. "14 Government agency officials, legislators, and
the media lost no time in reminding Centralians that the report
was, in the words of a retired state official, "the town's marching
orders." An OSM official, addressing almost two hundred Cen-
tralians on the day the report was made public, minced no words:
"It has taken twenty-one years to get to this point; your job now
is to tell us what you want. It is your decision, you tell us what
you want. But you must tell us quickly."
Many Centralians hoped that an independent expert opinion
would help them interpret the results of the borehole study and
make a rational decision, but this was not to be the case. Several
weeks before the governmenfs engineering study was made pub-
lic, the CCHO had offered $2,500 to the local government for
hiring an independent engineer to give a second opinion. The
Borough Council wrote the CCHO that it was about to solicit
bids for just that purpose, and "CCHO's contribution would be
greatly appreciated. "15 The CCHO replied to the Council that a
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"contract must be signed with Council as to our contribution to
the expense of hiring an engineer, and the information we must
receive. This information must be equivalent to the information
which Council receives. "16
The council did not respond to the CCHD's letter requesting
a contract; in the words of one councilman, "We're the elected
authority in the town. Why do we have to sign contracts with
people from our own town?" At a public meeting in late June,
when the council announced that it had hired an independent
engineering firm, CCHD members' questions about access to
workshops to discuss the engineers' report went unanswered.
The council president told CCHD members, "When the final
report is released, you'll get a copy at the same time as everybody
else," including the Unity Committee and Columbia County,
which had also contributed to the engineering fund. "As far as
I'm concerned, someone who gives $5 is the same as you."
Angry at the council's disregard for the size of its pledge, the
CCHD withdrew its offer and hired its own independent engi-
neer. Because the small village could not agree on how technical
information should be shared, its representatives paid almost
$10,000 dollars to purchase two independent engineering evalua-
tions of the same government-sponsored data. As it turned out,
the two reports on the federal government's data differed sharply.
The Borough Council's engineering report supported the fed-
erally sponsored study in recommending total relocation as the
only indisputable assurance of safety. 17 Residents living in fear
of the fire found reason to smile at the"cold-side" council's having
paid for a study that supported the threat beliefs of hot-side
residents. On the other hand, the CCHD's engineers saw a pos-
sibility that Centralia might make a profit from its disaster, by
"controlling the fire, and thereby the gas emissions," which
would "eliminate all the current haphazard venting." In a paper
submitted to the CCHD, "A Concept to Convert the Central
Mine Fire from a Perceived Hazard to an Asset, "18 the firm
recommended that it be hired to implement a "controlled burn-
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out" that would save the town and bring huge revenues from the
sale of thermal energy to local utilities.
Rumors of this report circulated in Centralia to the delight of
many cold-side residents, who enjoyed the idea that the CCHD
had spent the CC's grant money to be told that the fire was not
a disaster at all, but the economic salvation of the borough. In
the meantime, the CCHD reminded the engineers that they
were being paid to analyze the government's data and not create
work for themselves. The firm finally submitted a report that
recommended further research before adopting any engineering
option. 19 Many hot-side residents charged the CCHD with poor
judgment in hiring that firm.
Like most of Centralia's futile attempts to gain some control
over its destiny, this duplication of function and waste of money
for second opinions generated only conflicting information. Con-
fusion reigned over the summer, as the factions in Centralia
struggled to expand their influence and out-position one another.
Preparing for the release of the GAl report, the Borough
Council asked several citizens to form a committee to explore
ways ofgiving residents an opportunity to respond to the report's
recommendations. 20 This was the origin of the Centralia Input
Task Force, the fifth group to be formed in two years and the
fourth in eight months. It was the shortest-lived of the five
groups, holding only three meetings. Perhaps its only contri-
bution of note was initiating what would later be called Neigh-
borhood Area Meetings, although the group itselffell apart before
the meetings even started, the victim of misunderstanding be-
tween the CCHD and the council.
Because a consultant for the CCHD sat on the task force, the
CCHD had assumed that the task force represented a joint effort
with the council. This quickly proved to be an erroneous as-
sumption. On July 9, the CCHD told the press that "a series of
meetings at which Centralia and Byrnesville citizens can learn
about and discuss the options ... for dealing with the 21-year-
old mine fire" were being planned. 21 The next day, the council
corrected the CCHD by calling the press to announce that "Bor-
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ough Council, not Centralia Committee For Human Develop-
ment, will sponsor the meet-and-discuss sessions. "22
Contrasting the successful target workshops that had been
sponsored by the CCHO with the acrimonious gatherings spon-
sored by the council, many residents called council members to
urge that the CCHO be given the lead role in organizing the
Neighborhood Area Meetings. Rather than compete with the
CCHD for the trust of the community, the council cancelled
the "meet-and-discuss session." On July 15, a few days after the
federal government released its report on the fire, the Borough
Council held a public meeting that attracted fewer than forty
people, who spent most of the time questioning the council's
decision to cancel the neighborhood gatherings. Afollow-up gath-
ering on July 19 attracted even fewer people and prompted one
concerned state legislator to chastise the group. "I really wish,"
he said loudly, "you would get together and decide on the most
feasible option and spend less time quibbling and nitpicking."
Given the council's poor track record at organizing and con-
ducting public meetings, the CCHO announced on July 22 that
it would sponsor the "Neighborhood Area Meetings."
Thus, in a matter of only a few days, a new group emerged
and dissolved; meetings were planned, announced, canceled,
and rescheduled; and the meetings that in fact took place did
little more than add to the tarnish on the image of Borough
Council.
A few days after the CCHO pledged to take over the local
sessions, Borough Council made a last-ditch effort to take control
by announcing a plan that it had drawn up for assisting residents
in making their individual decisions to stay in Centralia or re-
locate. Rather than making a community decision and forcing
government to be accountable to the collective, the council ad-
dressed the community as a group of individual interests, ex-
pressing the radical subjectivity typical of this embattled
community: "Every homeowner in the borough of Cen-
tralia ... is [to be] approached by a government official and
asked whether or not they would like to relocate or remain in
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our community. . If any person feels he or she needs more
information to make their final decision they should feel free to
contact any member of ... Council."23
The president of the council expressed a profound pessimism
that his community could reach any kind of consensus regarding
its collective destiny: "The position we took is really giving every-
one the chance to communicate one to one what they would like
to have done.... What it leaves as a solution to the fire is that
it gives each individual a choice as to what they would like to
have done."
As it turned out, the council's attempt to satisfy everyone
actually won favor with no one. A hot-side resident questioned
the wisdom of the council's approach: "You've gone ahead and
chosen and took a position without first hearing from everyone
in the community." Others pointed out that once again Borough
Council has failed at leadership in moving toward a collective
decision, choosing only to poll individuals again and record their
opinions. The council's decision, in effect, was not to decide.
In the meantime, the CCHD was organizing the Neighbor-
hood Area Meetings, five gatherings held simultaneously at vari-
ous neighborhood locations throughout the borough. The
meetings were an offshoot of a sociological survey of the com-
munity that showed Centralians to be strongly attached to their
neighborhoods-in fact, more strongly attached to their neigh-
borhoods than to their community. The structure of the sessions
was modeled on the successful meetings that the CCHD had
conducted in the past. The objective was to "give the citizenry
access to a convenient and nonthreatening context within which
they can express their opinions and listen to the opinions of their
neighbors. "
More than two hundred residents attended the five sessions,
held on the evening of July 26. Citizens who were absent were
asked for their opinions in a door-to-door survey conducted the
following day. More than three hundred residents participated
in the CCHD's efforts to give voice to citizens' preferences re-
garding the future of their town. Seventy-three percent of those
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attending the meeting or responding to the survey expressed the
desire to relocate. In a survey of Centralia businesses done con-
currently with the Neighborhood Area Meetings, 90 percent of
the eighteen proprietors in town favored relocation. When a state
legislator from the area learned the survey results, he made
reference to euthanasia. "I guess," he mused, "they pulled the
plug on that community."
The consensus of a majority of residents in favor of leaving
town was, of course, the ultimate irony in the Centralia story.
Solidarity was reached on the one solution that assured the death
of the town: a majority of residents wanted out. This hard-won
consensus expressed itself in the formation of yet another group,
the Centralia Homeowners Association, which would lobby for
the rights of individual Centralians amidst the bureaucratic en-
tanglements of a federally sponsored relocation program. It
would be this group, which facilitated the death of the town, that
would attract more members than any previous group in the
tumultuous history of this northern Appalachian village.
8. "This Town Is Dead"
Although the Neighborhood Area Meetings on July 26 produced
a consensus on the future of Centralians, the mayor and the
Borough Council refused on the next evening to recognize the
citizens' plebiscite favoring relocation. The refusal was based not
on the results of the meetings, but on who had sponsored them.
As one councilman made very clear, "We are the elected officials
responsible for this town, not anybody else."
The mayor opened the public meeting on July 27 by calling
the neighborhood meetings "nonsense." "What do we need this
for?" he yelled. Some people in the audience shouted back at
the mayor, the noise level rose, and at one point two citizens
started to climb over the table at which the council was seated,
apparently ready for a fist fight. Someone from the audience
yelled, "Enough! End this meeting!" In a rare moment of agree-
ment, another responded, "Yeah, I'm going home-this town is
dead." Nothing more was said, and people started drifting out
of the building.
At this point, state agencies took a hand in prodding the Bor-
ough Council to act responsibly. Officials from the Department
of Environmental Resources and the Department of Community
Affairs, pressured the council to conduct a referendum on the
question of relocation. Of the 545 votes cast in Centralia on
August 11, 345 favored. relocation, while two hundred voters
wanted to remain in Centralia.
In the opinion of the Office of Surface Mining, the almost two-
to-one vote in favor of relocation was "probably a wise option,"
since "like it or not, all Centralians would probably have to be
relocated." There is evidence to suggest that the federal and
state governments were sufficiently impressed by the engineer-
ing report on the magnitude of the Centralia mine fire to have
concluded on their own that the town must go. Several days
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before the August 11 referendum, the Pennsylvania Department
of Health whose director had only months earlier denied that
any danger existed in Centralia, distributed throughout town a
two-page report, "Health Related Problems Associated with
Trenching and Excavating." The report paints a vivid picture.
Noting that dynamite would be used regularly to blast through
the rock, the report warned that "Extremely high levels of noise,
particularly over a prolonged period of time, can damage the
nerves of the ear causing temporary and/or permanent loss of
hearing." On the question of particulate matter, the Health De-
partment advised: "The excessive dust levels from digging and
blasting could irritate the throats and lungs of all residents.
Sneezing, coughing, and excessive nasal and throat mucous could
result. "
The report continued by describing the dangers ofsubsidences
and the poisonous gases released into the air when burning coal
was brought to the surface. The final warning of the two-page
report is, from our perspective, most indicative of how distant
health officials were from the critical issues facing Centralians:
"Paramount among the other factors is a concern for the impact
of stress on the residents.... Some potentially stressful events
in Centralia [as a result of trenching or excavation] may be ...
noise, questions of safety . . . and developing health prob-
lems. "1
We can assume from this passage that the Department of
Health did not notice the extreme social disharmony in Centralia,
which was causing stress even greater than expected from trench-
ing. The health department specialized in the use ofsophisticated
instrumentation to identify and measure the indicators of disease
and injury caused by natural or technological agents, not the
signs of a breakdown in the social order.
The health department's report was only of consequence if a
decision was made to relocate the town, and by all accounts, the
government had made such a decision well in advance of the
August 11 referendum. Centralians had no choice in the matter,
as was made blatantly clear during the first week in August, when
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the neighboring village of Byrnesville held its own informal ref-
erendum. At a public meeting that included officials from the
OSM and the DER, a spokesman for Byrnesville stood up and
announced that the residents had voted to remain in their homes
and asked that the government implement a plan to stop the
fire. The village had acted as it had been instructed by the state
government, promptly and decisively. Byrnesville's decision,
however, was obviously not what the government wanted to hear.
A DER official took the floor following Byrnesville's announce-
ment and said forcefully, "You made the wrong decision. Go
back and think about it."
The August 11 referendum in Centralia was not the first chance
for residents to express their views about relocation. Between
1981 and 1983, in no fewer than five polls sponsored by various
organizations, Centralians consistently favored relocation by
about a two-to-one margin. Before the summer of 1983, the state
and federal governments' main response had been that the mar-
gin was not large enough to truly show what Centralians wanted.
What apparently changed the government's position was the GAl
engineering report, after which the two-to-one margin in the
August referendum was reinterpreted as a clear majority favoring
relocation, hence a mandate for the government to act.
And act the government did, with a swiftness all the more
staggering in light of the two previous decades of indecisiveness
and inconsistency. By the end of August, a little over a month
after the release of the GAl report, DER and Columbia County
Redevelopment Authority personnel were doing their own sur-
vey of Centralia residents to estimate costs of relocation. They
were also researching the housing market within a twenty-mile
radius of the borough. 2
Lawmakers and agency officials were quick to embrace the
relocation option. In mid-September, the two u.S. senators from
Pennsylvania jointly wrote to Governor Thornburgh, urging that
a relocation plan like the one at Love Canal be adopted. 3 Shortly
thereafter, Interior Secretary Watt and Governor Thornburgh
held a meeting after which Thornburgh reported: "The Secretary
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assured us that if we could justify expenditures, the funds would
be forthcoming." Watt and Thornburgh would jointly chair an
interagency task force to determine the cost of a government
buyout. 4
Less than two weeks later, proposed federal legislation for a
$42-million appropriation to buy Centralia properties was ap-
proved by the House Appropriations Committee and sent on to
the full House. The government would pay the fair market value
of the property of owners who elected to sell, with no regard for
the existence of the mine fire. The money would come from the
OSM's Abandoned Mine Reclamation Fund, financed by active
coal companies. Seventy-five percent would come from the In-
terior Department's share of the fund and the remainder from
Pennsylvania's allotment. 5
In early October, the appropriations bill came before the full
House. A last-minute roadblock was removed by deleting money
for a project unrelated to Centralia, to be considered separately
at a later time. Ironically, from the perspective of technological
hazards, the unrelated project was the Clinch River breeder
reactor.
The $42 million appropriation made it through the House and
Senate by November 18, only fourteen weeks after the date on
which the government-sponsored engineering study was made
public.
Although the government had finally acted to cope with po-
tential risks to health and safety, no money was committed to do
anything about the fire itself. The government's engineering
study had recommended containing the fire by trenching. If this
option were pursued, Centralians were told, blasting, dust,
noise, and the like would make life in the borough intolerable.
Many decided to relocate on the assumption that trenching would
become a reality. But no commitment had been made.
This fact was not lost on some Centralians at the time. While
supporting the $42-million buyout plan, the president of the
newly-formed Centralia Homeowners' Association emphasized
that the question of containment had not been answered: "We
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want the government to go to the heart of the problem and go
after the fire."6 Centralia's congressman expressed concern over
a letter from the Federal Emergency Management Agency stat-
ing that the Interior Department would support either relocation
or suppression of the fire, but not both. The concern about stop-
ping the fire appears to have been well-founded: at this writing,
there is no further government commitment to any method of
containing or extinguishing the fire.
In any case, by acting decisively on relocation, the government
made way for what would become the most successful grassroots
organization in the history of Centralia: the Centralia Home-
owners' Association.
The CCHD, though unable to redefine the terms of the con-
flict and create communal bonds, had convinced many in town
that orderly meetings, at least, were possible. After the Neigh-
borhood Area Meetings in July of 1983, the CCHD, at the re-
quest of several residents, agreed to help organize a group to
represent individual homeowners in negotiating with the gov-
ernment for relocation subsides, as well as those residents who
chose to stay in town. The first meeting, on August 16, attracted
more than one hundred homeowners, most of whom favored
relocation.
In the months to come, the Centralia Homeowners' Associa-
tion would attract a membership of over three hundred, making
it the largest grasroots group in the history of the borough. Adopt-
ing the CCHD's model for public meetings, the Homeowners'
became a well-organized group representing the needs of a ma-
jority of Centralians. But, the Homeowners' was not intended
to fill the needs of the community of Centralia for close bonds
of identification, but to serve the pecuniary interests of indi-
viduals. Ironically, the reason for joining the group was the rec-
ognition that joint action was the most efficient means of meeting
individual needs. "I'm a member of Homeowners'," revealed
one man, "because the government will take me to the cleaners
if I let them. I figure for $5 bucks a year [the membership fee],
I'll join if it will help me get the most [money for my home]."
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Another man was more blunt: "Look, the government's out to
screw me; I'll join anybody who helps me screw them instead."
As the following excerpt from its articles of incorporations
suggests, the Homeowners' Association was the organized
expression of a town where a majority opinion was possible only
when the needs of the individual were paramount: "We the
members ofthe Centralia Homeowners' Association join together
in order to promote the future welfare of every homeowner and
tenant in Centralia and to maximize any assistance forthcoming
from state and federal governmental agencies concerning the
homeowners and tenants of Centralia and the mine fire that
threatens their homes."
Shortly after the Homeowners' organized, a seventh grassroots
group emerged, like the final expression of a town unable to heal
itself. Based on the long-standing model ofblame attribution and
confrontation, the Citizens to Save the Borough of Centralia
waged a bitter campaign against those of their neighbors who
had decided to relocate.
Organized by five or six families who would not accept the
evidence that the entire borough was now at risk, the Citizens
to Save the Borough grew to more than two dozen families, many
of them elderly, who wanted to remain in town and who accused
their neighbors of trying to "soak the government for a new
house." The group appealed to a vision ofCentralia that identified
people with their houses, under a cultural idea of "homes":
"Speak out and defend your homes-your little town of Centralia
is in danger. When one speaks of ,home' they speak of something
they love, even with all its imperfections and are reluctant to
leave it without serious reasons. Some homes are identified with
certain families, generation after generation, and are a source of
pride and love to them. You do not destroy your home because
it needs to be repaired and neither should Centralia be sacrificed
because it has imperfections. . . . Do not be afraid, stand up and
be counted for Centralia."7
Although the group spoke of the values of communality, the
"SOBs" (Save Our Borough), as they were jokingly referred to
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by some Homeowners' Association members, held their meet-
ings in secret, closed to anyone who was not a member. The
group's strategy, by now normative for Centralia, relied on blame
attribution, disrupting public meetings, and accusing neighbors
of "selling out" and abandoning the town.
But the group was at worst a minor annoyance for the majority
of residents, who had decided to accept the government's offer
to relocate. The Citizens to Save the Borough is significant, not
in its achievements, but in underscoring the point that the real
disaster in Centralia was above ground, not below it. Structurally
similar to the groups that preceded it, the Citizens pursued the
goal ofcommunal solidarity by way ofdivisive action. The Home-
owners' Association, by contrast, pursued the self-interest ofeach
member by way of cooperative action. It appears that at this
juncture in the town's history, personal pecuniary interest was
the only motivation for engaging in the type of communal action
that the CC, the Unity Committee, and other groups in town
had sought.
In their rear guard action, the Citizens confirmed the extreme
subjectivity of Centralians, which precluded any consensus on
the "reality" of the mine fire in terms of their health and safety.
The inherent ambiguity of the mine fire, distorted by the media
and treated in a contradictory fashion by the government, gave
rise to several competing interpretations of the same world, each
of them supported by both sensory and official intelligence.
It is now the winter of 1987. There are about thirty families
still living in Centralia. With the exception of a few households,
the entire village of Byrnesville has been relocated. Over the
course of the past four years, families have been relocating a few
at a time and their houses have been razed. Many homes are
boarded up, waiting to be torn down. These have been relatively
peaceful years in Centralia. With the strength that comes when
a final decision is made, families have quietly pursued their vari-
ous options for relocating, some finding just what they need in
the real estate listings, others building new homes, still others
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looking for older houses to fix up. Several families have moved
to a new development, called informally "New Centralia," which
lies only a few miles from their former town. With few exceptions,
the families have moved to better houses; many now live in
houses two to three times the size of their Centralia residences.
The Homeowners' Association was successful in getting a senior
citizens' residence built in a nearby town to accommodate the
elderly in Centralia who chose not to buy another home.
Not surprisingly, a relocated family seldom, if ever, returns
to Centralia, relieved that the days of anger and danger are over.
Most, if not all, former Centralians interpret relocation as a posi-
tive life change. Some see it in terms ofphysical safety and better
health, others in terms of relief from the stress of social conflict.
For all, this is an opportunity to begin anew, without the threat
of an underground ecological menace or an above-ground social
disaster. As one homeowner put it, in response to the claim that
the fire could be contained: "Maybe you're right. I just know
that I got to move. I don't know how many years I have left. I'd
like to ~pend them at peace with myself."
9. Making Sociological
Sense of the Story
A funeral was held in Centralia recently. Black-clad middle-aged
and elderly people entered coal-black limousines, which lined
the curb in front ofone of the few remaining occupied row homes
on Locust Avenue. Burial was in the Odd Fellows' Cemetery on
the hot side of town. Within sight of boarded-up homes and of
steam spewing from the ground and from venting pipes rising
toward the sky, the priest from a neighboring town said the
committal prayers: " ... we commit her body to the ground;
earth to earth, ashes to ashes, dust to dust. The Lord bless her
and keep her, the Lord make his face to shine upon her and be
gracious to her, the Lord lift up his countenance upon her and
give her peace."
The words echo as if intended for Centralia itself. No one in
Centralia died because of the mine fire. But a community died,
and with it much of the spirit of many proud and courageous
people. This is no small loss; some would say hardly less than
life itself. 1
We have emphasized throughout this book that what befell
Centralia was a social as well as an environmental disaster. From
our perspective, it was the way people responded to one another
that constituted the most profound disaster in Centralia. Yet the
social breakdown reflected not the shortcomings of individuals,
but rather the severe demands that a chronic technological di-
saster places on a social system.
There is a wide variance between the way communities re-
spond to natural disasters and the way they respond to techno-
logical disasters. The altruistic community that emerges in the
wake ofa natural calamity contrasts sharply with the social hatred
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that characterized Centralians' response to their long-term, hu-
manly produced disaster. Why does a natural disaster result in
the communal bonding of survivors and a CTD tend toward
debilitating social conflict? In this final section, we will modify
several key concepts in natural disaster research and place them
in a loosely defined theoretical schema to account for the variance
in collective responses to CTDs and natural disasters. Our in-
tention is to place the Centralia study within a broader com-
parative context that can serve as a guide to emergency response
planners and to future researchers on the sociology of long-term
humanly produced disasters.
"Community" can be defined as a structure of institutions
located in space or as a specific type of human association. Our
interest is in the effects of CTDs on primary human associations,
those groups larger than the family, yet less complex and im-
personal than corporations. Our concern is with groups that em-
phasize criteria of common belonging rather than pecuniary or
instrumental criteria, associations that provide a person's most
essential experiences of collective life outside the family. In par-
ticular, we are interested in the belief that the political bound-
aries of a municipality coincide with the symbolic boundaries of
the primary associations, a belief common to small towns and
villages.
A considerable body of research is available on the communal
associations that spontaneously emerge in the aftermath ofa natu-
ral disaster; the almost unselfconscious revitalization of com-
munity in the wake of natural destruction is a well-documented
fact. Our research and that of others to be discussed here indi-
cates that communal groups act very differently in the context
of CTDs; communal bonds disintegrate and are replaced by
emergent groups that compete for control of the crisis. We will
show that this contrasting perspective may be of use to policy
makers and sociologists interested in environmental issues and
in the nature of conflict.
Another reason for focusing on an associational definition of
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community is the relative significance of such communal groups
in the type of human settlements most likely to be the site of
CTDs, namely working- or lower-class rural areas.
Natural disasters are not especially class-biased. While it is
true that disasters most severely affect the lower classes, a tor-
nado is just as likely to strike an upper-middle-class neighborhood
as a lower-class area. Neither cities nor towns nor villages are
spared the devastation of natural cataclysms, which strike human
settlements of all sizes.
In sharp contrast, chronic technological disasters are very
class-specific, being much more likely in areas where the popu-
lation is largely working or lower class. 2 Because it is precisely
those areas that lack extensive, formal economic and political
resources with which to fight CTDs, they must rely mainly on
primary communal associations to see them through. A recent
study by the General Accounting Office found that four hazardous
waste landfills in one state were located in communities where
a majority of the population is black; at all four sites the black
population in the surrounding census areas has a lower mean
income than the mean income for all races combined. 3 Another
study found that the city of Houston, Texas, pursued a policy of
locating solid waste disposal sites in low-income, predominantly
black neighborhoods. 4
CTDs are less likely to occur in cities than in small towns,
and particularly likely to occur in lower- or working-class towns
that have historically depended on big corporations and extra-
local governments, where the centers of power lie far from the
settlement itself. Among the more well-known CTD occurrences
are the dioxin contamination of Times Beach and several other
small towns in Missouri; the asbestos contamination in Globe,
Arizona; the Love Canal neighborhoods of Niagara Falls, New
York; and, of course, Centralia. 5
The severe disruption of a CTD presents more intractable
problems for small towns than it would for large cities. Small
towns cannot mobilize extensive governmental and social service
machinery to respond effectively to a CTD. The smaller the
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locality, the more dependent residents becolne on both extra-
local bureaucracies and their town's informal process and orga-
nizations to meet their collective needs and prompt governlnent
to act on their behalf. In the small town, the front line of attack
on collective crises is mechanical solidarity-the bonds of com-
munal association manifested in friendship groups, voluntary as-
sociations, and kin networks, and the shared belief that the
boundaries of the town are but the physical expression of a com-
mon identity.
When a CTD occurs, the delnands often overwhelm a town's
communal associations. Local groups are called upon to do tasks
for which they have inadequate resources, structures, and ex-
periences. Groups that have related only on personal, informal
terms are called upon to become more detached and efficient to
represent the needs of residents struggling to protect their health
and property. In taking on this chore, local groups are bound to
please few residents. As the Centralia case clearly shows, the
differential impact of the disaster agent causes neighbors to ex-
perience and interpret the same world, "our community," in
very divergent ways. We would expect this situation to create a
substantially heavier burden on primary groups that take re-
sponsibility for organizing the town.
What happens to a community's structure and its culture when
confronted with a crisis? In a literature survey, Anthony Wallace
suggested that in an "extreme situation," socially understood
coping strategies are rendered ineffective, while at the same time
the population experiences a "drastic increase in tensions, to the
point of causing death or major personal and social readjust-
ment."6 Wallace emphasizes the concept of society as a structure
positioned in space and time, a structure that is lost when aver-
sive agents threaten life and property and disorganize the ac-
cepted patterns of crisis management. This idea of the extrelne
environment as a time between points of stability is found else-
where in the literature on disasters. 7
Implicit in Wallace's work, and in that of others, is the ac-
ceptance of the immediate-impact natural disaster as the classic
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aversive agent. 8 But it is reasonable to assume that the type of
extreme environment and the specific manner in which the rou-
tine socio-emotional patterns of a community become unstruc-
tured are closely tied to the type of aversive agent besetting the
society. To help distinguish between the two types of extreme
environments-one natural and short-term, the other techno-
logical and long-term-consider the stages in the conventional
model of natural disasters.
When natural disasters are the cause of extreme environ-
ments, the unstructuring of routines and common coping modes
typically begins with the warning stage, the apprehension that a
calamity may occur. 9 By the threat state, when there are un-
equivocal signs of the approaching disaster force, the extreme
situation is under way. During impact, a maelstrom of flying
debris or raging floods or towering walls of fire rip apart the last
vestiges of "business as usual" in the full force of nature's wrath.
The impact stage is temporally significant because it marks the
most intense point in the disaster sequence, after which there
may be considerable pain and grief but the destruction is over.
During the inventory and rescue stages immediately following
impact, survivors begin to assess their losses and gradually piece
together a picture ofwhat has happened. Survivor groups emerge
spontaneously-small, altruistic communities whose goals in-
clude treating the wounded, extinguishing fires, and freeing trap-
ped victims. With the onset of the remedy stage, the extreme
situation begins to subside as outside relief agencies take control
of the disaster scene and impose a formal structure (not always
with the approval of the survivors) on the inventory and rescue
stages. During the recovery stage, the extreme environment is
replaced with either a reconstitution of the old structure or a
modified pattern of personal and collective life.
Note that in this stage model, the time lapse between the
warning, threat, impact, and inventory and rescue stages may
be very brief-in some cases, only several minutes. The period
most likely to be extended in time is the warning stage. The
eruption of Washington State's Mount St. Helen's volcano in
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1980, for example, had been anticipated for several weeks. The
time lapse between the threat stage and the inventory-rescue,
however, was less than an hour. The extreme environment cre-
ated by natural disasters is typically short-lived, a horrendous
moment in time bounded by two periods of stability-one his-
torical, the other emergent. The customary sequence of stages
in a natural disaster moves a community from order, to chaos,
to the reconstitution of order. At that point, the disaster enters
the collective memory, recalled only on those occasions deemed
appropriate for remembering a shared experience of horror.
The type of extreme environment created by a chronic tech-
nological disaster differs considerably from this description. The
Centralia study and the work on Love Canal speak ofa protracted,
seemingly endless period of time between the discovery of the
aversive agent and the realization that its worst consequences
are past. There is no brief moment of terror, to be followed by
an easily defined sequence of inventory, rescue, remedy, and
recovery. Indeed, for many Centralians and residents of Love
Canal, relief from fear came only when they were permanently
removed from their homes and towns, a process that took several
years.
CTDs tend to trap at least some of the population in the
warning and threat stages of the model, freezing them in ex-
tended periods of apprehension and dread. A mine fire that
moves slowly through accessible veins, or toxic chemicals' that
leach invisibly through underground swales, may at times give
signals that danger is near, but the signals are frequently vague
and open to dispute. Long-term exposure to warning and threat,
particularly when distributed unevenly through the population,
places severe demands on the coping resources of a settlement.
Occasionally, individuals or families feel the impact of the
agent, in the form of subsidence, a chronic cough, or lassitude.
But since the experience rarely extends beyond the person or
the family, it is not likely to become the occasion for communal
action. Indeed, the source of the threat-the reason that a family
is always tired or a child or grandparent has upper respiratory
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trouble-is itself frequently vague to the point of inviting mul-
tiple interpretations. In other words, the impact of the CTD, to
borrow a distinction from C. W. Mills, is more likely to remain
a "trouble," a personal probleln, than to become an "issue," a
socially recognized occasion for communal response. 10
Trapped by a CTD in the first two stages of the disaster cycle,
a population is prevented from progressing to the point of reas-
sembling itself into a complementary distribution of under-
standings and tasks. Any attempt at what we might call remedy
and recovery are not humanistic efforts directed toward the af-
fected population but technical activities aimed at disposing of
the aversive agent. More likely than not, as we witnessed at
Times Beach, Centralia, and Love Canal, remedial and recovery
technology, however confounded by political game playing, will
be unable to stop the advance of the disaster agent. Residents
are rescued only by relocation, which does not allow the settle-
ment to reestablish itself. The web of social positions woven by
common understandings is ripped apart before there is an end
to the severe social and ecological disruption.
The more the stages of warning and threat become institu-
tionalized-that is, the more these normally temporary stages
take on the character of permanence-the greater will be the
toll on affected populations. A CTD does not create a moment
between points of stability; rather, it imposes a fixed, seemingly
permanent period ofinstability, a time within which conventional
patterns of behavior no longer seem to work. Extended period
of ambiguous warning and threat cues destabilize a human set-
tlement by rearranging the traditional pattern of social relation-
ships.
The ways in which this process differs from that of immediate-
iInpact natural disasters are examined in Wallace's concept of
"mazeway disintegration." Wallace developed this concept to
link the study of disaster to the role of culture in personal and
collective life. The "maze" he defines is the objective world
rendered into subjective landmarks (my photo albums, my
spouse, my house, my street, my friends, the policeman I see
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every day at the busy intersection, and so on). The moral and
rational codes for moving through these landmarks are called the
"way." Wallace suggests that we "fall in love with [our] maze[s]
and our way[s] of running [them] because they are associated
with every satisfaction [we] derive from life."l1 When our maze-
way is destroyed, we act "as if a beloved object were dead. "12
The extreme environment created by immediate-impact di-
sasters destroys both a portion of the object-world (the maze)
and the conventions and rules for using that world (the way).
For a relatively brief time, survivors are thrown into a milieu
where structured positions do not exist; the terror experienced
is that of chaos. Survivors sense an immediate, undeniable im-
perative to begin work on reconstituting their culture if they are
to live beyond this horrifying moment. The thread of life has
become too tenuous for survivors to remain passive. This im-
perative to survive the moment is linked to the visible, tangible
destruction of the maze, which creates a wide range of oppor-
tunities for participation in collective tasks. The tasks that sur-
vivors engage in are helping, altruistic endeavors that require
people to work side by side, in unison, to save lives and property.
Such tasks encourage the formation of communal associations,
which function to reassert the power of the group over nature
by reconstittiting routines that reinvest daily life with a sense of
permanence and predictability. If an aversive agent instead in-
hibits a population from progressing past the warning and threat
stage, there are no opportunities for spontaneous displays of
solidarity; there is no occasion for rescue but plenty of time for
anxiety and social discord.
In a CTD, it is not the maze but the way that undergoes the
most devastation. In many cases, the maze itself remains intact;
it is the way of getting through the maze that is dismantled.
Ambiguity arises when government agents use polysyllabic tech-
nical expressions to "explain" a situation to an audience; when
newspapers and magazines focus on the worst-case scenarios; or
when friends and neighbors exhibit states of anxiety and dread,
which spread in a contagion-like fashion from person to person.
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Compounding the equivocal and volatile warning and threat
stages of CTDs is their unconventional status in the meaning
system of most cultures. Few people relish the experience of a
natural disaster, but most people are at least able to invoke a
shared meaning system to make sense out ofwhat has happened.
CTDs, however, are too new a phenomenon to have become
routinized in popular culture. People experience CTDs' ex-
tended periods of warnings and threats without the benefit of a
coherent meaning to render the trauma comprehensible. "Just
what are we facing here?" "Where is it coming from?" "Is it really
dangerous?" "Who is responsible for starting it and abating it?"
"What should I do?" "How should I behave toward this issue?"
Myriad questions go unanswered by culture when one's "way"
has been damaged by a long-term technological crisis.
On the basis of our Centralia study and the work done on
Love Canal, we suggest that the more indeterminate the warning
and threat stages of an extreme environment and the more they
are extended in time, the more residents will turn to symbolic
activity to ascertain the degree of danger they are facing. The
extended duration of CTDs, combined with the high degree of
ambiguity created by lack of sensory confirmation and frequently
by contradictory technical assessments, ensure that people will
attach meaning to any number of cues in an attempt to make
sense out of their experiences with the aversive agent. In the
symbolic interpretation of warning and threat signals, people
seek out others whose interpretations are similar to their own,
and such affiliative behaviors in turn are likely to produce groups
that become, over time, institutionalized. At this point, any new
warning or threat-however ambiguous-will be interpreted by
members according to the shared appraisal of the group. In such
circumstances, groups engage not in consensual activities, but
conflict; they emphasize not unity, but divisions; and the result
is not the rebuilding of a sense of community, but its demise.
In natural disasters, it is not warnings and threats but recovery
needs that give rise to emergent groups; they engage in the
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rehabilitative response that follows the worst-point experience
of the disaster cycle. In the context of CTDs, however, groups
emerge and gain momentum during the protracted stages of
warning and threat, before there is any visible destruction to
respond to. These groups are not formed with the intent ofsaving
others, mourning the loss of the mazeway, and beginning the
process of rebuilding. Rather, they are motivated by apprehen-
sion, worry, fear, and anxiety, in the emotionally charged context
of warning and threat.
Freud observed a critical and common characteristic of the
reconstitution of order following a natural disaster-the thera-
peutic community: "One of the gratifying and exalting impres-
sions which mankind can offer is when in the face ofan elemental
crisis, it forgets the discordancies of its civilization and all its
internal difficulties and animosities, and recalls the great common
task of preserving itself against the superior power of nature. "13
A unique feature of this rehabilitative response is the unre-
flecting commitment that victims express to one another as mem-
bers of a group that survived catastrophe, who participated in
the same dramatic moment in history, which outsiders cannot
be assumed to appreciate fully. Indeed, spontaneous collective
action in the immediate aftermath of a natural disaster generally
accounts for most of the significant rescue work required. 14 The
spontaneity of such communal action is captured in Raphael's
description of survivor response to calamity: "Rescue of others
seems almost automatic, a basic human response, perhaps
evolved for the survival of the group. "15 It is not necessary,
however, to invoke evolutionary images to understand this un-
reflecting communality.
In the unselfconscious enactment of a therapeutic community
in the aftermath of a natural disaster, communal associations play
the key role in reconstituting the basis for a contractual society.
Quarantelli and Dynes suggest that natural disasters are "con-
sensus-type" crises. The extreme environment created by the
natural disaster is a "dramatic event in the life history of the
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community." For the survivors, it is "our disaster. "16 The visible,
undeniable destruction of life and property triggers a therapeutic
response.
At another level, we can postulate the necessity for the emer-
gence of communal solidarity in post-impact situations if we ex-
amine Turner's statement that "organic solidarity cannot replace
mechanical solidarity. Instead, organic solidarity requires, in ad-
dition to the division oflabor, an effective substructure ofmechani-
cal solidarity. "17
Turner is arguing that the existential community, the com-
munity of sentiment, is a necessary if not sufficient condition for
the constitution or reconstitution of a complementary task-
oriented society. The severe disruption of corporate life requires
a period of dramatic communal enactment "to recreate the con-
tinuing assurances upon which organic solidarity depends. "18
Stressing the technical side of the CTD, Baum and colleagues
observed that a "technological disaster is more likely to cause
long-term uncertainty and consequent psychological effects than
are natural disasters. "19 The ambiguity breeds uncertainty, which
undermines the basis upon which a therapeutic community might
be formed. As Lang and Lang argue, "When disaster threatens
over a long period of time, the cohesive forces that hold a group
together are subject to strain."2O Or, as Barton noted in his classic
work, chronic disasters "may gradually drain resources and lower
aspirations so that the whole system moves toward a less satis-
factory equilibrium, or towards collapse as a system. "21
Not only do CTDs inhibit the reconstitution of order through
therapeutic communities; they also work toward the breakdown
of communal structures and sentiments that previously existed.
What is destroyed or impaired is the "way," the common under-
standings, the unstated assumptions, that this neighborhood or
settlement is a community.
Consider the observations on intramural conflict culled from
other studies of long-term, human-caused disasters. For exam-
ple, in their study of Love Canal, Fowlkes and Miller found that:
"For the most part ... families that believe the chemical mi-
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gration was of limited seriousness do not so much marshal a body
of evidence in support of their position as they discredit any and
all claims that migration [was] widespread. They discredit those
claims primarily by categorically discrediting the people who
make them. "22
In Kasperson and Pijawka's research on asbestos contamina-
tion in Globe, Arizona, they found "that the non-victimized com-
munity [developed] sharp resentment against the disaster
victims."23 Cuthbertson and Nigg agree with this finding, arguing
that "conflictive, rather than consensual, adaptation develops
following a technological disaster. "24
It has been pointed out that conflict can facilitate the stable
growth of a society.25 In the latter stages of a natural disaster,
conflict facilitates the restructuring of society by helping to re-
align group interests and sustain the competitive milieu neces-
sary for an organic division of labor. The question in this phase
of the disaster cycle is not whether the settlement should con-
tinue to exist, but how to distribute power and resources in the
reconstitution of the social order. The type of conflict that is
likely to emerge in the remedial and recovery stages of a natural
disaster takes place within a consensual framework supported by
the therapeutic groups that emerge during the inventory and
rescue stages.
In a chronic technological disaster, however, conflict typically
emerges when competing interpretations of warning and threat
cues have become institutionalized in concrete groups; this type
of conflict places the basic consensus of a society in question.
We propose that CTDs create a condition in which a choice must
be made between several competing interpretations of the warn-
ing and threat cues, each demanding to be credentialed as the
correct view of the situation. One group interprets the warning
and threat messages as signals of impending disaster. Another
group interprets the messages as remote risks-a potential prob-
lem but certainly nothing to warrant the destruction of the set-
tlement. One group charges another with pursuing goals inimical
to its members' health and welfare. In turn, the accused group
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blames its accuser of seeking to destroy its members' traditional
way of life by working for relocation. This process of reciprocal
blame attribution escalates into a conflict that may, as in the case
of Centralia, become more debilitating than the hazard agent
itself.
A CTD can be expected to disrupt, or even destroy, the tra-
ditional patterns of interpersonal relationships and shared under-
standings that serve to anchor personal life in a social context.
This form of disruption is more insidious and harder to repair
than the destruction of a town's material culture. It is one thing
to rebuild a house; it is quite another to heal the pain and anger
felt when neighbors become enemies. In the aftermath ofa natu-
ral disaster, the loss of material culture evokes an outpouring of
aid and sympathy from the vertical structure, easing the burden
of rebuilding. There is no such outpouring to ease the loss of
communality in a long-term technological disaster. Indeed, as in
the case of Centralia, legislators and others in authority may
chastise the town for failing to demonstrate the "democracy of
stress" we have come to expect from those experiencing crises. 26
Disasters of whatever sort severely inhibit, perhaps destroy,
the capacity of a community to function routinely. If enactments
of emotional and intrinsic attachments are prerequisites to the
reconstitution ofan exchange-based community life, any dynamic
that impedes them will seriously hamper a town in responding
to its tragedy. When a crisis prevents a town from engaging in
the dramaturgy of communal solidarity, concerted, instrumental
action to rid the community of the aversive agent will be all but
impossible. A succession of failed attempts to construct com-
munal associations may leave citizens embittered and demoral-
ized. In the end, losses attributable to the breakdown in the
social order may outweigh the losses attending the environmental
hazard itself.
Natural disasters have become less terrifying. This is not to
say that the number of natural disasters has decreased in post-
industrial societies; the frequency of hurricanes and tornadoes
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now is roughly the same as one hundred years ago. What has
changed is our ability to adapt to these natural phenomena. Early
warning detection technology and pre- and post-disaster emer-
gency response policies have greatly reduced the number of
fatalities and the amount of property damage, while increasing
the chances for successful recovery, even revitalization. 27 It is
doubtful that we will ever be capable of preventing natural di-
sasters, but we are gaining the upper hand in reducing their
destructive effects.
Ironically, just as we are learning to control the devastating
effects of natural disasters, human-made disasters of extended
duration hit us more frequently. It was recently pointed out that
"the major burden of hazard management in developed societies
has shifted from risks associated with natural processes to those
arising from technological development and application. "28 Es-
timates of the late 1970s predicted that technological disasters
would continue to multiply, taking their toll in financial, social,
and human devastation. 29 In the ten years since those forecasts,
we have witnessed an almost relentless chain of chronic tech-
nological disasters, and there is little reason to believe that we
have seen the worst.
As illustrated in this book and in the studies of other CTDs,
governments and social service agencies must respond to this
new type of disaster without the benefit of coherent and inte-
grated local, state, or federal policies. 30 Legislators and social
service personnel, in turn, find little help from the social and
behavioral sciences in constructing technological hazard and di-
saster management policies that are consistent with the com-
munity response to this new genre of calamity. "We know very
little," Slovic has argued, "about the social psychological factors
that determine public response to technological risk. "31 Kasper-
son and Pijawka agree, noting that "[our] knowledge of long-term
impacts of technological disasters is scant. "32 Pointing out the
gaps in social and behavioral research on chronic technological
disasters, Kliman and colleagues argued: "Long-term, invisible
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disasters . . . will become even more prevalent, increasing the
need for psychological and sociological understanding of the
consequences. "33
The need to come to grips with the social and psychological
consequences of CTDs is made even more urgent by the little
we do know about them. As a community, Centralia is not an
isolated case of therapeutic intervention being rendered impo-
tent by the ravages of a CTD. Of a similar community, Kliman
and colleagues have written: "Our frustrating and saddening ex-
perience in consulting with the United Way agencies at Love
Canal was that the murkiness and pessimism of the situation
resulted in divisions among victims.... Effective community
organization was nearly impossible in an atmosphere of hope-
lessness and misplaced conflict. "34
In the closing pages of this book, we have offered a loosely
organized theory to account for the devastation of chronic tech-
nological disasters in terms of community conflict and disorga-
nization, which may, as in the case of Centralia, generate as
much stress as the disaster agent itself. Our purpose was to
outline and discuss a perspective that could guide researchers,
policymakers, and social service personnel in exploring or dealing
with CTDs. For our colleagues, we hope that this perspective
will help generate specific hypotheses that can be tested against
empirical reality. For policy implementers, we hope that a sen-
sitivity to the social dynamics emergent during a CTD will help
generate a rational, humane, and timely response to the problems
that arise in such a calamity. For policymakers, we hope that a
better understanding of the effects of CTDs will inspire policies
that aid the victims and minimize the hazards of the technologies
that cause CTDs in the first place.
For the victims of future CTDs, we hope that our research
helps to avoid or ameliorate the destruction of the social bond,




"We need to know whom we help and whom we injure and damage,
intentionally and unintentionally, so that we can figure out what we
should be doing and not doing in behalf of a better society, however
"better" may be defined."1
It was a chilly fall day in 1981 when we took our first trip to
Centralia. A slow rain was falling as we drove to the south end
of town and parked the car, and a gaseous stream from the venting
pipes wafted over the hill just behind a row of homes. We ap-
proached a woman sweeping wet leaves from her sidewalk; she
was sweeping the leaves more slowly than they were falling. It
hardly seemed worth the effort. We introduced ourselves and
commented that it appeared she was fighting a losing battle with
the leaves. She smiled in agreement and explained that with
fewer and fewer neighbors stopping by to visit her, she had little
to do but sweep. It was a rather sad encounter, of a nature that
would be repeated time and again. This was our first clue that
something was happening in Centralia that had not been reported
in the media, something that appeared to be inconsistent with
research on disasters and the altruistic community.
Before we first saw Centralia, we had made the moral judg-
ment that environmental disasters are "bad." People should not
be exposed to the danger and misery of toxic waste contamination
or underground mine fires. Little did we know at the time that
the most devastating loss was the breakdown of ties to neighbor,
friend, and family. Nor did we know that our research would
become part of the problem itself, as well as of efforts to solve
Centralia's crisis. To resolve the moral dilemma we faced in
Centralia, we adopted a participatory research strategy.
Our first hurdle after committing ourselves to the study was
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to agree upon the unit of analysis. Would we study the local
government's response to the problem, focusing on the political
aspects of the crisis? Would we study family adjustment or mal-
adjustment to the threat of the fire? We discussed several op-
tions, but the only one that made any real sense to us was to
focus on the community. "Theories about disasters," Torry re-
minded us, "are inherently theories about communities, that is,
community continuity and change."2
In the summer of 1982, we conducted a community survey of
the entire adult population of Centralia. Questionnaires were
returned by 368 adults, or 56.9 percent of the adult population.
The survey instrument was designed to reveal opinions about
the quality of life in town, the threat of the fire, and the response
of state and federal agencies to the fire, as well as the response
of local groups. The survey gave us the preliminary data we
needed to launch a fieldwork project.
In planning a strategy to investigate the impact of the mine
fire on the town's social fabric, we concluded that long-term,
firsthand involvement with the problem was essential. Kroll-
Smith's prior experience with fieldwork made him the logical
candidate to move into town and map the complex beliefs, re-
lationships, and coping strategies that evolved over the next sev-
eral months as Centralians sought to make sense out of their
predicament. On March 7, 1983, Kroll-Smith moved into a house
on the south end of town, less than a hundred yards from where
a fire-related cave-in two years previously had almost swallowed
a twelve-year-old boy. The two-story house was attached to a
row ofhomes that had been built by a mining company fifty years
earlier. In that house, Kroll-Smith lived and worked for eight
months. A gas monitor in the basement assured at least that an
alarm would signal the presence of dangerous gases. In the end,
the only serious threat from gas was seepage from an improperly
sealed natural gas stove. 3
Even before the fieldwork phase began, we realized that our
techniques of data gathering and the nature of some of the in-
formation we sought would be perceived by diverse groups
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within the community as having immediate relevance for them
in reacting to the problem. If we tried to explain to any group
that we could not release our findings to them, but that eventually
we would publish insights into the roots of their misery, we risked
being excluded from group activities. Entrance into Centralia
and its trust depended on cooperating with these struggling
groups. In short, we knew that as we were interpreting Cen-
tralians, they would be interpreting us and our data, ensuring a
place for sociology in their struggle to reach a consensus on the
destiny of their town. Gouldner was probably thinking of col-
lective turmoil when he observed, "knowing and changing are
distinguishable but not separate processes."4
Our expectations that factions in town would solicit our per-
ceptions of their situation forced us to deal with a complex moral
and methodological quandary. The interests of science and social
action are frequently argued to be in competition. To abandon
one's scientific detachment while working with a collective in
crisis is to place the scientific value of the research at risk. Yet
one maintains the scientific posture at the risk of lending tacit
support to the continuance of a "bad" situation. In considering
Centralia's trauma and our simultaneous responsibilities to the
community and to science, the distinction between social science
and advocacy appeared to us particularly forced and artificial.
It was apparent to us that our involvement with Centralia was
itself a topic for inquiry, and we needed to strengthen our ca-
pacity to reflect critically on that involvement. The questions we
faced were two: How were we to reinforce our interpretation of
ourselves interpreting Centralia? By what moral guideline would
we release information to the community?
The first question was comparatively easy to answer. Couch
assumed the role of the silent partner, concerned but not in-
volved with the minutiae of daily life in Centralia. His role in
the community was limited to organizing the survey, examining
government and historical materials, attending a limited number
ofcommunity events, and reflecting on the influence our research
was having on the flow of events. Couch's position of limited
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liability proved indispensable in achieving that measure of de-
tachment necessary to interpret critically our roles in the Cen-
tralia drama.
The question about what ethical standard to follow in releasing
information to the community proved more difficult to answer.
We agreed after much discussion that data would be released
only when we both concurred that it would further the efforts
of residents to achieve a common interpretation of their predica-
ment and to heal the divisions within the community.
In adopting this moral guideline for the release of information,
we expected some groups to perceive us as being nonsupportive
oftheir immediate goals, strategies, or tactics. In Centralia, being
perceived as nonsupportive was tantamount to being an enemy.
For example, we were denied access to the inner circles of two
groups because we had withheld from them some portions of our
data. However, we recognized that all groups in Centralia held
in common the objective ofcommunity unity, albeit on their own
terms. In the case, then, of those groups we could not support,
we decided to represent their needs to those groups with whom
we established a working relationship. In short, we took the
stated objective of all the groups-to rally the town around a
common understanding of its crisis and its destiny-as a moral
goal worthy of our support.
Our experiences in Centralia convinced us that to research a
community in crisis carries with it a moral obligation to further
the developmental needs of the community. It is also our belief
that a commitment to enhance the problem-solving skills of a
community need not conflict with the commitment that sociolo-
gists make to their colleagues and students. When we study a
group or community, particularly one in profound crisis, we rep-
resent both researchers and moral agents. As moral agents, we
become part of the problem and the solution-and part of our
own data.
For those sociologists who share our ethical position, and who
seek to do research in communities while simultaneously working
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toward the betterment of those communities, we offer the fol-
lowing tentative guidelines:
(1) Suggest options but do not choose for the community.
Support those of its choices that promise to heal and not divide.
(2) Do not expect to establish rapport with all competing
groups. Respond empathetically to expressions of hostility and
anger on the part of those groups whose strategies you cannot
support.
(3) If feasible, when group tactics preclude your support, be
prepared to represent the group's needs to those with whom you
are working more closely.
(4) In responding to requests for information and guidance
you cannot provide, be forthcoming in admitting your limitations.
But, do not underestimate the insights sociology can provide.
(5) Ifyou are fortunate enough to have a collaborator, carefully
consider the division of labor in light of the goals of the research
and the needs of the community.
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